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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE
By
IKUHO KOCHI
May 2007
Committee Chair: Dr. Laura O. Taylor
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation addresses two important issues in the literature estimating the
Value of a Statistical Life. The first issue is the potential endogeneity bias in crosssection hedonic wage models. The second issue is the transferability of the VSL between
different policy contexts.
To address the first issue, we estimate cross-section and panel hedonic wage
models to identify the bias due to the time-invariant worker heterogeneity. We also
consider potential endogeneity bias due to measurement error associated with risk
variable, time-variant worker heterogeneity and simultaneity between wage and risk in
panel models. We obtain labor market data from the 1996 Survey of Income and
Program Participation panel, and occupational fatal risk data from Scotton (2000). We
find that the cross-section hedonic wage model is significantly biased upward due to
unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity, but not from time-variant worker
heterogeneity or simultaneity between wage and risk. Our results are sensitive to the
inclusion of industry variables, but not sensitive to the sample of workers used in
estimation.

xv

xvi

To address the second issue, we examine whether or not workers and firms
differentiate heterogeneous risks to determine the risk-wage compensation levels. We
focus on two very different fatal risks in terms of the degree of workers’ control over the
risk and the degree of dread associated with risk: violent assaults and risks related to nonviolent events. We use occupational drivers to mitigate potential unobserved
heterogeneity of job characteristics and measurement error associated with risk variables.
The labor market data comes from the basic CPS, and the occupation-geographic specific
risk rates for each cause of death are created from the non-public Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries. We find that occupational drivers require larger compensation to
accept a marginal increase of violent risk as compared to non-violent risk. This is true
for both fatal and non-fatal risks. Our results are quite robust. This study suggests that
current direct use of VSL obtained from hedonic wage studies in benefit estimation of
various governmental programs should be reconsidered.

xvi
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Chapter I
Introduction

The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is an important component of benefit
estimates for many governmental programs that intend to reduce premature deaths. The
VSL is a society’s aggregated willingness to pay to save one anonymous person’s life
(Fisher, Chestnut, & Violette, 1989). Due to the difficulties of estimating the value of
life directly, the VSL is estimated based on individual behavior as related to risk-dollar
tradeoffs. For example, in a society of 100,000 people, if each individual is willing to
pay $10 to reduce the risk of death from 2 in 100,000 to 1 in 100,000, then the VSL is
calculated as $1 million ($10*100,000). Thus the VSL is the value of reducing the
probability that one anonymous person in a group dies. It is important to understand that
the VSL is not the value of saving a certain person’s life, but the value of saving an
anonymous person’s life. In policy applications, the benefit of a policy to reduce
mortality is computed by multiplying the VSL by the reduction in deaths expected from
the policy.
There are several methods used to estimate the VSL, and one of them is the
hedonic wage method. The hedonic wage method uses labor market to analyze the
individual’s risk taking behavior and estimate the worker’s marginal willingness to
accept a marginal increase in risk. The basic idea behind the hedonic wage model is that
in a competitive market, the worker who faces a higher level of disamenity on the job,
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such as fatal risk, must be compensated with higher wages than the worker who faces a
lower level of disamenity on the job, or ceteris paribus.
Empirically, the hedonic wage model regresses the worker’s occupational risk
level as well as observed worker and job characteristics on wage. The estimated
coefficient for the risk variable represents the additional wage workers require to accept
an additional unit of risk, the wage-risk premium. This risk premium is then aggregated
over the pool of workers at risk to estimate the value that workers collectively place on
reducing the risk that one among them dies, which is equivalent to the VSL.
The literature of hedonic wage model is extensively reviewed in Fisher et al.
(1989), Viscusi (1992) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) as well as analyzed in Mrozek and
Taylor (2002) and Kochi, Hubbell and Kramer (2006). Beginning with early work in the
mid-1970s (Smith, 1974, 1976; Thaler & Rosen, 1976), there have been nearly 50
hedonic wage studies that estimate the VSL, with applications in many countries
including the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and some Asian countries (Kochi et al.,
2006).1
Most hedonic wage studies use cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) models
to estimate the wage-risk premium. The VSL estimates from studies using data in U.S.
workers have a quite wide range from $0.1 million (Dilingham, 1985) to $43.3 million
(Olson, 1981) in 2005 dollars (Kochi et al. 2006). Mrozek and Taylor (2002) conduct a
meta analysis of the VSL literature and conclude that the main source of variation in the
past VSL estimates comes from differences in the quality of occupational risk data and

1

This is the number of hedonic wage studies published until 2002. There are more recent studies published
such as Black and Kniesner (2003), Viscusi (2004), and Kniesner et al. (2005).
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samples of workers (blue collar or white collar workers or mix of both) and differences in
the hedonic wage model specifications.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.EPA) and some other
government agencies use hedonic wage studies as a primary source of information for
their VSL estimates. For example, according to the 2004 U.S.EPA White Paper
regarding the use of VSL, the U.S.EPA used $4.8 million in 1990 dollars or $7.1 million
in 2005 dollars as the VSL to assess their policy benefits (USEPA, 2004). This value
was first estimated for the 1997 retrospective analysis of the Clean Air Act and is the
average of 21 estimates from previous hedonic wage studies and 5 estimates from
previous contingent valuation studies. All hedonic wage studies considered in 1997
retrospective analysis employed the cross-section hedonic wage models.
Recently, the U.S.EPA updated its VSL to $5.5 million in 1999 dollars (or $6.4
million in 2005 dollars) to evaluate the benefit of reducing mortality by Inter-State Air
Quality Rule. This is the central estimate between the reported “best estimates” from two
meta-analyses, Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003), that analyze
previous hedonic wage studies only (U.S.EPA 2004). The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) also uses the lower and upper bound of the “best estimate” from these
same two meta-analyses of hedonic wage studies to evaluate the policy benefits for
preventing the premature mortality when an individual agency does not monetized this
benefit(OMB, 2003).2

2

Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2004 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/draft_2004_cbreport.pdf .
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The importance of the VSL for federal benefit cost analysis can be seen in The
Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1970-1990 conducted by the U.S.EPA to report
the periodic assessment of costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act to congress (U.S.EPA
1997). U.S.EPA (1997) reports that monetized benefit of the Clean Air Act during 19701990 is $22 trillion with 5th and 95th percentile of $5.6 and $49.4 trillion, respectively (in
1990 dollars). The cost of the policy is estimated as $0.5 trillion (in 1990 dollars). Over
80% of the benefits come from preventing premature mortality. The substantial
uncertainty in the policy benefit estimation also comes from the large variance of the
VSL estimate used where the mean VSL is 4.8 million with standard deviation of 3.2
million (in 1990 dollars).3
Given the strong link between the hedonic wage estimation and the policy
evaluation, the quality of hedonic wage studies has been a major concern (U.S.EPA
2004). Although there have been significant improvements in hedonic wage literature,
especially in the quality of fatal risk data, there are still many criticisms regarding the use
of the hedonic wage model to evaluate certain government programs, such as
environmental policy programs.
One of the major concerns regarding the hedonic wage model in policy analysis is
the potential bias in the estimators due to omitted variables. A number of studies have
indicated that the omission of unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as risk
preferences or the worker’s skill in protecting themselves in a dangerous work
environment, are potentially important sources of bias in estimating the risk-wage
premium (McConnell, 2006; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).

3

U.S.EPA apply Weibul distribution on the VSL estimates, so the range of VSL considered in the report is
always positive.
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There are several studies that addressed this problem. One group of studies uses
an instrumental variable approach to obtain unbiased risk estimators in cross-section
hedonic wage models (Arabsheibani & Marin, 2001; Garen, 1988; Gunderson & Hyatt,
2001; Siebert & Wei, 1994). The other group of studies uses panel models to control for
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity (Black, Galdo, & Lin, 2003; Brown, 1980;
Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, & Ziliak, 2005). The instrumental variable studies generally
report unstable and unreliable risk estimators due to the weak instruments problem. The
panel models show more robust results, but the estimators may be still significantly
biased due to exacerbated measurement error bias and omitted time-variant
heterogeneity.
The first objective of this dissertation is to identify the potential magnitude and
direction of bias in previous cross-sectional hedonic wage studies. Unobserved timeinvariant heterogeneity is controlled for by employing a first-difference model and a
fixed-effect model on national panel data. The issues of exacerbated attenuation bias in
the first-difference and fixed-effect model due to measurement error of the risk variable,
as well as the bias due to the time-variant omitted variables and simultaneity between
wage and risk variable are also identified by employing the instrumental variable
approach on the panel models.
This dissertation is the first study to combine panel models and the instrumental
variables approach to examine the comprehensive bias due to omitted variables in crosssectional hedonic wage models. The results are used to evaluate past hedonic wage
studies and potential biases that may have affected their wage-risk premium estimates.

6

Another concern regarding the use of hedonic wage estimators in policy analysis
is the applicability of VSL estimates from labor market studies to policies with very
different safety contexts, such as reducing the risk of death from pollution exposure
(Hammitt, 2000; USEPA, 1997, 2004, 2005). The hedonic wage model estimates the
tradeoff between an occupational risk and wage. Some psychology studies have found
that individuals value the reduction of different types of risk differently (Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). Individuals may have a very different perception about
occupational risk and other types of risk, such as environmental risk, and may place
different monetary value on each type of risk reduction.
There are several stated preference studies examining the link between the risk
characteristics and the individual’s willingness to pay (Cookson, 2000; McDaniels,
Kamlet, & Fischer, 1992; Subramanian & Cropper, 2000). However, there is little
evidence regarding the nature of fatal risk/dollar tradeoff using revealed preference
methods, such as hedonic wage models. Since the stated preference methods may
contain the hypothetical bias, or bias resulting from difficulties in the communicating
risk, it is important to verify whether or not individuals exhibit different willingness to
pay to reduce different types of risks with revealed preference approach, which observes
individual’s actual behavior.
The second objective of this dissertation is to evaluate if workers have different
willingness to pay to reduce different types of risks (e.g. violent assaults vs. trafficrelated accidents) using a hedonic wage models. We use a specialized sample of workers
combined with location and occupation-specific risk rates to determine if workers
command different wage-risk premia for different types of occupational fatality risks.
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More specifically, we examine whether fatal risks from violent assault risks (i.e.,
homicide) are compensated differently than non-violent risks.
A sample of occupational drivers is used, which includes truck, taxi, sales and bus
drivers. These occupations are focused on for two reasons. First, these occupations face
either high violent assault or high non-violent assault (or both) risks routinely as part of
their job which may mitigate the measurement error due to the disparity between
perceived risk and objective risk level. Second, these workers have very similar non-risk
job characteristics which could help to mitigate bias due to unobserved job heterogeneity
between occupations. Importantly, a location-specific fatal risk rate for two types of
risks for each occupation is created. This allows risk to vary across Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) or state
This is one of a few studies that use hedonic wage studies to address the
heterogeneity of risk and its effect on individual’s willingness to pay to reduce a marginal
amount of risk. Also, this is the first study that use location-occupation specific fatal risk
rate. This study evaluate if the previous finding from the stated preference methods can
be verified by the revealed preference method. Although the focus of this study is to
estimate the different willingness to pay to reduce different types of occupational risks,
the results of this study still can provide useful information whether or not the VSL used
in the evaluation of policy which is different from occupational safety needs to be
adjusted accordingly.
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theory of
the hedonic wage model and important assumptions. The maintained hypothesis that we
examine in this dissertation are also discussed. Chapter 3 presents data used in each

8

estimation in later chapters. Two sets of worker data are used in this dissertation. In
chapter 4, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a national panel data, is used
to conduct the panel data analysis. In chapter 5, a large-scale cross-section demographic
data for occupational drivers is constructed from the Current Population Survey and is
used to analyze the heterogeneity of risk preferences among workers.
We also use different risk data for each analysis. In chapter 4, we use an
occupation-industry fatal risk matrix created by Scotton (2000). This risk data is varied
by occupation and industry, which enables us to identify the risk change among workers
who change jobs between or within industry and occupation. In chapter 5, we create an
original occupation/location specific risk rate from the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries by Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Chapter 4 presents the literature review and the analytical results of our panel data
analysis of the hedonic wage model. We review past efforts to control unobserved
heterogeneity in hedonic wage models. Then we describe the panel methods we employ,
and present the results and conclusions. Chapter 5 presents the literature review and
analytical results of our second objective of this study. We review previous stated
preference studies to estimate different willingness to pay to reduce different types of
risks, and discuss their potential problems. We also review the previous hedonic wage
study which we improve upon. We present the estimating hedonic wage models and the
robustness of our estimation. Lastly, we present our conclusions. Chapter 6 discusses
the findings in the main analyses, and its contribution to the VSL and hedonic wage
literature. We also discuss the policy implications of our results and future research.

9

Chapter II
Theory of Compensating Wage Differentials

This chapter reviews the theory of compensating wage differentials (hedonic
wage theory) as related to measuring the value of reducing mortality risks. The theory of
hedonic wages is largely based on the theory of hedonic pricing developed by Rosen
(1974). Rosen analyzes the price determining process of attributes of goods in the
implicit market. Jones-Lee (1974) also analyzes the workers risk-wage taking behavior
using the state dependent expected utility theory. In general, both theories from Rosen
and Jones-Lee are combined to describe the underlying theory of hedonic wage.4
In a hedonic wage equilibrium, there is assumed to exist a hedonic wage schedule,
v, which relates all relevant job characteristics to wages. The job characteristics of
interest here is risk, r. Thus the hedonic wage functions is written, v(r,z), where z
subsumes all job characteristics other than risk. This hedonic wage schedule is an
envelope function arising from all worker’s utility maximization and all firm’s profit
maximization process. For each individual worker or individual firm, the market hedonic
wage schedule is given. Workers maximize their utilities and firms maximize their
profits subject to a given hedonic wage schedule.
In the following sections, we base on Jones-Lee (1974), Rosen (1974) and
McConnell (2006) for the description of hedonic wage theory. As mentioned earlier,
Jones-Lee developed the basic theory of worker’s expected utility maximization between
the states of survival and death, and Rosen developed the general theory of hedonic

4

See also reviews of hedonic wage theory in McConnell (2006) and Scotton (2000).
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pricing models. McConnell (2006) provides the overview of hedonic wage models
incorporating more recent findings from hedonic wage literature.
After describing the basic hedonic wage theory, we discuss important underlying
assumptions in the hedonic wage model. We discuss the assumption of homogeneity
among workers or firms and the homogeneity of fatal risk. There are two aspects of the
hedonic wage literature as related to estimating the VSL that we wish to extend in this
dissertation.
Preferences over Risks and Wages: the Worker
In this section, we review the workers risk-wage taking behavior using the state
dependent expected utility theory developed by Jones-Lee (1974). Given that workers
face the uncertain outcomes of death and survival at work, we assume that the individual
worker maximizes expected utility between utility in the death state and utility in the
survival state. First, we define state-dependent utility over these two states. Let
U S (W ) be utility in the survival state, which depends on the level of wealth (wage). We
assume that utility is increasing at a decreasing rate as wealth increases, which denotes
∂U L (W )
= U L '> 0
∂W

(1)

and
∂U L (W ) 2
= U L ''< 0 .
∂ 2W

(2)

We also define U D (W ) as the utility in the death state. We assume that utility in
the death state is also a function of wealth (wage), since individual may obtain a certain
utility by bequesting the wealth to heirs. If this is not the case, then the utility in death
state is zero. Thus, we define
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∂U D (W )
= U D '≥ 0
∂W

(3)

and
∂U D (W ) 2
= U D ''≤ 0 .
∂ 2W

(4)

We also assume that for a same level of wealth, workers obtain higher utility in
the state of survival than in the state of death, thus
US > UD.

(5)

Workers choose a job with a probability of death, r, to maximize their expected
utility. Suppose workers initial wealth is W (>0), and the initial level of fatal risk is r
(0< r <1). Consequently their expected utility is:
EU 0 = (1 − r )U S (W ) + r U D (W )

(6)

Now, suppose workers fatal risk level is increased to r (0< r < r <1). To sustain
the original level of utility, workers need to be compensated by additional wages. Let the
compensation level that leaves workers in the same expected utility level be V. We call V
the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for an increment change of risk. We
assume that V is a function of the risk preference parameter, α. By definition, the
following equality holds:

(1 − r )U S (W ) + r U D (W ) = (1 − r )U S (W + V (α )) + rU D (W + V (α ))
(7)
The left hand side is a fixed level of expected utility, say EU0. By rearranging (7),
we obtain the function for V at the fixed level of expected utility, EU0, which is
V = V (r ,W , α , EU 0 )
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Substituting back this V function to (7), and by total differentiating with respect to
r, the marginal willingness to accept compensation for a marginal change in risk, ∂V ∂r ,
is given by:
∂V U S (W + V ) − U D (W + V )
=
(1 − r )U S '+ rU D '
∂r

(8)

where U s' = ∂U s (W + V ) ∂V and U D' = ∂U D (W + V ) ∂V . From (1), (3), (5), the
equation (8) is positive. The second derivative of (8) is also positive, indicating that the
workers WTA curves are positively sloped and convex.
Figure 1 shows the mapping of two individuals’ WTA curves. To simplify the
argument, we assume that individuals are equally productive. The wage level is
determined by the worker’s productivity as discussed detail in the next section. The
variation of identically productive workers wage may arise when workers choose
different risk levels.
Figure 1 maps two WTA functions, where V1 is the WTA locus for worker 1 and
V2 is the WTA locus for worker 2. Along each WTA locus, the utility level is constant.
The workers WTA is a function of risk level, r, worker’s risk preference parameter, α,
and wealth level, W. Since the WTA function is convex, the movement towards northwest direction increases their utility level. In figure 1, worker 1 has a higher utility level
in V1' than V1. In addition, worker 1 is more risk averse than worker 2, thus the V1 curve
is steeper than V2 curve. The steeper V curve indicates that the worker 1 requires more
wage compensation to accept a marginal increase in risk than worker 2 when they face a
same risk level. The workers’ different marginal rates of substitution between risk and
compensation force workers to find different optimal levels of risk-wage compensation
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when they face a same market constraint. Workers maximize their utility level where V
curves and hedonic wage schedule are tangent to each other.
Firm’s Production and Risk
A firm’s profit function can be complicated depending on which cost factors we
include (McConnell, 2006). Here we assume a simple profit function that is:

π = ϕz ( L) − wL − c(r ; µ ) L ,5

(9)

where φ is the price of output, z(L) is the production function as defined over labor
inputs, w is the wage rate, c is the cost of providing a certain level of safety per worker
and µ is the efficiency parameter of providing a certain safety level. For simplicity, we
assume there is no factor other than labor to produce output. Firms maximize their
profits subject to the hedonic wage schedule (thus w=w(p;z)) by choosing the number of
workers hired and the level of safety provided.
The profit maximizing conditions respect to L and r are:
∂z w + c
=
∂L
ϕ

(10)

∂w
∂c
=− .
∂r
∂r

(11)

Equation (10) shows that in order to maximize profits, the firm should choose
labor inputs such that the marginal productivity of labor (left hand side) should equal to
the wage rate plus the cost to provide safety per worker (right hand side) assuming the
price of output equal to one. Equation (11) shows that the firm’s marginal implicit price

5

This is a slightly modified profit function presented in McConnell (2006), which assumes that firms do
not pay death benefit and compensation for the event of injury, and available instant replacement of an
identical worker when the worker die. See McConnell for the discussion with more comprehensive profit
function.
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of risk represented by the hedonic wage schedule (left hand side) should be equal to the
marginal cost-saving from a marginal increase of risk level (right hand side).
By rearranging firm’s profit function (9), we obtain the firm’s wage offer curve
(OC);
OC = w(r , L, µ , π ) = [ϕz ( L) − c(r ; µ ) L − π ] / L .

(12)

This offer curve shows the firm’s trade-off between providing safety and wage
compensation for a given profit level (thus this is an isoprofit curve). The slope of OC
curve is given by ∂OC ∂r = − ∂c ∂r . Assuming the cost of providing additional unit of
safety is decreasing at a decreasing rate as risk increases, 6 OC is a positively sloped
concave function from below. At the maximum profit level given hedonic wage
function, the conditions (10) and (11) hold.
Figure 1 illustrates the OC for two types of firms. To simplify the argument we
assume all firms offer identical job characteristics except fatal risk level. The only
difference comes from the different efficiency of providing the safety at work. Firm 1
has an offer curve 1 (OC1) and Firm 2 has an offer curve 2 (OC2). Firms’ profits are
higher on offer curves that are in the south-eastern direction. For example, firm 1’s profit
level is higher in OC1' than OC1 since at every risk level, firm 1 pays less wage for
workers in OC1' than OC1. Firm 1 has a flatter offer curve than firm 2, indicating firm 1
has a higher efficiency of providing an additional safety than firm 2. Firms maximize
their profit where their offer curves are tangent to the hedonic wage schedule. The
different shapes of offer curves force firms to find different optimal levels of providing

6

The cost incurred by reducing a marginal risk at high risk levels are lower than the cost incurred by
reducing a marginal risk at a low risk level.
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safety and compensation given the market equilibrium wage/risk constraint. Firm 1
provides higher safety level than firm 2, given the hedonic wage schedule.
Figure 1 also shows how the hedonic wage schedule emerges when there are
heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. As described more detail in
McConnell (2006), the hedonic wage schedule is generated by the joint distribution of
workers’ risk preference (α) and firms’ efficiency to provide safety (µ) holding other job
and worker characteristics constant. Worker 1, who is more risk averse than worker 2,
will be hired by firm 1 for whom providing safety is relatively inexpensive at a risk of r1
an wage of wage1. Worker 2, who is less risk averse than worker 1, will be hired by firm
2 for whom providing safety is relatively costly. The hedonic wage schedule is an
envelope function which traces out the each worker/firm labor contracts, where the
workers’ marginal willing to pay for a marginal decrease in risk level is equal to the
firms’ marginal cost of providing a marginal decrease in the risk level.
As noted in Rosen (1974) and further explained by McConnell (2006), the
hedonic schedule is solely determined by the distribution of firms’ offer curves in the
long run. In the long run, due to the entries into the market, firms’ profits are fixed at
zero. Provided that in a large economy there is a continuum of workers’ preferences
over risks and wages, the distribution of firms’ profit functions (or envelope profit
schedule) reflects the hedonic wage schedule. This is important because as seen later, it
relaxes the information requirements to recover the marginal willingness to accept by
workers to take more risky jobs. This envelope profit schedule will shift in two cases
(McConnell, 2006). One case is when technology innovation alters firms’ cost functions
to supply safety. The other case is when the distribution of risk preference of workers
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changes. Redistribution of risk preference affects the distribution of isoprofit functions
through changes in the wage level and the profit levels of firms.
Underlying Assumptions

The major underlying assumptions of the hedonic wage model are that the labor
market is competitive, highly mobile, and the workers and firms have perfect information
regarding the occupational risk level (McConnell, 2006). However, the perfect
information assumption may be relaxed in the long run. It may not be reasonable to
assume that the workers have perfect information about the occupational risk level of a
particular job they are about to take. Workers would have a certain level of perceived
fatal risk level of that job, and use this perceived risk level to determine their optimal
wage/risk compensation. This perceived fatal risk levels may or may not be the same as
actual risk levels.
Researchers do not observe the workers’ perceived risk levels, and thus use the
objective level of risk on the job, which is estimated from occupational fatal statistics. If
the labor market is in a long-run equilibrium, the use of objective risk levels would result
in unbiased estimates of wage/risk tradeoffs if firms perceive risks accurately. In the
long run, there is an entry in the market and the firms profit level is fixed at zero. This
constraint results in the hedonic wage schedule being the envelope of firms’ isoprofit
functions, regardless of the perceived risk level by workers. Thus researchers observe
risk-wage pairs that are on the hedonic wage function and are able to recover an unbiased
hedonic wage function.
In the short run, however, there is no entry into the market and firms can enjoy
positive profits. In this case, the hedonic wage schedule is influenced by both workers
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and firms. When all workers underestimate the fatal risk level, the estimated hedonic
wage functions is also underestimated. This is illustrated in figure 2. Suppose there is
“actual” hedonic wage function which is determined by the “actual” risk level. Worker 1
has an V1 and he perceives the risk level of the job at riskperceived and demands wage
compensation at wage0. However, suppose that the actual risk level for this job is
riskactual where riskperceived< riskactual. Assume that a firm knows the actual risk level, and
is willing to pay up to wage1 as compensation. At the end of wage negotiation, the wage
level will likely be determined between wage1 and wage0 levels. Since we only observe
the actual risk level, we match the wage level (likely) less than wage1 and riskactual as
opposed to wage1 and riskactual to estimate the hedonic wage function. This causes an
underestimation of the actual hedonic wage schedule. Similarly, if all workers
overestimate the risk level, we are likely overestimating the hedonic wage function. If
there are mix of workers who underestimate or overestimate risk level, the bias in the
hedonic wage estimation depends on the distribution of worker’s mis-perception of risk
levels.
Another important assumption of the hedonic wage model is homogeneity among
workers in their productivity and job characteristics. The hedonic wage schedule is
determined by the characteristics of job and the characteristics of workers (McConnell,
2006). As stated in the basic theory of hedonic wage section, we assume identical
workers in terms of their productivity. The only difference among workers is the
difference in their risk preference. The same is true for firms. We assume firms are
identical except their efficiency in providing safety.
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When there are heterogeneous groups of workers or firms, then each group would
have different hedonic wage schedules. For example, assume that college graduates and
high school graduates have an identical distribution over risk preference parameter.
Generally college graduates are more productive than high school graduates because of
their higher human capital. Even though the marginal cost to provide safety is same for
both groups at every risk level, firms would pay college graduates who have higher
marginal productivity more than high school graduates. Thus college graduates and high
school graduates have different hedonic wage schedules as illustrated in figure 3. This is
a particularly important point in estimating hedonic wage model empirically. Failing to
take into account differing productivities of workers (i.e., the slope of the hedonic wage
schedule between different groups of workers) may cause biased estimates of the HW
schedule and could even cause negative slope estimates in the hedonic wage function
(McConnell, 2006).
In terms of job characteristics, homogeneity in terms of firms benefit package
would be particularly important to control for in estimating a HW function (McConnell,
2006). If one group of firms offer full employer provided health insurance plan and
another group of firms offer no health insurance plan, then their wage schedules should
be different. The former group of firms can attract workers with fewer wages than latter
group of firms.
We also generally assume that worker’s risk preference does not change for
heterogeneous risks. Even for fatal risk, there can be heterogeneity among risks
depending on the circumstances of death. As discussed in detail in chapter 5, previous
studies indicate that individuals may have different risk preferences towards different
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types of risks. The different risk preferences seem to depend on the different qualitative
characteristics of risk such as level of controllability or dread involved. If workers
consider different types of risks as separate job characteristics, or marginal cost of
reducing different types of risk are differed, then there exists separate hedonic wage
schedules for different types of risks.
Extensions Examined in This Dissertation

In implementing the theory and estimating hedonic wage functions, a number of
key assumptions are invoked. Chapter 4 examines the implication of failing to take into
account all heterogeneity among workers and firms in the empirical analysis. As
reviewed by McConnell (2006), it is common to control for the heterogeneous levels of
productivity (actual or perceived) among workers resulting from market segmentation
based on factors such as race, gender, and education level in the empirical analysis.
However, it is less common to take into account the heterogeneity among jobs. In
addition, there may be more heterogeneous levels of productivity among workers
originated from workers characteristics which are unobservable to researcher.
Chapter 4 examines the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity among workers on
estimating hedonic wage model. As discussed in chapter 4, we employ panel models that
control for all time invariant worker characteristics. We also explore the effect of
unobserved time-variant worker characteristics and the effect of workers’ potential misperceptions about the risk levels they face on the job. While we focus on unobserved
worker heterogeneity, we also attempt to improve on earlier studies, with regards to firm
heterogeneity. We include several important job characteristics in our estimation model,
such as employer provided health insurance availability and firm size. The firm size may
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represent the overall amenity of firms. Unfortunately, a lack of data on firms precludes a
more sophisticated analysis.
The second assumption underlying most hedonic wage estimates is that all risks
may be aggregated into a single event; death, even though the circumstance of each death
can be very different. The distribution of workers’ risk preferences and firms’ efficiency
to supply safety may be significantly different among different circumstances of fatal
accidents as discussed earlier. If this is the case, there may be separate HW functions for
each type of risk, and estimating a HW function with an aggregated measure of risk may
significantly bias the estimation. This hypothesis is formerly examined in Scotton and
Taylor (2006). As presented by Scotton and Taylor (2006), when there are
heterogeneous risks, the workers expected utility (6) becomes:
N −1

EU = rN U S (W ) + ∑ riU D i (W )

(13)

i =1

where rN is the probability of survival (rN >0), ri is the probability of death by the fatal
N −1

event i (ri >0), rN + ∑ ri = 1 , Us is the utility level in the survival state, and UDi is the
i =1

utility in the death state resulted in the fatal event i. The fatal event, i, may be car
accident, exposure to toxic materials, homicide and so on. Since UDi is a separate utility
function for each event of death, the compensation required to accept a marginal increase
of each type of fatal risk may differ significantly. In chapter 5, we improve the study
design upon Scotton and Taylor (2006) and estimate separate hedonic wage functions for
different types of risks to examine the second assumption of homogeneity among fatal
risk.
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The data considerations for each of the above extensions, as well as a review of
the relevant literature and the testable hypotheses we develop, are presented in detail in
chapters 3, 4 and 5. In the next chapter, the data available to explore our extensions to
previous work estimating hedonic wage functions are presented.
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Figure 1. HW equilibrium schedule for heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms.
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Figure 2. HW equilibrium schedule with workers who underestimate risk levels.
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Figure 3. HW equilibrium schedules for workers with different productivity.
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Chapter III
Data

This section describes the data used in this dissertation. The key data needed to
estimate a hedonic wage (HW) model are occupational fatal risk and labor force data.
Due to their different focus, chapter 4 and chapter 5 will rely on different data sets to
estimate hedonic wage models.
Chapter 4 focuses on controlling for worker heterogeneity in a hedonic wage
model through panel data methods. For this purpose, the demographic information must
come from longitudinal data. The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is
used to construct this longitudinal data. It is also critical to identify the changes in risk
level when workers change their jobs. An industry based risk level, which has been most
commonly used in hedonic wage literature, is not a good candidate for this purpose since
it does not capture the changes in risk if workers change occupations within the same
industry group. The risk data should at least vary by occupation and industry.
Occupational fatal risk data created by Scotton (2000), which varies by reasonably
disaggregated occupational and industry codes is used.
Chapter 5 focuses on identifying potential heterogeneity in risk-wage premia for
different types of risk. To accomplish this, a sample of occupational drivers is used.
These workers are chosen to control heterogeneous aspects of job requirements as well as
mitigate measurement error associated with the risk variable. In a cross section study
such as that employed in chapter 5, it is difficult to control for unobserved non-risk
aspects of jobs, such as working conditions and job requirements, even though these
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could be important factors to determine the wage, as well as the risk level. Using a
sample of occupations which requires similar working conditions and job skills may
enable us to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem associated with omitted variables
in HW models. In addition, there is likely a disparity between the objective risk measure
and the subjective risk measure, which can be another source of endogeneity problems in
the HW model. Benjamin (2001) observed that the individuals who are facing the high
objective risk often understand their objective risk level correctly. Driving is one of the
riskiest jobs in the United States. For example, in 2003, 861 sales workers and truck
drivers died at work. This is the highest level of death among all occupation groups.7
The fatality rate of these drivers is 2.67 per 10,000 workers, which is the fourth highest
risk rate among all occupations.8
The demographic information for this sample comes from the basic monthly
Current Population Survey collected by the BLS. We divide risks into two types for this
analysis: violent assault risks and all other risks, which mostly relate to traffic accidents.
These risks for occupational drivers largely vary by geographic area (Knestaut, 1997).
Thus the risk data varies by occupation and geographic area. This occupational fatal risk
data is created from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) 1992-2002,9 and
the Occupational Employment Statistics 1998-2003, both collected by the BLS. In
addition, various geographic specific wage determinants, such as the unemployment rate,

7

Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 2003 data retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0002.pdf
8
Ranking of high risk occupation is (from the highest to lowest): logging, aircraft pilots and farmers and
ranchers.
9
This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS.
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local industry composition, population, local total vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are
collected.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the demographic data
and risk data used for chapter 4 are discussed separately. Then, demographic data are
merged with the risk data and risks for the sample of workers used in chapter 5 are
presented. Data for chapter 5 are then discussed, following the same format as the
discussion for the data used in chapter 4.
Data for Panel Study (Chapter 4)
Labor force data: the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
Data for individual hourly wage, job and socio-economic characteristics come
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).10 The SIPP is national
panel data administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. The SIPP contains rich information
about individual income, labor force status, and general demographic characteristics of
U.S. population. People are interviewed by phone or in person every four months. Each
four months reference period is called a wave. 11 Only one observation from each wave is
used.
The 1996 SIPP data is used in this analysis.12

The 1996 SIPP panel lasts for four

years and contains twelve waves. The total sample sizes in the beginning of the 1996
panel are approximately 115,700 individuals. 13

10

Detailed data description and data download is available at http://www.bls.census.gov/sipp/ (retrieved
March 25, 2007)
11
Some questionnaires ask people to record information for every month since the last interview. In this
case, only the fourth observation is used for the analysis.
12
The SIPP is available for 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996 and 2001 panels. Samples in each panel
are independent from each other. Since the risk data is available only from 1992 as discussed later, the
1990 and 1991 panel are removed from the analysis. The 2001 panel is also removed because the risk data
is available only until 1997 and there is no overlap in the time period between the 2001 SIPP panel and the
risk data. The 1993 SIPP panel does not include many eligible workers who has two or more observations,
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The main advantage of using the SIPP data as compared to other labor force data
such as the CPS and the PSID is its structure as panel data and the richness of the
information it contains. The SIPP is a medium length time series data with large sample
size. The CPS is a relatively short length time series data with limited wage
observations. In the CPS, for each individual, there are only two observations obtainable
for the current wage level, while there are nine to twelve observations on current wage
levels in the SIPP. The PSID is the long length time series data (since 1968), but with
relatively small sample size (about 6,000-8,000 households).
As compared to the CPS and the PSID, the SIPP also provides more information
on employer characteristics, as well as current earned and unearned income. The SIPP
collects important employer characteristics such as the availability of employer-provided
health insurance and the size of firms. According to the SIPP User Guide,14 the SIPP
collects 70 cash and in-kind source income data for the current year, 15 while the CPS
collects only 35 and the PSID collects only 25 cash and in-kind source income for the
prior calendar year.
The major wage determinants commonly used in the hedonic wage literature are
available in the SIPP. These include age, educational attainment, gender, race, marital

and thus is also removed from analysis. The data from the 1992 panel is not used in this analysis due to a
concern about the data quality.
13
The sample size of SIPP is increased in 1996 panel dramatically as a part of SIPP reform. This reform is
called 1996 redesign. Main aspects of reform include: lager sample size, longer panel, introduction of
computer-assisted interviewing system, which automatically check the consistency of reported data during
the interview, and oversampling the low-income household (http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/evol.html,
retrieved March 25, 2007).
14
Available via http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/usrguide/sipp2001.pdf (retrieved March 25, 2007).
15
Cash and in-kind source income include: wage, earnings from various financial and real estate
investments, and payment relating to the workers compensation, such as temporal sickness benefits,
pensions and government welfare programs.
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status, number of children under 18 in the household,16 union status, and the occupation
and industry group of the firm for which workers work. The worker’s current wage is
available on either an hourly or monthly basis. The hourly wage data is preferred since
there are more missing observations in the monthly wage data. Also collected are
residential location (urban vs. rural), region, availability of employer provided health
insurance, size of firms, and whether or not the person works over-time as potentially
important wage determinants.
Table 1 shows the definition of variables extracted from the 1996 SIPP panel and
the summary statistics for the sample of workers. The sample is full time workers17 who
hold only one job at a time. The workers who are earning less than minimum wage,18 or
whose age are less than 18 or more than 65 are omitted from the analysis. There are total
of 166,362 observations for 34,846 workers. The minimum, average and maximum
number of observations per worker is 1, 4.8 and 12, respectively. The average hourly
wage is $13.27, which is lower than the average hourly earning in the U.S. labor market
that is $16 in 2005.19 The average age of workers is 38 years old, and 41% of the sample
graduated from high school, 33% of the sample has attended college, and 9 % of the
sample has a bachelors or higher degree. The current national trend is that approximately
30% of the workforce having graduated from high school, 30% have attended a college
but have no degree, and 30% hold a bachelor’s degree or more.20 Compared to the current
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Inclusion of the number of children in a HW equation is rather rare, but is seen in Lenoie et al. (1995),
Herzog and Schlottman (1990), Siebert and Wei (1994) and Sandy and Elliot (1996).
17
Full time workers are defined as workers who work more than 35 hours per week.
18
The minimum wage level for the service workers ($2.13 per hour) is used as a cut off wage level.
19
October 2005 Employment Situation Summary retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm. All monetary values are adjusted to 2005 dollars using
the consumer price index.
20
The educational attainment level of labor force over time retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chart2-1.pdf.
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national trend of educational attainment in the U.S. labor force, our sample underrepresents the labor force with bachelor’s degree or more, and over-represents the labor
force with less than high school diploma.21
About 45% of the sample is female and 56% of the sample is married. The
majority of workers are white, 13% of workers are Hispanic and another 13% of workers
are African American, which correctly reflects the recent racial composition of the labor
force in the US.22 About 19% of workers are union members or covered by union
benefits, which is slightly higher than the current average union membership rate in the
U.S. of 12.5%.23 The average number of children for workers in the sample whose age is
less than 18 is 0.79, which is less than the national average of 0.9.24 More than 60% of
workers receive part or full health insurance through their employers. Seventy-eight
percent of workers lived in urban areas. There is a slightly larger proportion of workers in
the South, and a smaller proportion of workers from the Northeastern region. Fifty-six
percent of workers work in the firms with more than 100 employees in all location, and
29% of workers work in the firms with less than 25 employees in the worker’s location.
The share of workers who work in each major occupation and industry group is
following. 25 Only five percent of workers have a farming related occupation. Twentyeight percent of workers have a technical occupation, 26% of workers have a labor

21

This difference may come from the oversampling of low-income household in SIPP.
Selected labor force characteristics of Hispanics or Latinos retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chart4-2.pdf. According to this, the Hispanic makes up 13% of labor
force in 2005.
23
Union members summary: Union members in 2006 retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
24
This is the average number of children under 18 per household. Average number of children per family
and per family with children, 2000 Census retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabST-F1-2000.pdf.
25
Major industry and occupation classification follows Scotton (2000), and is reproduced in appendix B
and C, respectively.
22
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occupation, 14% of workers have a service occupation, 16% of workers have a craftsman
occupation, and 11% of worker has a professional occupation. There are few workers
engaging in the agricultural, construction, transportation/ communications/utility and
public industry. These workers makes-up only 15% of total sample. In contrast, a high
proportion of workers engage in the trade, service and manufacturing industries. Thirty
one percent of workers engage in the service industry, 19% of workers engage in the
wholesale or retail trade industry, and 25% of workers engage in the manufacturing
industry.
In the 1996 SIPP sample, there are total 16,001 workers who change their
occupation or industry at the 3-digit level classification group between waves. This is
approximately 9% of total observations in the sample. Among these job changers, 5,849
workers change the occupation within the same 3-digit level industry group, 1,587
workers change the industry but stay in the same 3-digit level occupation group, and
8,565 workers change both the occupation and the industry group. Although there may
be significant number of workers who change their jobs within a same occupation and
industry, the exact number who does so is difficult to identify. The SIPP provides
information on whether or not a worker changes jobs between consecutive waves.
However, many individuals in our sample do not have observations in consecutive waves
because an observation(s) from a previous or following wave is dropped due to missing
data, or because they are ineligible to be included.26 Thus without a balanced panel from
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For instance, say a worker was employed full time in one job in wave 1. In wave 2, the worker takes a
second part-time job and keeps this for two waves. This worker would not be included in wave 2 or 3
because sample is limited to those working one fulltime jobs. If in wave 4, we observe the worker in new
job (as compared t wave 1) and working one fulltime job again, they would re-enter our sample.
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consecutive waves, the exact number of workers who change their jobs within the same
occupation and industry is uncertain.
Table 2 shows the summary of job changing behavior between major occupation
groups among the 1996 SIPP sample. The first row shows the major occupation groups
workers belong to at t where t=2, 3,…12. The first column shows the major occupation
groups workers belong to at t-1. For example, the second column-third row cell
represents the number of workers who change job from a craftsman occupation to a
professional occupation. About 5-10% of workers in each occupation group change jobs
to different major occupation groups. Although workers move between all major
occupation groups, there are tendencies for workers in certain occupations to change jobs
to certain other occupations. For example, relatively high proportion of workers who are
in a professional occupation switch to a technical occupation, and the workers who are in
a technical occupation tend to switch to a professional, labor or service occupation. In
general, there is a balanced in-flow and out-flow in each occupational group during the
panel.
Table 3 shows the summary of job changing behavior between major industry
groups among the 1996 SIPP sample. There are 3-12% of workers in each industry
group who switch their jobs to a different industry group. The workers who are in the
public industry has the lowest rate to switch jobs to a different industry (3.05%), and the
workers in the construction industry has the highest rate to switch jobs to a different
industry (12.14%). There are also tendencies of workers job changing pattern between
major industry groups. The workers in a construction industry tend to switch jobs to an
agriculture, service or manufacturing industry. Workers in a wholesales trade, service or
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manufacturing industry tend to switch jobs among these industries. The workers in a
transportation/communication/utility industry tend to switch to a service or wholesales
trade industry. The workers in a public industry tend to switch to a service industry.
Changes in key demographic characteristics of workers (regardless of whether
they change jobs) are as follows. There are 1,503 times that someone changes marital
status from single to married and 805 times that someone changes from married to
single.27 These make-up about 0.9% and 0.4% of total observations, respectively. There
are 2,358 observations that become new parents during the panel, and there are 3,341
observations whose underage kids become older than 18, or deceased during the panel.
There are 3,660 observations that have a union membership at t-1, and lose that
membership at t, after they change jobs. There are 3,553 observations who newly acquire
union membership due to a job change.
Occupational fatal risk data.
Scotton (2000) creates 506 risk rates based on a 22 occupation × 23 industry fatal
risk-rate matrix. To avoid measurement error due to yearly fluctuations of death
incidences, Scotton computes a six year average risk rate between 1992 and 1997. The
risk rate in each occupation-industry cell is calculated by the following formula:
p oi =

Doi
Woi

(14)

where poi is the fatal risk rate in occupation o and industry i, Doi is the annual average
number of death incidents in occupation o in industry j, and Woi is the annual average
total number of workers in occupation o in industry i.
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An individual may changes marital status more than one time. Thus the number of changes may be
greater than the number of individuals who change marital status.
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The numerator in equation 14, Doi, is obtained from the CFOI files for the period
1992-1997, which contains more than 37,000 deaths. CFOI for this period uses 3-digit
occupation code from the Census Occupation Classification System 1990, and 4-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 1987 code to classify the occupation and
industry, respectively (Scotton 2000). There are 473 occupation and 1,183 industry
categories included in 1992-1997 CFOI. The list of all variables available in the CFOI
files is reproduced in Appendix A. The CFOI contains various characteristics of
deceased workers, such as gender, age, race, location of accident, size of firm, event of
accident, occupation, industry, and time of accident.
Scotton regroups occupation and industry codes in the CFOI into an original
matrix of 22 occupation and 23 industry codes. She obtains the annual average deaths in
each occupation industry pair between 1992 and 1997. In the equation 14, Woi is
obtained from taking annual averages of employment levels in the industry and
occupation pairs from the Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix (OEM) 1991-1996
administered by the BLS. Scotton’s 22 occupation and 23 industry classification is
reproduced in Appendix D and E. Appendix D shows the occupation group mapping.
The first column shows Scotton’s 22 occupation group, the second column is the title of
the occupational group and the third column is the census’ 3-digit occupation categories
which are included in each occupation group created by Scotton. Appendix E shows the
industry group mapping. The first and second columns show the Scotton’s 23 industry
group title and codes, respectively. The third and fourth columns show the 2-digit SIC
title and codes included in Scotton’s grouping, respectively. The last column shows the
corresponding industry code in the SIPP for each of the 23 industry groups.
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The SIPP uses the same 3-digit occupation code as the CFOI, so the occupation
code in the SIPP is directly converted to 22 occupation groups created by Scotton. The
SIPP uses the 3-digit industry code following the 1990 Census classification as described
in the SIPP data dictionary.28 The data dictionary also shows the corresponding 4-digit
SIC code for each 1990 Census classification system industry categories. Scotton
presents a corresponding 2-digit SIC code for her 23 industry group. Thus for this
analysis, the SIPP industry codes are matched to the 2-digit SIC codes, and then
converted to the 23 industry groups used by Scotton.
First, we briefly discuss the average annual risk rate among the 506 occupationindustry groups. The average number of deaths is nine in every 100,000 workers or
0.9×10-4. The highest risk bearing group is the construction tradesmen in the personal
transportation service industry, where the risk is 35.5 ×10-4. The second highest risk
bearing group is the agricultural workers in the lumber/wood/stone/glass product industry
where the risk is 12.4 ×10-4. High risk bearing industries include the personal
transportation industry and the mining industry. High risk bearing occupations include
construction tradesmen and truck drivers. Examples of a low risk bearing industry is the
social/legal/education service industry, while and example of a low risk bearing
occupation is the financial record keepers. Fifty-one occupation-industry groups had no
deaths during the 6 year period.
After merging the risk data with the SIPP workforce data, we can examine the
distribution of risk in our sample. The mean fatal rate in the SIPP sample is 5.5×10-5 with
standard deviation of 9.5×10-5 and the median risk rate is 2.0×10-5. This is comparable to
the mean risk rate of related studies which use the occupation within industry risk rates.
28

Data dictionary is available via http://www.bls.census.gov/sipp/diction.html (retrieved March 25, 2007).
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Scotton (2000) reports a mean risk rate for her sample from CPS (n=4,891) is 5.0×10-5
with standard deviation of 9.0×10-5. Kniesner et al.(2005) report a mean risk rate for
their sample from the PSID (n=7,937) is approximately 5.8×10-5 with a standard
deviation of 8.5×10-5.
About 0.6% of total observations, 1,156 observations in the SIPP sample, face
zero risk. There are only two observations in the SIPP sample that face the highest risk
level which is 35.5×10-4. Both workers are construction tradesmen in the bus service and
urban transit industry. The second highest risk level is 12.4×10-4, and there are 75
observations who face this level of risk.
There are a total 13,733 observations in the SIPP sample where the risk rate
changes between waves due to worker’s job changes. This comprises approximately 8%
of total observations. The risk change ranges from -12.3×10-4 to 12.4×10-4. The workers
who experience the largest negative risk change, -12.3×10-4, are those who change the job
from a timber cutter in the millwork industry to a production coordinator in the same
industry. The workers who experience the largest positive risk change, 12.4×10-4, is the
worker who change the job from a stock/inventory clerk in the health service industry to
a timber cutter in the logging industry.
The mean risk change is 0.02 ×10-5. Table 4 and 5 shows the mean risk change
between major occupation and industry groups, respectively. The structure of tables is
same as table 2 and 3. The risk change is the risk level at t minus the risk level at t-1.
Thus the positive (negative) number indicates the increased (reduced) risk level due to a
job change. Diagonal entries are not zero since there can be some risk changes within an
aggregated level occupation/industry group if workers change jobs at more disaggregated
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occupation/industry groups. As shown in table 4, the mean risk change within the same
major occupation group is small and it ranges from -0.4×10-7 to 0.4×10-6. However, for
some occupation groups, the range of risk changes is large even for workers who stay in a
same occupation group. For example, craft, technical, and labor occupations show risk
changes ranging between -5.0×10-4 and 5.0×10-4. Considering that the mean risk level of
workers in the sample is 0.5×10-4, this risk change is significant. The variation of risk
changes within the same major occupation group comes from the changes of industry
group and the changes of occupation group at a disaggregated level. On the other hand,
professional and service workers experience relatively small risk change when they stay
in the same occupation groups, ranging between -1.0×10-4 and 1.0×10-4, and -1.5×10-4
and 1.5×10-4, respectively.
On average, for technical workers, switching jobs to any other major occupation
group increases their risk level. For labor, farming, and craft workers, switching jobs to
any major occupation groups except farming or labor reduces their occupational risk
level. For the professional workers, switching jobs to technical occupation reduces their
risk level. For service workers, changing the job to the professional or technical
occupation reduces their risk level.
The job changing pattern between major industry groups is as follows. On
average, the workers in the service industry increase their risk level when they change the
job to any other industry. For workers in the construction, agriculture or
transportation/communication/utility industry group, changing the job to other industries
other than these three major group industries reduces their risk level. The workers
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moving into the service industry from other industries reduce their risk level, and the
workers moving into the construction industry increase their risk level.
Table 6 shows the summary changes in the risk level of workers who do not
change demographic categories and table 7 shows the summary changes in the risk level
of workers who change demographic characteristics. For example, suppose worker 1’s
marital status is single from wave 1 to 10 and is married in wave 11 and 12. Changes in
risk levels between wave 1 and wave 2, wave 2 and wave 3, …, and wave 9 and wave 10
(total 9 observations) for worker 1 are included under “single worker” category in table 6.
The change in risk level between wave 11 and wave 12 (one observation) is included
under the “married worker” category in table 6. In other words, the change in risk levels
between wave 10 and wave 11 where worker 1 changes his/her marital status is not
included in table 6 but included in table 7 under “single to married” category.
Demographic categories examined here include, gender, marital status, kids status, and
union status.
As shown in table 6, for male workers, the mean risk change level is 3.9×10-7
while that of the female workers is 0.2×10-8. Due to the large standard deviation, these
mean values are not significantly different from zero. In fact, none of demographic
category has a mean risk change value which is different from zero. Almost 90% of
female or male workers have zero risk change and thus the median risk change level is
zero. This high proportion of zero risk changers is also true for all other demographic
categories. Once zero risk changers are removed, we have higher mean risk change
values of 3.7×10-6 and 0.2×10-7 for male and female workers, respectively. The variance
of risk change for the male workers is much larger than that for the female workers as
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well. This does not change after we remove zero risk changers. This may be due to the
limited availability of high risk jobs for female workers while male workers have more
mobility between safe and risky jobs.
For workers who remain single and workers who remain married between waves,
the mean risk changes are 0.3×10-6 and 0.1×10-6 respectively (including zero risk
changers). There is not much difference between these two groups of workers in terms of
standard deviation, maximum and minimum value of risk change for both with and
without zero risk changers. For workers whose kids’ status does not change between
waves, the mean risk changes are 0.1×10-6 and 0.9×10-7 for those with underage kids and
those without underage kids, respectively (including zero risk changers). In general,
workers without kids have more variation in risk change than workers with kids.29 This
may indicate that the having underage kids forces workers to make a conservative
decision in terms of occupational risk when they change a career.30 For the workers who
remain as a union member, and workers who remain as a non-union member between
waves, the mean risk changes are 0.2×10-6 and 0.1×10-6, respectively. The workers who
remain as a non-union member show wider variation of risk changes than unionmembers. Although table 6 shows the smallest risk change for unionized worker is 10.74×10-4, there is only one observation for this level of risk change. The second
smallest risk change for unionized workers is -5.64×10-4, thus the more reasonable range

29

Although the table 6 indicates the similar min and max risk change of workers with underage kids
compared those of workers without underage kids, there are only one observation at upper and lower bound
level of risk changes. Removal of these observations reduce the range of risk change to -5.64×10-4 to
5.50×10-4.
30
Of course there may be other demographic characteristics which explain the difference of the risk change
range between two groups. For example, workers with underage kids are younger and more likely being
married than workers without underage kids.

40

of risk change for these workers is -5.64×10-4 to 4.96×10-4 which is much narrower than
the risk change for non-union workers (-12.33×10-4 to 12.41×10-4).
This section describes the risk level change associated with the changes in
workers demographic characteristics shown in table 7. In general, the range of risk
change for workers who change demographic characteristics is narrower than that of
workers who do not change demographic status.31 32 The difference in the range of risk
change between these two groups of workers may be due to the different sample size.
For example, there are only 2,308 worker-wave observations who change marital status
while there are 131,515 worker-wave observations that do not change marital status. The
small sample size in table 7 may fail to capture the workers movement between extreme
risk changes. Risk changes seem to be randomly distributed on observable demographic
characteristics changes as indicated the mean changes not being significantly different
from zero. This is consistent with the mean risk changes for workers whose demographic
status does not change. Interestingly, however, workers tend to change risk level when
they change a demographic status more often than when staying in a same demographic
category. The proportions of zero risk changers among workers who stay in a same
demographic status are between 4 and 11% depending on the category, while that among
workers who change a demographic status are between 17 and 28%.

31

Although the maximum risk change for workers who change marital status from married to single is
11.37×10-4, there is only one observation that experiences this level of risk change. The second highest risk
change is 4.31×10-4 for these workers.
32
Although the table 3.7 indicates that the min and max risk change of workers who change from nonunion to union status is -11.58×10-4 to 10.83×10-4 there are only one observation at upper and lower bound
level of risk changes. Removal of these observations reduces the range of risk change to -5.36×10-4 to
5.58×10-4.
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Data for Chapter 5
This section is organized as follows. First, the labor force data used in chapter 5,
the Current Population Survey (CPS), is discussed. Also discussed are potential wage
determinants for drivers that are not available from the CPS, such as regional
characteristics including the local annual unemployment rate, and the per capita sales
volume of wholesale, retail, transportation, and entertainment industries. Next section
discusses the occupational fatal data followed by the employment data and the summary
of risk rates for each occupational driver. Also the non-fatal injury risk data and the
summary of non-fatal injury risk rates for each occupational driver is discussed. Lastly
the summary statistics for fatal and non-fatal events for the sample workers are discussed.
Labor force data: Current Population Survey (CPS).
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a national survey administered by the
Census Bureau and the BLS. Each survey includes about 50,000 households. It is a
monthly survey and each respondent participates for 16 month. The samples are
interviewed each month for the first four months, and then take a break for eight months,
and then come back and are interviewed each month for a final four months. The sample
used in the analysis is group of respondents who are either in the fourth or the eighth
“Month in Survey,” in other word, in the fourth or the 16th month of their participation
period. Survey participants in the fourth or 16th month are referred to as the “outgoing
rotation group.” The outgoing rotation group is a preferred sample because of the
availability of current wage data. We collect the sample of workers every other year so
that no person appears in an outgoing rotation group more than once.
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The sample of drivers is obtained from the CPS administered in 1994, 1996, 1998,
2000 and 2002. The sample is limited to a non self-employed, single job holding, full
time occupational drivers. Workers earning less than minimum wage33 and workers in
Hawaii and Alaska are not included. Self employed workers are omitted for several
reasons: 1) our focus is to estimate hedonic wage equations resulting in the wage-risk
negotiation, however this would not be the case for self-employed workers, and 2) as
described later, the risk measure does not reflect the risk of self employed workers.
There are total 19,371 occupational drivers in the CPS sample including truck,
sales, bus and taxi drivers. The worker’s occupation in the CPS is coded according to
the Census Occupation Classification, which follows the Standard Occupation
Classification 1980 definition. In Census Occupation Classification, the following codes
are assigned to each occupational driver; 804 for truck drivers, 806 for sales drivers, 808
for bus drivers and 809 for taxi drivers. The detailed definition of each occupational
driver is presented in Appendix F. Truck drivers operate tractors, heavy or light trucks.
They transport, deliver or/and pick up goods and merchandise. Sales drivers operate
trucks or other vehicles to deliver, sell, or collect goods over establish routes. Bus
drivers transport passengers inter-city and intra-city by bus. Taxi drivers operate
automobiles or limousines to transport passengers.
The wage, individual and job characteristics other than occupational fatal risk (X)
are also obtained from the CPS. The variables in Xi includes age, educational attainment,
race, U.S. citizenship, gender, usual work hours, union status, marital status, location of

33

Minimum hourly wage for taxi driver is $2.13 per hour. Minimum wage per hour for other drivers is
$4.25 in 1994, $4.75 in 1996, and $5.15 in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Per hour minimum wage is multiplied by
35 hours to obtain weekly minimum wage.
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household, occupation dummy, regional dummy and MSA dummy variables. Table 8
shows the definitions, data source and summary statistics of each variable.
The average weekly wage of occupational drivers is $683 which is higher than the
average U.S. worker’s weekly wage which is about $530 and the SIPP sample used in
chapter 4.34 In chapter 5, all monetary values are adjusted to 2004 dollars using the
consumer price index. Average age of the sample is 40 years old which is slightly older
than the SIPP sample. About half of the sample graduated from high school, 23% of the
sample received a college level education, and 4% of the sample graduated from a four
year college. Compared to the SIPP sample, the educational attainment level is slightly
lower among the CPS driver sample, and compared to the national average, the
educational attainment level is even lower.
Ten percent of the sample is of Hispanic origin, and 12% is African American.
Most of the sample has U.S. citizenship (93%) and only 6% of the sample is female,
reflecting the male-dominance of the occupations upon which we focus. Fifty-percent of
the sample works overtime and 23% of the sample holds a union membership, both of
which are noticeably larger than that of our general sample from the SIPP used in chapter
4. In the SIPP sample, only 19% worked overtime and 19% held a union membership,
which is still higher than the national average (12.5%). Sixty four percent of the sample
is married, which is again higher than the proportion of married sample in the SIPP
(56%). In summary, occupational drivers tend to be older, less educated, highly male
dominated, engaged in more overtime work, and more heavily unionized than the
national average and our general SIPP sample from chapter 4.

34

According to October 2005 Employment Situation Summary published by BLS. Monetary value of
average weekly wage for the U.S. worker is adjusted to 2004 currency level by consumer price index.
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Local area unemployment statistics.
The local unemployment rate is a potentially important factor for determining the
wage level, as well as the willingness of workers to accept workplace risk. The
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) unemployment rate in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and
2002 is obtained from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) administered by
the BLS. 35 The average annual unemployment rate during the sample period (19942002) is between 4% and 6%. However, the unemployment rate varies significantly
across MSAs. For example, some MSAs such as the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission MSA in
Texas recorded quite high unemployment rates (over 10%) between 1994 and 2002,
while others such as Madison, Wisconsin experienced quite low unemployment rates (23%) during the sample period. In general, the West census region experienced relatively
high unemployment rate (average 6%) compared to other regions (4.5% to 5.5%) during
the sample period.
Economic activity in each MSA.
Different levels of economic activity in each MSA could affect the wage level of
workers through different levels of demand for occupational drivers. The volume of sales
in wholesales, retail, transportation, arts-entertainment, and accommodation and food
service industries in each MSA would likely affect the demand for the truck, sales, bus
and taxi drivers. These data are obtained from the 1997 Economic Census administered
by the U.S. Census Bureau and are only available for 1997.36
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The population of each

The data is available via the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) retrieved March 25, 2007
from http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm.
36
The data is available via 1997 Economic Census retrieved March 25, 2007 from
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html.
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MSA is also obtained from the 1997 Economic Census to calculate the per-capita sales
volume and employment level in the above industries.
The vehicle miles traveled (VMT).
The number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in each MSA may indicate different
traffic levels and workload for occupational drivers among MSAs. This difference may
affect the wage level of occupational drivers, and the fatal or non-fatal risk levels the
drivers face at work. The VMT is obtained from Bluestone (Forthcoming). Bluestone
collects the county level VMT in 1996 from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)37 and aggregates it to the MSA level. The VMT is computed on a per-capita basis.
Occupational fatal incidences.
This section describes the source of occupational fatal incidence data. The next
section presents the local employment data used to calculate the local fatal risk rates,
followed by a discussion of the estimated local fatal risk rates.
The number of occupational fatal incidences is obtained from the Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (CFOI) file collected by the BLS for the period 1992 through 2002.
This data differs from that in chapter 4 by level of detail and is thus not publicly
available. The non-public use CFOI file contains information on the location of injury at
the county level in addition to the information available in the public CFOI (see appendix
A). For this research, the location of injury at the county level is aggregated into an
MSA level count of deaths using the 1999 MSA definition by the Office of Management
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U.S.EPA (1998) National Air Pollutant Emission Trends Update, 1970-1997," EPA-454/E-98-007, U.S.
Environmental Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC,
December 1998
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and Budget.38 This is the definition used in the 1999-2002 Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES), which provide the source of our employment level in each MSA.39
Later, the count of deaths in each MSA for each occupational driver is divided by the
employment level of each occupational driver in each MSA, so the MSA definition
should be matched between denominator and numerator. The location of injury at the
state level is directly coded from the CFOI.40
Two types of fatal events are also obtained directly from the CFOI; homicide and
non-homicide deaths. For ease of exposition, we refer to homicides as violent assault
deaths and non-homicides as non-violent deaths. Violent assaults include assaults and
violent acts by persons such as hitting and shooting, and do not include self-inflicted
injuries and assaults by animals. Non-violent events include deaths from all sources
other than homicide and self-inflicted injuries.
There are a total of 10,475 non-self employed occupational drivers deaths during
the period 1992 to 2002 or 952 deaths per year on average.41 Among them, 8,872 are
deaths of truck drivers, 468 are sales drivers, 198 are bus drivers and 937 are taxi drivers.
The number of deaths is re-counted for each occupational driver in each MSA/state for
each death event. The summary of the fatal incidence for each type of driver for each
event is shown in table 9. The transportation related injuries are the main cause of death
for truck, sales, and bus drivers and accounts for 70 to 80% of total deaths. Violent
assaults are the main cause of death for taxi drivers, accounting for 70% of total deaths.
38

MSA definition available from Metropolitan Areas and Components 1999 with FIPS code retrieved
March 25, 2007 from http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt.
39
We also use 1998 and 2003 OES which use slightly different MSA definitions. However, definition
change between 1998 OES, 2003 OES and 1999-2002 OES is marginal and should not have any effect on
using 1999-2002 MSA definition for entire period.
40
Both county and state are coded based on FIPS. In CFOI, state of New York is coded as 68 instead of 36
as of FIPS.
41
This number includes the deaths due to self-inflicted injury and assaults by animals.
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Other deaths include being struck by objects, caught in equipment, compressed or
pinched by rolling, sliding or shifting objects, caught in or crushed in collapsing
materials, falls, bodily reactions and exertion, contact with electric current, exposure to
temperature extremes or to caustic, noxious or allergenic substances, ingestion of
substances, fire, or explosion.
The majority of violent assault deaths occur inside MSAs. Of those who die of a
violent assault, 84 percent of truck drivers, 87% of sales drivers and 91 % of taxi drivers
died within an MSA. The number of death within an MSA for bus drivers and all drivers
are suppressed for reasons of confidentiality. A high level of deaths by homicide within
MSAs could be due to the higher crime rates in urban areas as compared to non-urban
areas. Non-violent deaths including transportation related deaths and other types of
deaths often occur outside MSAs. Of those who die of a transportation related event, 47
percent of truck drivers, 36% of sales drivers, 35% of bus drivers, and 21% of taxi drivers
died in transportation related events outside MSAs. Also, of those who die of other types
of death, 36% of truck drivers and 31% of sales drivers died outside the MSAs. In the
analysis, the regression results using different combinations of MSA-level and state-level
violent and non-violent risk rates will be presented.
Table 10 reports the MSAs where the top five numbers of deaths occurs for truck,
sales and taxi drivers summarized by the event of death. The second and the fourth
columns show the actual number of deaths in each MSA with a corresponding risk rate,
which discussed later. Los Angeles and Chicago are ranked in the top five for
occupational deaths in each driving occupation regardless the death event. The other
cities in the top five ranking are large MSAs, such as Dallas, Washington, DC, Miami,
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Atlanta, Houston, Philadelphia, Detroit, and New York. Not surprisingly, New York City
has an outstanding number of violent assault deaths of taxi drivers. One-hundred, eightysix taxi drivers (17 taxi drivers annually) died due to the violent assault over the last 11
years. Also table 11 shows the list of states where the top five number of deaths occurs
for the truck, sales and taxi drivers. For truck drivers, California, Texas and Florida have
the highest deaths for both violent and non-violent events. For sales drivers,
Pennsylvania, Texas and Georgia record the highest deaths among all states for both
events. For taxi drivers, New York, California, Florida and Illinois are the states with the
highest level of deaths regardless of the event.
Area specific employment level: Occupational Employment Statistics (OES).
The fatal risk rate is calculated by equation 14. The annual average number of
deaths in each occupation and in each MSA/state is divided by the annual average
employment level in each occupation and in each MSA/state. The number of workers in
each driving occupation in each MSA/state is collected from the Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) administered in 1998-2003 at the MSA level and 19982004 OES at the state level by the BLS. Unfortunately, employment data at the MSA
and state level (for detailed occupations) is not available prior to 1998. In addition, the
OES does not include self-employed workers, therefore self-employed worker deaths are
removed from the risk estimation.
There can be significant bias of our risk estimation due to the use of data from a
different time period in the numerator (period in 1992-2002) and the denominator (period
in 1998–2003). If the actual employment level between 1992 and 1997 is significantly
lower (higher) than the employment level between 1998 and 2003, the estimated risk rate
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is underestimated (overestimated) as the annual average risk rate of the period in 19922002.
Table 12 is the assessment of the potential bias due to the limited employment
data period. According to the BLS’s Current Employment Statistics (CES), which report
a longer period of national employment data, there is the following employment trend for
the driving occupations between 1992-1997 and 1998-2003. In the CES, there is no
distinction between the truck driver and the sales drivers, so both occupations are
combined into the “truck” category in table 12. The taxi and bus drivers are reported to
have about a 3 to 4% increase in employment levels, while the truck drivers show a rather
significant increase in the employment level between two periods (12%). This indicates
that using the 1998-2003 average employment level as a denominator would likely
underestimate the average fatal risk level of truck drivers between 1992 and 2002
periods.
A solution to this problem is to estimate risk rates using only the 1998-2002 death
record to match the data period of the denominator and the numerator. A potential
problem of this solution is a reduction of number of deaths due to the shorter period of
data. The reduction in the number of deaths will generate more geographic areas with
zero risk, which can lead to a less variation in the risk variables. This is a particular
concern for the violent assault fatal risk.
Table 13 shows the summary of deaths by occupation in the period of 1998-2002.
If the frequencies of deaths are constant over time, the number of deaths in the period of
1998-2002 should account for about 45% of total number of deaths between 1992 and
2002. The parentheses in table 13 shows the proportion of deaths occurred in the period

50

1998-2002 in the total deaths occurred between 1992 and 2002. For the violent assault
case, truck drivers and taxi drivers have somewhat fewer deaths than expected during
1998-2002 while the number of transportation related deaths is increased for all drivers,
particularly for bus drivers compare to the period of 1992-1997.
To further examine the potential impact of the available data on our hedonic
results, hedonic wage models are estimated separately using two risk rates. First the risk
rates created with the 1992-2002 death record are matched to our 1994-2002 worker data,
and then the risk rates created with the 1998-2002 death record are matched to 1996-2002
worker data. For the model using the risk rate based on the 1998-2002 death record, the
1994 CPS is dropped from the analysis because its labor data period is far before the risk
data period.
Fatal risk rate.
The summary of risk rates by occupation for each event is described in this
section. Table 14 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the risk rates created
from the 1992-2002 death record for each event of death and for each occupational
driver. The risk rates are estimated both at MSA and state levels. Standard deviations are
presented in parentheses. At the MSA level, the average violent assault fatal risk is 0.97
in 10,000 drivers or 0.97×10-4, and the average non-violent fatal risk is 1.74×10 -4.
Compared to the average risk level of all occupations, which is 0.9×10-4, driving is a
somewhat higher risk occupation. Taxi drivers report the highest violent fatal risk rate of
3.52×10 -4. The average violent fatal risk for the sales, bus and truck drivers are 0.24×104

, 0.13×10-4 and 0.06×10-4, respectively. On the other hand, truck drivers have the

highest non-violent fatal risk rate of 2.62×10-4. Taxi drivers have the second highest fatal
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risk rate, 2.17×10-4, followed by that of sales drivers of 1.02×10-4, and that of bus drivers
of 0.95×10-4.
Compared to the MSA level risk, the mean value of state level violent assault risk
is higher for all occupational drivers, and the mean value of state level non-violent risk is
slightly higher or similar. For example, the mean state-level violent assault risk is 46%
more than the mean MSA level risk, and the mean state level non-violent fatal risk is
14% more than the mean MSA level non-violent fatal risk. The largest difference in the
mean violent risk can be seen for the taxi drivers where the state level risk is 51% more
than the mean MSA level risk. The largest difference in the mean non-violent risk is for
the bus drivers where the state level risk is 52% more than the mean MSA level risk
which indicates that the deaths outside MSA are proportionally more than the number of
workers outside MSA.
Table 15 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the MSA level fatal risk
rate by occupation and event after dropping MSAs with less than 100 employees. Since
some MSAs have very high risk rate due to their small employment level, we examine if
the average risk level change by excluding MSAs with less than 100 employees. There is
no change in the risk rate for the truck drivers. There are slight decreases in risk rates for
other drivers, except the violent assault risk rate for the taxi drivers. The violent assault
risk rate for the taxi drivers actually increased. This is because dropping MSAs with less
than 100 employees removes many MSAs with zero risk as well as MSAs with a very
high violent assault risk.
Table 16 and 17 repeat the information in table 14 and 15, but risks are created
using only the 1998-2002 CFOI data. As indicated in table 16, the violent fatal risk rate
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created based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data is generally smaller than that created based on
the 1992-2002 CFOI data except for the bus drivers. This is true for both the MSA level
risk rate and the state level risk rate. For example, with the MSA level risk rate, the mean
1998-2002 CFOI based violent risk rate is 0.75×10-4 for all drivers, which is 22% less
compared to the 1992-2002 CFOI based risk rate. The non-violent fatal risk created
from the 1998-2002 CFOI is larger than that created from the 1992-2002 CFOI for the
MSA level risk for any types of driver. It is slightly larger for truck and sales drivers and
smaller for bus and taxi drivers when we compare the state level risk.
Table 17 is the mean and standard deviation of the fatal risk rate by occupation
and the event of death based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data after dropping MSAs with less
than 100 employees. There is no change in the risk rate for truck drivers. The risk level
is decreased for other drivers except for the violent risk for the sales drivers.
The decrease in violent fatal risk rates based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data (except
bus drivers) as compared to the risk rates based on the 1992-2002 CFOI data is as
expected. The annual frequency of violent fatal incidence during the period of 19982002 is less than that of 1992-2002 (except bus drivers), but we use a same annual
employment level to estimate both risk rates. For the same reason, the increase in nonviolent fatal risk rates based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data as compared to the risk rates
based on the 1992-2002 CFOI data is as expected.
Non-fatal injury incidence: Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (IIF) program.
This section describes the number of non-fatal occupational injuries and its risk
rates among occupational drivers. The non-fatal occupational injury risk is called injury
risk in this study. The count of non-fatal injuries comes from the Injuries, Illnesses, and
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Fatalities (IIF) program, administered by the BLS. The IIF provides information about
the number of incidences of occupational injuries for each state in the United States.
The number of injuries can be broken down into the following categories: state where the
incidence occurs, employer profile (private, state government, or local government), year
of incidence, and injured worker’s characteristics such as industry and occupation
affiliation and event of injuries. The aggregated number of injury cases for stateoccupation-event pairs is readily available in the IIF CD-Rom (available from the BLS
upon request). However, for each state-occupation-event pair, the information about
industry affiliation of injured worker is not available. Thus, we include school bus
drivers, which are removed from the fatal risk calculation, to estimate a injury risk for
bus drivers.
The number of injuries is defined as the number of workers who experience days
away from work due to an occupational injury. Occupational injuries which result in
death are omitted from these statistics. The annual non-fatal injury data are available
between 1992 and 2002 for most states. The more detailed data availability by state is
summarized in table 18. Colorado, Washington DC, Idaho, New Hampshire, North
Dakota and Ohio do not participate in the IIF program and so there is no injury data
available for these states. The nonfatal injuries are divided into two events following the
fatal risk creation: those caused by violent interactions such as worker conflicts or
assaults and those caused by non-violent acts.
For each occupation, the number of nonfatal injuries for each event is divided by
the number of total employment in each state to create non-fatal injury risk rates. The
number of total employment is obtained from the OES. The injury risk is only available
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at the state level. For the same reason of the fatal risk case, the injury risk rate is
calculated separately using 1992-2002 data and 1998-2002 data.
Table 19 shows the mean injury risk rates for each driving occupation across state
for total risk, violent interactions and transportation related event created from the 19922002 injury data. Truck driving has the highest non-fatal injury rate for both total injury
and transportation related injuries. Five in 100 truck drivers experience some kind of
injury every year, and seven in 1,000 truck drivers experience some type of traffic-related
injury. Bus drivers show the highest violent-related injury rate among all driving
occupations. Four in 1,000 bus drivers suffer a violent-related injury every year. Taxi
drivers experience a relatively low non-fatal violent-related injury (seven in 10,000). A
relatively low non-fatal violent-related injury rate combined with a high violent-related
fatality risk indicates that when a taxi driver is assaulted, it tends to be fatal.
For the truck, sales and bus drivers, the proportion of transportation related nonfatal injuries to total injuries is between 6 and 21%. This is a dramatic difference
compared to the proportion of transportation-related fatal injuries of between 70 and
80%. This disparity of event component between fatal and nonfatal injuries may explain
why there is generally no effect of adding injury risk on the fatal risk coefficient in the
previous HW studies (Kochi et al., 2006; Mrozek & Taylor, 2002).
Table 20 shows the non-fatal injury rates by occupation based on the IFF 19982002. When the injury risk is created from the 1998-2002 injury data to match the period
of employment data, the injury risk rate is generally slightly reduced as compared to the
injury risk rate created based on the IFF 1992-2002.

55

Fatal and non-fatal risks in the sample.
This section describe the fatal and non-fatal injury risk level our sample of
workers face. First I describes the risk rates created from the 1992-2002 CFOI, and then
describe the risk rates created from the 1998-2002 CFOI. Table 21 shows the summary
statistics of the MSA level risk rates based on the 1992-2002 CFOI in the sample. There
are 12,892 total drivers who live in MSAs in the sample. Among them, 40% of drivers
face zero violent fatal risk and 8% of drivers face zero non-violent fatal risk. The mean
violent assault fatal risk rate is 0.83×10-4 and the mean non-violent fatal risk rate is
1.92×10-4. Compared to the mean fatal risk level in the SIPP sample in chapter 4, the
fatal risk level of occupational drivers is quite high.
The proportion of the sample living in MSAs which face zero violent fatal risk is
39% for truck drivers, 60% for sales drivers, 79% for bus drivers, and 14% for taxi
drivers. On the other hand, there is generally a much smaller proportion of the sample
which faces zero non-violent fatal risk (except for taxi drivers). Only 1% of truck
drivers, 38% of sales drivers, 39% of bus drivers and 20% of taxi drivers face zero nonviolent fatal risk.
The mean violent fatal risk rate for truck, sales, bus and taxi drivers is 0.08×10-4,
0.30×10-4, 0.18×10-4, and 10.67×10-4 respectively. The mean non-violent fatal risk rate
for truck, sales, bus and taxi drivers is 2.07×10-4, 0.70×10-4, 0.87×10-4, and 2.38×10-4
respectively. Table 22 summarizes the state level risk rates in the sample that is
constructed from the CFOI 1992-2002. In general, the state level violent assault risk is
lower than MSA level violent risk, while the state level non-violent risk is higher than the
MSA level non-violent risk for the sample. The number of workers with zero risk at the
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state level is much smaller than at the MSA level. With the state level risk rates, there are
18% of drivers who face zero violent fatal risk and only 1% of drivers who face zero nonviolent fatal risk. There is no state in which truck drivers face zero non-violent fatal risk
in the sample.
Table 23 and 24 shows a summary of the MSA and state level risk rates that are
constructed from the CFOI 1998-2002 sample, respectively. The risk rates are merged
with CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 only. The number of workers who face zero risk
increases as compared to table 21 and 23. For violent fatal risk, the 1998-2002 CFOI
base risk rates is smaller than the 1992-2002 risk rate for total, truck and taxi drivers
regardless of the geographic level at which the risk is created. Compared to the 19922002 CFOI base risk rate, the mean MSA level violent risk is reduced from 0.83×10-4 to
0.46×10-4 for the entire sample. The risk rate changes for truck, sales and bus drivers are
small, while that of taxi drivers is quite large (5.43×10-4 in the 1998-2002 CFOI base
risk)
For the non-violent fatal risk, the 1998-2002 CFOI base risk rates are larger than
the 1992-2002 CFOI risk rates for all drivers except taxi drivers, regardless the
geographic level at which the risk is created. Compared to the 1992-2002 CFOI based
risk rate, the mean MSA level non-violent risk is increased from 1.92×10-4 to 2.09×10-4,
and the mean state level non-violent risk is also increased from 2.92×10-4 to 3.16×10-4 for
the entire sample.
Table 25 shows the summary of injury risks for each driver and event created
from the 1992-2002 IFF. For all drivers, the mean violent injury rate is 2.0×10-4 and the
mean non-violent injury rate is 5.22×10-2. The lowest mean violent injury risk is for
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truck drivers (1.0×10-4) and the highest mean violent injury risk is for bus drivers
(1.2×10-3). The lowest mean non-violent injury risk is for taxi drivers (1.1×10-2) and the
highest mean non-violent injury risk is for truck drivers (5.7×10-2). Thirty-percent of
drivers face zero violent injury risk, and only 0.1% of drivers face zero non-violent injury
risks. None of the truck, sales or bus drivers face zero non-violent injury risks. Table 26
shows the summary of the injury rates created from the 1998-2002 IIF. When using the
1998-2002 IIF, the mean injury risk rates are generally slightly decreased as compared to
the 1992-2002 based injury risk. Only the violent injury risks for sales drivers are
slightly increased.
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Table 1
Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics

Definition
hwage
risk
age
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
othrace
female
workov
union
married
kids18
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize
neast
midwest
west
south
urban
agind
constind
tcuind
trdind

hourly wage
fatal risk injury rate by occupation and industry per 10,000
workers
age in years
1 if individual have bachelor degree or more
1 if individual attended college
1 if individual graduated from high school
1 if individual has a Hispanic origin
1 if individual is black and non-Hispanic
1 if individual is non-white, non-black, non-Hispanic
1 if individual is female
1 if individual usually works more than 40 hours
1 if individual is a union member or covered by union
1 if individual is married
number of kids under 18 years old
1 if individual is provided part of health insurance by employer
1 if individual is provided full health insurance by employer
1 if number of employee at all locations > 100
1 if number of employee at worker's location < 25
1 if individual lives in Northeastern region
1 if individual lives in Midwestern region
1 if individual lives in West region
1 if individual lives in Southern region
1 if individual lives in urban area
1 if individual works in the agricultural industry
1 if individual works in the construction industry
1 if individual works in the transportation, communications or
utility industry
1 if individual works in the wholesale or retail trades industry

1996SIPP, all
worker-wave
(N=166,362)
Mean
(SD)
13.27
(5.90)
0.55

(0.95)

38.06
0.09
0.33
0.41
0.13
0.13
0.04
0.45
0.19
0.19
0.56
0.79
0.44
0.20
0.56
0.29
0.16
0.26
0.18
0.34
0.78
0.02
0.07

(11.47)

0.06
0.19

(1.10)
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servind
1 if individual works in the service industry
manufind
1 if individual works in the manufacturing industry
pubind
1 if individual works in the public industry
craftocc
1 if individual has a craft job
profocc
1 if individual has a professional job
techocc
1 if individual has a technical job
servocc
1 if individual has a service job
farmocc
1 if individual has a farming job
laborocc
1 if individual has a labor job
Note. Standard deviations for continuous variables are shown in parenthesis.

0.31
0.25
0.10
0.16
0.11
0.28
0.14
0.05
0.26
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Table 2
The Number of Observations Changing Jobs between Major Occupation Groups
After (t)
Professional

Craft

Technical

Service

Labor

Farming

Total

Professional

13,854

103

595

196

155

11

14,914

Craft

151

21,438

279

150

716

50

22,784

Technical

752

289

35,388

423

603

31

37,486

Service

243

142

468

16,482

392

38

17,765

Labor

198

833

662

408

33,666

115

35,882

Farming

15

45

53

55

119

2,397

2,684

Total

15,213

22,850

37,445

17,714

35,651

2,642

131,515a

Before (t-1)

a

The total number in this cell does not match the total number of observations in the sample because for each
worker, the first observation is dropped due to the lack of a “previous occupation” data.
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Table 3
The Number of Observations Changing Jobs between Major Industry Groups
After (t)

Construction

Agriculture

TCU

WST

Service

Manufacturing

Public

Total

Construction

9,380

754

56

144

155

162

25

10,676

Agriculture

51

2,902

14

86

55

34

14

3,156

Transportation
/Communication/
Utility (TCU)

52

8

8,785

102

175

84

16

9,222

Wholesales/
Trade (WST)

158

66

133

22,584

834

495

66

24,336

Service

175

43

204

641

38,978

519

147

40,707

Manufacturing

218

48

115

428

546

34,593

46

35,994

Public

21

6

23

35

124

39

7,876

8,124

Total

10,055

3,827

9,330

24,020

40,867

35,926

8,190

132,215a

Before (t-1)

a

The total number in this cell does not match the total number of observations in the sample because for each worker, the first
observation is dropped due to the lack of a “previous occupation” data.
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Table 4
The Risk Rate Change in Each Major Occupation Group

After (t)

Professional
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Craft
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Technical
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Service
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Labor
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Farming
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

professional

0.00004 (0.037)
[-1.04/0.94]

0.722 (1.201)
[-0.247/5.301]

-0.049 (0.315)
[-0.934/5.584]

0.053 (0.317)
[-0.870/0.835]

0.757 (1.264)
[-1.378/5.357]

1.115 (0.433)
[0.420/1.672]

craft

-0.522 (0.677)
[-3.442/0.942]

0.0008 (0.180)
[-5.325/4.887]

-0.518 (0.846)
[-5.434/5.080]

-0.382 (0.731)
[-2.210/1.063]

0.532 (1.467)
[-4.851/5.071]

0.461 (2.110)
[-4.927/11.372]

technical

0.055 (0.164)
[-1.482/0.928]

0.509 (0.795)
[-4.867/5.239]

-0.0004 (0.064)
[-5.638/5.391]

0.064 (0.359)
[-3.819/1.806]

0.753 (1.121)
[-4.765/5.402]

1.992 (3.314)
[-0.554/12.413]

service

-0.027 (0.334)
[-1.814/1.025]

0.534 (0.966)
[-1.653/4.774]

-0.051 (0.249)
[-1.564/0.737]

0.0001 (0.058)
[-1.509/1.521]

0.670 (1.160)
[-1.022/4.983]

1.167 (0.699)
[-0.374/3.036]

labor

-0.872 (1.266)
[-4.270/1.499]

-0.306 (1.347)
[-5.013/5.278]

-0.695 (1.058)
[-5.640/1.053]

-0.547 (1.111)
[-4.534/1.185]

0.004 (0.358)
[-5.072/5.500]

0.356 (2.342)
[-3.302/12.286]

farming

-0.969 (1.583)
[-1.672/0.185]

-0.799 (2.514)
[-10.746/4.244]

-1.302 (1.721)
[-12.336/2.177]

-1.460 (2.178)
[-12.182/0.403]

0.239 (2.117)
[-11.505/3.809]

0.002 (0.275)
(-2.646/10.695]

Before (t-1)
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Table 5
The Risk Rate Change in Each Major Industry Group

After (t)

Construction
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Agriculture
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

TCU
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Wholesales/
Trade
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Service
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

Manufacturing
Mean (sd)
[min/max]

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

Construction

-0.002 (0.391)
[-4.826/4.411]

0. 335 (1.909)
[-2.721/5.091]

0.067 (2.044)
[-3.612/4.317]

-1.500 (1.092)
[-4.436/0.590]

-1.667 (1.452)
[-5.162/1.917]

-1.986 (1.337)
[-5.072/1.724]

-2.022 (1.078)
[-3.713/-0.059]

Agriculture

0.290 (1.831)
[-3.765/2.622]

0.002 (0.382)
[-4.072/5.402]

0.425 (1.553)
[-1.690/2.597]

-1.551 (1.135)
[-5.434/0.111]

-1.273 (0.937)
[-4.327/2.235]

-1.361 (2.484)
[-5.325/10.695]

-1.610 (1.665)
[-5.367/0.453]

Transportation
/Communication/
Utility (TCU)

0.092 (2.097)
[-3.769/4.169]

0.240 (2.302)
[-2.235/4.253]

0.008 (0.388)
[-5.640/5.366]

-1.128 (1.667)
[-5.417/1.120]

-0.886 (1.496)
[-5.638/2.102]

-1.141 (2.159)
[-4.867/12.125]

-0.851 (1.511)
[-3.483/0.852]

Wholesales/
Trade

1.471 (1.192)
[-0.826/4.943]

1.241 (0.996)
[-0.265/4.672]

0.692 (1.508)
[-1.361/5.391]

-0.0003 (0.111)
[-1.410/1.563]

-0.089 (0.395)
[-1.379/2.728]

-0.050 (0.578)
[-1.474/2.847]

0.1003 (0.437)
[-0.960/0.804]

Service

1.632 (1.373)
[-1.364/4.983]

1.546 (1.020)
[0.035/5.301]

0.796 (1.485)
[-2.798/5.584]

0.077 (0.413)
[-2.715/1.399]

0.003 (0.094)
[-2.949/2.949]

0.087 (0.900)
[-2.194/12.413]

0.134 (0.471)
[-2.900/1.366]

Manufacturing

1.815 (1.844)
[-10.746/5.094]

1.908 (1.175)
[-0.125/5.278]

1.260 (1.530)
[-0.946/5.500]

0.061 (0.771)
[-11.505/1.578]

-0.060 (0.695)
[-12.182/2.383]

0.0006 (0.201)
[-12.336/11.831]

0.195 (0.456)
[-0.765/0.860]

Public

1.752 (1.226)
[-0.424/3.713]

0.700 (0.746)
[-0.820/1.650]

1.454 (1.781)
[-0.370/4.344]

-0.049 (0.429)
[-0.804/0.901]

-0.175 (0.377)
[-0.891/1.251]

-0.079 (0.461)
[-1.007/0.813]

-0.0002 (0.083)
[-1.399/1.382]

Before (t-1)

(unit: 10-4)

(unit: 10-4)

Public
Mean (sd)
[min/max]
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Table 6
The Summary of Risk Changes in Different Groups of Workers

Total

Male workers

72,212

Female workers

59,303

Single workers

55,029

Married workers

76,486

Workers who have kids age
under 18
Workers who do not have kids
age under 18

a

22,507
72,380

Workers in union

23,471

Workers in non-union

100,831

The median value of all cases is zero.

Meana (sd)
[min/max]
(unit:10-4)
0.0039 (0.46)
[-12.33/12.41]
0.0002 (0.15)
[-5.64/4.95]
0.0031 (0.39)
[-12.18/12.41]
0.0016 (0.33)
[-12.33/12.12]
0.0013 (0.33)
[-10.74/10.83]
0.0009 (1.13)
[-12.33/12.41]
0.0024 (0.25)
[-10.74/4.96]
0.0018 (0.36)
[-12.33/12.41]

# of workers
whose risk
change is not
zero (%in Total)
7,646 (10%)
6,087 (10%)
6,821 (12%)
6256 (8%)
2,294 (10%)
7,131 (9%)
984 (4%)
11,335 (11%)

Mean (sd)
[min/max]
(unit:10-4)
0.0376 (1.43)
[-12.33/12.41]
0.0020 (0.49)
[-5.64/4.95]
0.0226 (1.09)
[-12.18/12.41]
0.0193 (1.15)
[-12.33/12.12]
0.0135 (1.06)
[-10.74/10.83]
0.0099 (1.13)
[-12.33/12.41]
0.0588 (1.25)
[-10.74/4.96]
0.0167 (1.08)
[-12.33/12.41]

Median

(unit:10-4)
0.0009
0.0001
0.0008
0.0010
0.0021
-0.0008
0.0122
0.0001
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Table 7
The Summary of Risk Changes in Different Groups of Workers Who Changes Demographic Status

Total

Single to married

1,503

Married to single

805

No kids under 18 to some kids
under 18
Some kids under 18 to no kids
under 18

a

2,358
3,341

Union to non-union

3,660

Non union to union

3,553

The median value of all cases is zero.

Meana (sd)
[min/max]
(unit:10-4)
0.0037 (0.50)
[-5.32/5.09]
0.0236 (0.63)
[-3.98/11.37)
0.0099 (0.54)
[-4.99/5.30]
0.0189 (0.57)
[-5.32/11.37]
-0.0147 (0.50)
[-5.41/4.20]
0.0301 (0.64)
[-11.58/10.83]

# of workers
whose risk
change is not
zero (%in Total)
429 (28%)
227 (28%)
552 (23%)
698 (20%)
652 (17%)
762 (21%)

Mean (sd)
[min/max]
(unit:10-4)
0.0131 (0.94)
[-5.32/5.09]
0.0839 (1.19)
[-3.98/11.37]
0.0425 (1.13)
[-4.99/5.30]
0.0908 (1.26)
[-5.32/11.37]
-0.0828 (1.18)
[-5.41/4.20)
0.1405 (1.38)
[-11.58/10.83]

Median
(unit:10-4)
-0.0113
-0.0008
0.0070
0.0018
-0.0161
0.0124
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Table 8
Variable Definition, Source and Summary Statistics (n=19,371a)
Variables

Description

Mean
(SD)
683
(336)
40.69
(11.60)
0.04
0.23
0.52
0.10
0.12
0.02
0.93
0.06
0.36
0.50

wage

weekly wage (adjusted to $2004)

age

age in years

ugdeg
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
othrace
uscit
female
salary
workov
married
central
truck
bus
taxi
year dummy
MSA dummy
State dummy
Region dummy

1 if individual has a four year college degree
1 if individual attended college
1 if individual graduated from high school
1 if individual has a Hispanic origin
1 if individual is black and non-Hispanic
1 if individual is not black, white or Hispanic
1 if individual is U.S. citizen
1 if individual is female
1 if individual works for salary
1 if individual usually works more than 40 hours
1 if individual is a union member or covered by
union
1 if individual is married
1 if individual lives in central city
1 if individual is truck driver
1 if individual is bus driver
1 if individual is taxi driver
1 if individual's data comes from corresponding year
1 if individual lives in a corresponding MSA
1 if individual lives in a corresponding state
1 if individual lives in a corresponding region

nonfatal_vrisk

occupational nonfatal violent assault risk

nonfatal_other

occupational nonfatal non-violent injury risk

unemp

annual unemployment rate of MSA where
individual lives

5.10
(1.95)

per capita sales in whole industry in MSA where
individual lives ($1,000)
per capita sales in retail industry in MSA where
individual lives ($1,000)
per capita sales in transportation industry in MSA
where individual lives ($1,000)
per capita sales in entertainment industry in MSA
where individual lives ($1,000)
per capita vehicle miles traveled in MSA where
individual lives

17.58
(9.95)
9.38
(1.91)
1.39
(1.04)
0.08
(0.05)
8,315
(2,901)

union

whole_sales
retail_sales
trans_sales
ent_sales
msavmtp

Data source

CPS (94, 96, 98,
00, 02)

0.23
0.66
0.21
0.83
0.07
0.05

2.18×10-4
(5.36×10-4)
5.25×10-2
(1.63×10-2)

estimated by
authors from IIF
(92-03) and OES
(98-03)
Local Area
Unemployment
Statistics (94, 96,
98, 00, 02)

1997 Economic
Census

Bluestone
(forthcoming)

Note. The variables unemp, whole_sales, retail_sales, trans_sales, ent_sales, msavmtp,
msavmta, ppmsa contain less observations due to the missing values.
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Table 9
Summary of Fatal Incidences by Occupation and Event (1992-2002 CFOI)
Violent

Total
(in an MSA)
[MSA % of total]

Truck
232
(195)
[84]

Sales
101
(88)
[87]

Non-violent
Transportation Total
7,176
335
(in an MSA)
(3,776)
(214)
[MSA % of total]
[52]
[63]
Others Total
1,362
29
(in an MSA)
(862)
(20)
[MSA % of total]
[63]
[68]
a
The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality.

Bus
25
-a
-a

Taxi
668
(612)
[91]

Total
1,026
-a
-a

150
(97)
[64]
16
-a
-a

245
(193)
[78]
16
-a
-a

7,906
(4,280)
[54]
1,423
(907)
[63]

68

Table 10
MSAs with Top Five Number of Deaths by Occupation and Event (1992-2002 CFOI)
Violent fatal injury

# of deaths
(risk rate)

Non-violent fatal injury

# of deaths
(risk rate)

Truck driver
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA
Dallas, TX PMSA
Chicago, IL PMSA
Washington D.C, PMSA
Miami FL, PMSA

16
(0.22×10-4)
9
(0.19×10-4)
7
(0.19×10-4)
7
(0.19×10-4)
6
(0.35×10-4)

Riverside-San Fernardino, CA
PMSA
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA
Chicago, IL PMSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Houston, TX PMSA

140
(4.93×10-4)
126
(1.79×10-4)
113
(1.38×10-4)
94
(1.91×10-4)
94
(2.29×10-4)

Sales driver
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA
Dallas, TX PMSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Detroit, MI PMSA
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA

8
(1.43×10-4)
6
(1.32×10-4)
6
(0.85×10-4)
5
(0.90×10-4)

Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Chicago, IL PMSA
Houston, TX PMSA
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA

-a

11
(1.97×10-4)
10
(1.42×10-4)
7
(0.81×10-4)
7
(0.85×10-4)
7
(0.51×10-4)

Taxi driver
New York, NY PMSA
Chicago, IL PMSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Washington D.C, PMSA
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA
a

186

(32.26×10-4)

29
(9.39×10-4)
24

(13.41×10-4)

24
(8.33×10-4)
20
(4.36×10-4)

New York, NY PMSA
Chicago, IL PMSA
Washington D.C, PMSA
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA
PMSA
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA

The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality

25
(4.3×10-4)
9
(2.91×10-4)
7
(2.43×10-4)
7
(1.42×10-4)
6
(2.36×10-4)
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Table 11
States with Top Five Number of Death Incidences by Occupation and Event
(1992-2002 CFOI)
Violent fatal injury

# of deaths
(risk rate)

Non-violent fatal injury

# of deaths
(risk rate)

Truck driver
California
Texas
Florida
Illinois
New York

36
(0.14×10-4)
27
(0.13×10-4)
15
(0.11×10-4)
10
(0.07×10-4)
10
(0.08×10-4)

California
Texas
Florida
North Carolina
Pennsylvania

821
(3.20×10-4)
777
(3.93×10-4)
418
(3.08×10-4)
351
(4.17×10-4)
332
(2.49×10-4)

Sales driver
Pennsylvania
Texas
Georgia
New York
Florida

10
(0.55×10-4)
9
(0.27×10-4)
8
(0.60×10-4)
6
(0.38×10-4)
6
(0.21×10-4)

Texas
Georgia
Missouri
Ohio
Pennsylvania

34
(1.04×10-4)
30
(2.27×10-4)
21
(2.24×10-4)
20
(0.93×10-4)
20
(1.11×10-4)

Taxi driver
New York
California
Florida
Illinois
Georgia

200
(18.88×10-4)
48
(3.23×10-4)
36
(3.73×10-4)
33
(6.90×10-4)
33
(10.07×10-4)

New York
California
Florida
New Jersey
Illinois

40
(3.77×10-4)
23
(1.54×10-4)
22
(2.28×10-4)
15
(2.32×10-4)
13
(0.20×10-4)
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Table 12
National Trend of Employment Growth in Driving Occupations

Truck

1217.66

1367.23

Percent change
between 1992-1997
average and 19982003 average
12% increase

Taxi
Bus

31.35
21.85

32.4
22.86

3% increase
4% increase

Occupation

Average employment
Average employment
1992-1997 (thousands) 1998-2003 (thousands)

Table 13
Summary of Fatal Incidence by Occupation and Event in the 1998-2002 CFOI (in
parenthesis, the proportion of deaths in 1992-2002 is reported)
Truck

Sales

Bus

Taxi

Total

85
(36%)
74
(37%)

43
(42%)
38
(43%)

12
(48%)
-a

208
(31%)
190
(31%)

348
(33%)
-a

4,125
194
102
130
(48%)
(53%)
(61%)
(49%)
(in an MSA)
2,259
124
67
101
(48%)
(52%)
(61%)
(49%)
a
The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality

4,551
(48%)
2,551
(49%)

Violent
Total
(in an MSA)
Non-violent
Total
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Table 14
Mean and Standard Deviation of Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event (1992-2002
CFOI) (standard deviation reported in parentheses)

Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

MSA level
Non-violent fatal
Violent fatal risk
risk
(in 10,000)
(in 10,000)
0.97 (3.97)
1.74 (3.72)
0.06 (0.15)
2.62 (2.10)
0.24 (1.00)
1.02 (2.19)
0.13 (0.85)
0.95 (2.95)
3.52 (7.36)
2.17 (6.09)

State level
Non-violent fatal
Violent fatal risk
risk
(in 10,000)
(in 10,000)
1.42 (4.20)
1.99 (1.64)
0.08 (0.15)
3.27 (1.68)
0.27 (0.27)
0.98 (0.70)
0.16 (0.43)
1.45 (1.59)
5.34 (7.30)
2.14 (1.39)

Table 15
Mean and Standard Deviation of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event
(1992-2002 CFOI) After Dropping MSAs With Less Than 100 Employees (standard
deviation reported in parentheses)

Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

Violent fatal risk
(in 10,000)
0.75 (2.82)
0.06 (0.15)
0.23 (0.82)
0.11 (0.51)
3.75 (5.88)

Non-violent fatal risk
(in 10,000)
1.60 (2.29)
2.62 (2.10)
0.97 (1.91)
0.68 (1.44)
1.68 (3.10)
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Table 16
Mean and Standard Deviation of Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event Based on
1998-2002 CFOI (standard deviation reported in parentheses)

MSA level
Non-violent fatal
Violent fatal risk
risk
(in 10,000)
(in 10,000)
0.75 (4.39)
1.95 (5.09)
0.05 (0.22)
2.79 (2.46)
0.19 (1.11)
1.22 (3.63)
0.14 (1.64)
1.43 (5.20)
2.66 (8.40)
2.25 (7.80)

Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

State level
Non-violent fatal
Violent fatal risk
risk
(in 10,000)
(in 10,000)
1.00 (3.11)
1.91 (1.91)
0.04 (0.05)
3.32 (2.19)
0.26 (0.45)
1.09 (1.10)
0.19 (0.83)
1.43 (1.76)
3.47 (5.47)
1.79 (1.65)

Table 17
Mean and Standard Deviation of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event
After Dropping MSAs With Less Than 100 Employees Based on 1998-2002 CFOI
(standard deviation reported in parentheses)

Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

Violent assault
(in 10,000)
0.48 (2.33)
0.05 (0.22)
0.21 (1.15)
0.05 (0.31)
2.29 (5.06)

Non-violent fatal risk
(in 10,000)
1.78 (3.20)
2.79 (2.46)
1.03 (2.53)
0.92 (2.55)
2.03 (5.09)
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Table 18
Missing Injury Data by Statea
Name of State
Years missing
Colorado
1992-2002
District of Columbia
1992-2002
Idaho
1992-2002
Illinois
1992-1997
Maine
1995
Maryland
1995
Mississippi
1995-2002
Missouri
1995
Montana
1995
New Hampshire
1992-2002
New Jersey
1992
North Carolina
1996
North Dakota
1992-2002
Ohio
1992-2002
Oregon
1995
Pennsylvania
1992, 1995-2002
South Carolina
1995
Vermont
1995-1996
Virginia
1995
West Virginia
1992-1997
Wyoming
1995-2001
a
State not listed had no missing data.
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Table 19
State Level Non-fatal Injury Rates by Occupation Based on the IFF 1992-2002 (standard
deviation reported in parentheses)

Assault injury
Transportation
related injury
Total injury

Truck drivers
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.007
(0.001)
0.0581
(0.011)

Sales drivers
0.0002
(0.0009)
0.003
(0.002)
0.046
(0.018)

Bus drivers
0.0004
(0.0008)
0.004
(0.003)
0.019
(0.015)

Taxi drivers
0.00007
(0.0003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.007
(0.007)

Table 20
State Level Non-fatal Injury Rates by Occupation Based on the IFF 1998-2002 (standard
deviation reported in parentheses)

Assault injury
Transportation
related injury
Total injury

Truck drivers
0.00005
(0.0001)
0.007
(0.001)
0.055
(0.012)

Sales drivers
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.004
(0.003)
0.041
(0.014)

Bus drivers
0.0003
(0.0007)
0.004
(0.003)
0.019
(0.014)

Taxi drivers
0.00006
(0.0004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.006
(0.008)
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Table 21
Summary of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based
on 1992-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses)

N
Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

12,892
10,293
602
1,115
882

Violent fatal risk (in
10,000)

Non-violent fatal
risk (in 10,000)

0.83 (4.19)
0.08 (0.11)
0.30 (0.57)
0.18 (1.64)
10.67 (12.33)

1.92 (1.63)
2.07 (2.46)
0.70 (3.63)
0.87 (1.39)
2.38 (3.17)

# of workers with
zero violent/nonviolent risk
5,408/1037
4,036/ 189
366/231
880/440
126/177

Table 22
Summary of State Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based
on 1992-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses)

N
Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

19,371
16,085
895
1,385
1,006

Violent fatal risk (in
10,000)

Non-violent fatal
risk (in 10,000)

0.52 (2.71)
0.07 (0.08)
0.26 (0.23)
0.11 (0.23)
8.38 (8.73)

2.92 (1.67)
3.23 (1.56)
0.91 (0.58)
0.92 (1.06)
2.39 (1.32)

# of workers with
zero violent/nonviolent risk
3,505/200
2627/ 0
195/33
629/130
54/37

76

Table 23
Summary of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based
on 1998-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses)

N
Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

10,479
8,369
483
906
721

Violent fatal risk
(in 10,000)

Non-violent fatal
risk (in 10,000)

0.46 (1.91)
0.06 (0.11)
0.36 (1.04)
0.17 (0.96)
5.43 (4.98)

2.09 (1.84)
2.23 (1.60)
0.76 (1.48)
1.38 (2.78)
2.37 (2.41)

# of workers with
zero violent/nonviolent risk
6,215/1155
4,862/ 254
358/283
823/392
172/226

Table 24
Summary of State Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based
on 1998-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses)

N
Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

15,447
12,829
689
1,118
811

Violent fatal risk
(in 10,000)

Non-violent fatal
risk (in 10,000)

0.32 (1.58)
0.05 (0.05)
0.27 (0.38)
0.13 (0.47)
4.90 (4.99)

3.16 (1.98)
3.48 (1.93)
1.15 (0.96)
1.27 (1.23)
2.38 (1.35)

# of workers with
zero violent/nonviolent risk
4,600/348
3,580/ 0
265/70
658/189
97/89
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Table 25
Summary of State Level Injury Rates for the Sample of Workers (Injury Risk Created
Based on 1992-2002 IFF; standard deviation reported in parentheses)

N
Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

17,091
14,164
772
1,230
925

Violent injury risk

Non-violent injury
risk

0.0002 (0.0005)
0.0001 (0.0001)
0.0002 (0.0007)
0.0012 (0.0014)
0.0002 (0.0004)

0.0525 (0.0163)
0.0577 (0.0093)
0.0466 (0.0148)
0.0279 (0.0179)
0.0115 (0.0078)

# of workers with zero
violent/non-violent injury
risk
5,142/22
2,215/ 0
772/0
1,230/0
925/22

Table 26
Summary of State Level Injury Rates for the Sample of Workers (Injury Risk Created
Based on 1998-2002 IFF; standard deviation reported in parenthesis)

Total
Truck
Sales
Bus
Taxi

N

Violent injury risk

Non-violent injury
risk

12,754
10,529
561
945
719

0.0001 (0.0005)
0.00005 (0.0001)
0.0003 (0.0008)
0.0010 (0.0012)
0.0001 (0.0006)

0.0485 (0.0159)
0.0534 (0.0103)
0.0409 (0.0139)
0.0271 (0.0154)
0.0111 (0.0090)

# of workers with zero
violent/non-violent injury
risk
7,747/105
6,286/ 0
436/70
344/189
681/105
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Chapter IV
Panel Data Analysis of Hedonic Wage Model

This study uses panel data models to identify the endogeneity bias in the crosssectional HW model and to estimate a consistent wage/risk premium. In addition to
employing panel models to control for time-invariant omitted variables, we also test the
strict exogeneity assumption to assure the consistency of panel estimators. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to test the use of panel estimators in estimating the HW
model. The labor market data comes from the large continuous national panel, the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panel administered by U.S. Census
Bureau. As discussed in chapter 3, the SIPP contains rich information on workers’ wage
and demographic characteristics. The occupational fatal risk comes from Scotton (2000).
The risk rate varies by occupation and industry group.
Endogeneity in Hedonic Models.
The standard HW model estimates the following equation by an ordinary least
square (OLS) model:
y i = β ri + X i γ + µ i

(15)

where yi is a wage level (often natural log form), ri is an occupational fatal risk level, Xi is
a vector of determinants of wages (e.g., age, educational attainment, race, sex, including a
constant), and µi is an error term for individual i.
The coefficient of risk variable β represents the risk premium on wages. The
estimated β is unbiased only if ri is an exogenous variable. If the risk variable is
endogeneous such that the cov(ri, µ i|Xi)≠0, then the estimated β is biased and
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inconsistent. The non-zero covariance between the risk variable and the error term may
arise from omitted variables, measurement error associated with the risk variable, or
simultaneity between wage and the risk variable.
In the HW literature, many researchers show concern for this endogeneity
problem in the cross-section HW models, especially endogeneity related to omitted
variables or measurement error associated with risk variables. Potential unobservable
characteristics which could influence wages and would vary with a worker’s wage-risk
tradeoff include heterogeneous workers’ characteristics such as risk preference or
productivity under non-safe environment, and working conditions such as the level of
physical exertion involved and the risk of job-related injuries (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).
Measurement error associated with the risk variable can be one of two types. One
type is measurement error between the estimated objective risk level and the actual
individual worker’s risk level. The other type is measurement error between the actual
individual worker’s risk level and worker’s perceived risk level (see discussion about
measurement error in chapter 2). The first type of measurement error has not been
considered in the HW literature until recently. Most of the HW studies in the U.S. assign
the industry average risk level to each worker to estimate the HW equation (Viscusi and
Aldy 2003). This practice assumes that different occupations in a same industry such as
the secretary and construction worker at construction industry face the same risk level,
which is apparently not true.
The recent renovation in the occupational risk data enables researchers to
construct more flexible format of the risk variable, such as the risk rate varies by
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occupation and industry group as used in this study.42 It is still possible that there is
measurement error between the estimated risk level and the actual individual worker’s
risk level, but error of this type should be smaller when we use the occupation-industry
risk rate as compared to the industry average risk rates.
There is no satisfactory argument about the second type of measurement error
(McConnell 2006). However, past studies report important disparities between subjective
risk measures (the risk a person believes he/she faces) and objective risk measures for
different types of risks (Benjamin, 2001; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, &
Combs, 1978), and thus this type of error may bias the risk estimator significantly.
Several empirical studies attempt to correct this endogeneity bias in the HW
model using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Siebert and Wei (1994) use a
standard 2SLS model. Garen (1988) use a general case of the 2SLS approach which
includes the interaction term between the estimated residual from the first stage equation
and the risk variable in addition to the risk variable itself (Card, 1999). Gunderson and
Hyatt (2001) and Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) follow Garen’s approach using labor
market data in Canada and in the United Kingdom, respectively.
Previous studies generally find a substantial increase of the risk premium when an
IV estimation strategy is used. For example, Siebert and Wei (1994) find a 1.5 to 2.5fold increase, Gunderson and Hyatt (2001) find a five-fold increase, and Arabsheibani
and Marin (2001) find up to a 10-fold increase in the estimated risk premium. However,
results of these studies are often quite sensitive to the model’s specification.
Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) find that a slight change in the sample composition and in
the model specification dramatically changes the magnitude of their estimated risk
42

See Scotton (2000) and Viscusi (2004) for the studies which use occupation-industry risk rates.
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premium in the Garen model. They argue that the instability of their risk premium
estimates are likely due to the poor fit of the first stage risk equation.
There are a few studies that use panel data to correct the time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity problem in the HW equation, but the results of these are mixed.
Brown (1980) estimates a HW model using a fixed effect (FE) model with panel data of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Although he uses an actuarial risk
measure, which reflects not only occupational causes of death, but all causes of death, he
finds a statistically significant positive estimate of the risk premium. Black et al. (2003)
also use NLSY for their analysis, but could not find a statistically significant result, likely
due to a large measurement error bias associated with their measure of workplace risk.
Kniesner et al. (2005) use a first difference (FD) model on panel data from the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), incorporating a fairly disaggregated occupational
risk measure. They find a significant decrease in risk premium once they control for the
time-invariant heterogeneities.
Although Kniesner et al. (2005) provide the most reliable risk premium estimate
among previous panel studies because they use the most disaggregated occupational risk
data, there still remains concern. As Griliches and Hausman (1986) indicate, it is
common to observe lower or insignificant estimates when one applies a FE or FD model
as these models exacerbate measurement error bias. Thus smaller or insignificant
coefficient estimates may be caused by measurement error bias, and not necessarily due
to the correction of unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, Kniesner et al. (2005) assume
that time-varying unobserved factors that could be correlated with risk are negligible, but
it may not be the case. For instance, on the job training in a previous job might affect the
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worker skill related to the next job, although on-the-job training is often unobserved to
the researcher
VSL is an important component of policy analysis, and careful examination of
this potential bias in the panel data analysis should be conducted. The panel data analysis
and IV approach have different advantages and disadvantages. Panel data provides an
excellent way to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but panel models
are sensitive to measurement error bias. The IV approach can control for more
endogenous factors, but requires additional information.
In this study, we estimate panel models to assess the potential bias due to
endogeneity problems in cross-section HW models. We test the consistency of panel
estimators by employing simple statistical tests, as well as by combining the panel data
approach and the IV approach to control for time-invariant and time-varying worker
heterogeneity, measurement error bias, and simultaneity between wage and risk variable.
The next section first discusses the theory underlying the FD and FE models, followed by
a discussion of the strict exogeneity assumption to obtain consistent panel estimators.
We then present the estimation results for the pooled cross-section OLS, FD and FE
models. After discussing these results, we examine potential violations of the strict
exogeneity assumption in panel models from the simple statistical test and from two stage
panel models. We also conduct sensitivity analysis on our results. Lastly we present the
conclusions of the analyses.
Basic FD and FE Model
Assume the wages in period t, y i ,t , are determined as follows:
y i ,t = β ri ,t + X i ,t γ + Z i δ + µ i ,t ,

(16)
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where y i ,t , ri ,t and X i ,t are defined as in the equation (15), Z i is a vector of unobserved
time-invariant factors, µ i ,t is an error term which may contain a vector of unobserved
time-varying factors or measurement error associated with the risk variable, and
t = {1,2,..., T }.

A FD model with T periods implies the following estimating equation:
∆y i ,t = β ∆ri ,t + ∆X i ,t γ + ∆µ i ,t ,

(17)

where,
∆y i ,t = y i ,t − y i ,t −1 , ∆ri ,t = rt − rt −1 , ∆X i ,t = X i ,t − X i ,t −1 , and ∆µ i ,t = µ i ,t − µ i ,t −1 .
For a FE model with T periods, the estimating equation becomes:
&y&i ,t = β&r&i ,t + X&& i ,t γ + µ&& i ,t

(18)

where &y&i ,t = y i ,t − y i , &r&i ,t = ri ,t − ri , X&& i ,t = X i ,t − X i , and µ&&i ,t = µ i ,t − µ i , and where
T

yi =

∑ y i ,t
t =1

T

T

, ri =

∑ ri,t
t =1

T

T

, Xi =

∑ X i ,t
t =1

T

T

and µ i =

∑µ
t =1

T

i ,t

.

Note that in both equations, the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity Z is
perfectly controlled, while remaining unobserved factors may be still a problem. We
estimate equation 16 and 17 to obtain the FD and FE estimators.
Endogeneity in Panel Models
The important underlying assumption that panel models must satisfy to obtain
consistent estimators is the strict exogeneity assumption.. The strict exogeneity
assumption requires that the error terms are uncorrelated with r, X or Z in any time period
as expressed in equation (19):
E ( µ i ,t | ri , s , X i , s , Z i ) = 0 , for ∀ t, s ∈ T.

(19)
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The violation of strict exogeneity may come from contemporaneous correlation
between the risk variable and the error term, which can be caused by time-varying
omitted variables, measurement error associated with risk variable, or simultaneity
between wages and the risk variable (Wooldridge, 2001). The violation of strict
exogeneity assumption leads to inconsistent panel estimators. In this study, we assume
that a vector of X satisfies the strict exogeneity assumption. Thus we only focus on r as a
potential endogeneous variable.
According to Wooldridge (2001), one can test for the strict exogeneity assumption
of variable of interest, using the FE model with t>2 by testing a H0: ξ =0 by estimating on
the FE model assuming the HW model is
yt = β rt + X t γ + Wt +1ξ + Z δ + µt

(20)

where W is the subset of X. In our case, W consists only of the risk variable. If there is a
violation of strict exogeneity, one msut find external instruments to obtain consistent
estimators.
For the FD model, the outside instruments, Q, should satisfy following conditions:
cov(∆u i ,t , Qi ,t ) = 0 and cov(∆ri ,t , Qi ,t ) ≠ 0

(21)

And for the FE model, the outside instrument should satisfy:
cov(u&&i ,t , Qi ,t ) = 0 and cov(&r&i ,t , Qi ,t ) ≠ 0

(22)

The conditions above imply that the variables Q are expected to influence the
choice of risk but not wages received. More specifically, Q is expected to be correlated
with changes in risks but not changes in wages in the FD models. And for the FE model,
Q is expected to influence time-demeaned risks but not time-demeaned wages.
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In the next section, we present the OLS, FD and FE estimation results, followed
by the test results for the strict exogeneity assumption. We also examine the potential
endogeneity problem from the contemporaneous correlation using external instruments,
assuming there are time-varying omitted variables, measurement error associated with
risk variable or simultaneity between wage and risk variables.
Results
Table 27 shows the estimation results with OLS, FD and FE models. Data are
discussed in chapter 3. The dependent variable is the log of gross hourly wage level, and
independent variables include the occupational risk level, job characteristics, worker’s
characteristics, and regional variables. Most of explanatory variables are statistically
significant, and results are generally consistent with findings in previous studies using
similar risk measures such as Scotton (2000) and Viscusi (2004). Age and education
level are positively correlated with wages. Hispanics and African Americans earn less
than whites, and females earn less than males. Workers who belong to a union receive
higher wages than non-union workers and so do married workers compared to single
workers.
The coefficient for the risk variable from the cross-section HW model is 0.0167
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The cross section HW model allows the
correlation among observations of a same worker. The estimated VSL from this crosssection HW model is $4.6 million.43 This value is in a range of the average value of
previous VSL estimates (Kochi et al., 2006; Viscusi, 1992). This VSL estimate is
significantly smaller than the estimate based on the similar risk measure by Kniesner et

43

The VSL is estimated as follows: VSL=coefficient of risk variable ×hourly wage× 40 ×52 (weeks)
×10,000, where 10,000 is the unit of fatal risk.
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al. (2005), which is $17.7 million.44 The difference between the estimates likely comes
from the different model specification as well as the difference in average wage level of
the sample. Kniesner et al. (2005) do not include industry dummy variables due to the
concern of multicolinearity between risk variables and industry dummy variables. In
addition, Kniesner et al. (2005) do not include firm side variables included in our model.
The VSL estimate also depends on the average wage level. In our sample, the average
wage is $13.27 while the sample of Kniesner et al. (2005) has the average wage of
$21.04.
When we omit industry dummy variables from our model, the estimated
coefficient of the risk variable increases to 0.0374, which also increases the VSL to $10.3
million. This estimate is still less than the estimates of Kniesner et al. (2005). When we
omit firm specific variables, hipart, hifull, empsiz, empall, in addition to omitting
industry dummy variables, the estimated coefficient of the risk variable decreases to
0.0264, which is a VSL of $7.2 million. Both these estimates are higher than the VSL
obtained from our pooled cross-section OLS model, which is $4.6 million. This indicates
that the excluding industry dummy variables and firm-side variables likely overestimates
the wage/risk premium.
As shown in table 27, all industry dummy variables and firm variables are
significant factors to determine wages and they also affect the coefficient of risk.
Including these variables does not reduce the significance of risk coefficients, which
indicates that the multicollinearity is not likely the issue in our model. Since these
variables are correlated with risk variable, excluding these variables would bias the
results and thus we keep these variables in our models.
44

Estimate based on 11-year average risk rates.
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Remaining differences in the VSL estimates between our study and Kniesner et al
(2005) are likely from the difference in the wage level across sample of workers. As
mentioned earlier, the average wage (in our sample) is $13.27 while that of Kniesner et
al.’s (2005) sample is $21.04. Due to the over-sampling of low-income population in the
SIPP program, the average wage level of the sample in the SIPP is less than national
average (see chapter 3). The average wage level of Kniesner et al.’s (2005) sample is
higher than the national average, which we would expect to make the divergence between
our estimate and their estimate larger if risk is a normal good.
Our cross section HW result indicates that workers in the U.S. labor market
receive a significant wage premium for accepting higher levels of occupational risk.
However, when we apply the FE model and the FD model, the coefficient of risk variable
dramatically reduced, yet still significant. The FE and FD models show the coefficient of
0.0094 and 0.0062, respectively, which are significant at the 1% level. The estimated
VSL are $2.5 and $1.7 million, respectively. The 95% confidence interval of the VSL
based on the FE estimator is $1.7 -$3.4 million and that of the VSL based on the FD
estimator is $0.5 -$2.9 million. These results indicate that the unobserved time invariant
worker characteristics significantly bias the OLS results upward, and resulted in the
pooled OLS overestimating the wage-risk premium. This finding is similar to Kniesner
et al. (2005). They also find that panel models significantly reduce the risk coefficient.
However, after they use FD models, their estimated VSL becomes $6.7 million (with
approximate 95% interval of $2.7-$10.7million), which is still higher than our point
estimates, and just barely overlaps with the 95% confidence interval of our FD estimate.45

45

When we omit the industry dummy and firm-side variables, our FE and FD estimator is 0.014 with
standard error 0.0013 and 0.011 with standard error 0.0019, respectively. The corresponding VSL
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The estimated risk coefficients of our FD and FE models are similar to each other
with overlapped 95 % intervals, which may indicate that there is not an important
endogeneity issue in the models.46 However, it is still worthwhile to examine the
consistency of estimators using additional methods because the panel estimators of risk
variable are not consistent if the risk variable is endogenous in the panel. The following
section examines the consistency of FE and FD estimators using two methods. The first
method employs the strict exogeneity test illustrated in Wooldridge (2001), and the
second method employs the second stage panel models.
First, we examine the consistency of risk estimators in panel models using the
strict exogeneity testing method illustrated in Wooldridge (2001). Following Wooldridge
(2001), we include one period lead risk variable (riskt+1), and re-estimate the FE model,
assuming all other explanatory variables are strictly exogeneous. The estimating
coefficient of lead risk variable is -0.0004 with standard error 0.0015. The coefficient is
not significant, which indicate that the strict exogeneity assumption is not violated in our
models. However, when we estimate model without industry variables, where the risk
variable is clearly endogenous, the lead risk variable is still not significantly different
from zero. This indicates that this strict exogeneity test may not be strong enough.
Next, we employ the two stage panel models to ensure the exogeneity of risk
variable. Two types of instruments are explored. The first type of instrumental variables
are “outside” the model data and are variables that we expect will influence the choice of
risk-level but not wages-received. These are; the monthly income other than wage
estimates are $3.8 (95% interval: $3.1-$4.5million) and $3.0 million (95% interval: $2-4million),
respectively. These change indicate that the Kniesner et al. (2005) study overestimate the VSL.
46
Ziliak et al. (1999) noted that if there is no endogeneity in panel models and if the FE model is adjusted
for a non-stationarity, then the FD model and the FE model should have a same probability limit when
more than two time period are contained in the data.
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(inc_other), the number of social security recipients in the household (N_SS), the monthly
income from all financial investments (inv_all) and a dummy variable indicating that the
reason the employee chose not to have health insurance is a lack of belief in health
insurance (nohi_reason).47 These variables are obtained from the 1996 SIPP.
The wage level should be determined according to the worker’s productivity. The
incomes that are earned through non-wage sources, the number of social security
recipients in household, or their lack of belief in health insurance would not likely affect
the worker’s productivity. On the other hand, the level of total wealth, number of
dependents or belief in health insurance may be related to the worker’s risk taking
behavior.
The second type of instruments adds a variable developed from the risk data itself.
This additional variable is the difference between the risk level of individual worker and
the average risk of the 3-digit level occupation in which the worker engages (dif_rocc).
The variable dif_rocc is expected to have a strong correlation with the risk variable. The
variable dif_rocc is a valid instrument only if the worker’s deviation from the mean risk
level within a same occupation is not correlated with the error term.48
Table 28 shows the first-stage regression results with the second type of
instrumental variables, and table 29 shows the second-stage regression results from IV-

47

There are several categories of reasons employees chose not to be covered by health insurance in the
1996 SIPP, and they are: health insurance not offered by employer; they use a VA or military hospital; they
are covered by other health plans; they haven’t needed health insurance; job layoff, loss, unemployment;
they are no longer covered by parents; they are not eligible (part time or temporal workers), poor health,
illness, age, etc.; some other reason; and too expensive and cannot afford. Models were estimated using all
these variables but there is no improvement in results.
48
More specifically, the changes in the deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all industries)
must be uncorrelated with changes in the error term from the regression estimating the changes in wage for
the FD model. For the FE model, the time-demeaned deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all
industries) must be uncorrelated with time-demeaned error term from the regression estimating the timedemeaned in wage.
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FE and IV-FD models based on the second type of instrumental variables. As presented
in table 28, dif_rocc and nohi_reason are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively in the
first-stage FE model, and only dif_rocc is significant at 1% in the first-stage FD model.
Note that most of industry dummy variables are significant risk determinants at the 1%
level. In addition, our firm variables, empsize, and hifull, are also significant risk
determinants at the 1% and 10 % levels, respectively. These strong correlations of the
risk variable between industry dummy variables and firm-side variables confirm the
importance of including these variables in the hedonic wage model, as discussed earlier.
As shown in table 29, the second stage IV-FE model and IV-FD models show the
coefficients of the risk variable to be 0.0112 and 0.0077, respectively. The Hausman test
for endogeneity results, shown in the Endogeneity test row, indicates that these
coefficients are not significantly different from those in the FD and the FE models.
These results suggest that there is no endogeneity bias in the FD and FE models resulting
from contemporaneous correlation. The Sargan statistics, which evaluates the overidentification restriction, fails to reject the null hypothesis. Failing the null hypothesis of
the over-identifying restriction indicates that the current set of instruments is valid,
although this may be due to the low power of the test (Wooldridge 2001). Nevertheless,
the coefficient estimates in the IV-FE and IV-FD models are similar to each other, which
indicate that the models are well-specified. There is no significant change among nonrisk variables when we estimate the IV-FE and IV-FD models as compared to the FE and
FD models.
There may be a question about using dif_rocc as an instrument. The instrument
should correlate with risk variable and not correlate with error terms in the FD and FE
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models. As mentioned earlier, the variable dif_rocc is not a valid instrument if worker’s
deviation from the mean risk level within a same occupation is correlated with the error
term. Table 30 shows the second-stage results of the IV-FE and IV-FD estimators when
we omit dif_rocc as an instrument in the first stage. The top half of table 30 presents key
results from the second stage of the IV-FE and IV-FD models and the second half shows
key results from the first stage. None of the external instruments are significant in either
the FD or FE models. The Anderson statistics, which test for the relevance of
instruments, fail to reject null hypothesis that indicates that the correlation between the
risk variable and external instruments are weak (Baum, 2006). Weak instruments
generally make the estimators inconsistent, and increase the standard error of the
estimator (Wooldridge 2001). The omission of dif_rocc apparently makes the
instruments weak and the IV-FD and IV-FE estimators become insignificant. In addition,
the IV-FD estimator changes sign indicating that the estimators may indeed be
inconsistent. Including additional variables indicating why workers do not have health
insurance (see footnote 47), does not improve the results.
It is difficult to say with certainty whether dif_rocc is a valid instrument. The
conditions be met are quite complicated in this context. Again, the conditions for the FD
model are that the changes in the deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all
industries) must be uncorrelated with changes in the error term from the regression
estimating the changes in wage.49 There is not an intuitive story as to why this condition
might hold. However, there is not a clear argument against its validity either.
Furthermore, the closeness of estimated IV-FE and IV-FE estimators when dif_rocc is
included as an instrument, as well as the failing to reject Sargan statistics in these models,
49

See footnote 48 for the condition of valid instrument for the FE model.
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provide some confidence that the models are well-defined. Therefore, we draw our
conclusions relying on the results from IV-FE and IV_FD models which include dif_rocc
as an instrumental variable.
Sensitivity Analysis.
There is a concern that the difference of the OLS and panel estimators may be due
to the systematic difference between job changers and non-job changers. In the pooled
OLS model, the variation in the risk variable from both job changers and non-job
changers contribute to estimate the risk coefficient. On the other hand, since the risk
change is zero for all non-job changers, the variation to estimate the risk coefficient in the
panel models comes from only the job changer sample. It is possible that job changers
and non-job changers may be systematically different in terms of the observable
characteristics such as risk taking behavior or age, as well as the unobservable
characteristics, such as risk preference or the level of job competence. If job changers
and non-job changers are systematically different, then there are two factors contributing
the difference between the panel risk estimators and the OLS risk estimator. One is timeinvariant worker heterogeneity (within sample heterogeneity), and the other is worker
heterogeneity between job changers and non-job changers.
Table 31 shows the summary statistics of key variables of job changers and nonjob changers. Job changers are defined as workers who changed jobs at any point in the
1996 Panel. The main noticeable, but relatively minor, differences between job changers
and non-job changers are in their average age, union membership and the availability of
full employer-provided health insurance. The average age of non-job changer is 39
years old while that of job changers is 36 years old. This difference makes sense because
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young people tend to change jobs more often. There is a slightly higher proportion of
people who are married, but a slightly lower proportion of people who have kids under
age 18 among non-job changers as compared to job changers. These differences are
likely due to the difference in age between job changers and non-job changers. The nonjob changer sample has a higher level of union membership rate and more access to the
employer provided full health insurance as compared to job changers. In addition, nonjob changers earn slightly higher hourly wage than job changers.
To examine the effect of potential heterogeneity between job changers and nonjob changers on the estimating results, we re-estimate the pooled OLS model and panel
models under two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the job changers and non-job
changers face different hedonic wage schedules for occupational risk compensation, but
both samples have the same sample distribution in terms of worker/job characteristics
other than risk. The second hypothesis is that the job changers and non-job changers may
face different hedonic wage schedules for occupational risk compensation and both
samples have different sample distributions in terms of other worker/job characteristics.
To examine the first hypothesis, we estimate the following pooled OLS model.
y i = β 1 ri + β 2 ri × JC + X i γ + µ i ,

(23)

where all variables are as described in equation 15 and JC is a dummy variable, where 1
indicate a job changer and 0 indicate a non-job changer. This model allows job changers
and non-job changers to face different hedonic wage curve for occupational risk, but
assumes all other variables have the same sample distribution. The estimation results
show that the risk coefficient for job changers is 0.0068 (SE=0.0031) and for non-job
changers is 0.0238 (SE=0.0030) and they are significant at 1% and 5% level,
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respectively. The 95% confidence interval of these two risk coefficients do not overlap.
This results strongly indicates that job changers and non-job changers face different
hedonic wage schedule for risk. In addition, we do not find a significant difference
between pooled OLS risk estimator for job changers and panel risk estimators presented
in table 27, which indicates that there is no time-invariant worker heterogeneity bias in
the pooled OLS model when based on job changers only.
Now, we assume that the job changers and non-job changers may face a different
hedonic wage schedule for risk compensation and also assume that they may have
differences in other worker/job characteristics that correlate with the risk variable. To
examine this hypothesis, we estimate the pooled OLS and panel models with only the
job-changer sample. Table 32 shows the regression results. The risk coefficient in the
pooled OLS model is 0.0207 and is significant at the 1% level. The 95% confidence
interval of the risk coefficient is between 0.0140 and 0.0275. As shown in table 27, the
risk coefficient in the pooled OLS model based on both job-changer and non-job changer
sample is 0.0167 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.0118 and 0.0215. When we
estimate the pooled OLS model only with non-job changer sample, we obtain the risk
coefficient of 0.0130 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.0062 and 0.0197. Thus,
including the non-job changers lowers the estimated risk coefficient in the pooled OLS
somewhat, but the difference between the coefficient estimates from the three models is
not statistically significant at the 5% level. As expected, the risk coefficients from fixed
effect and first difference models do not show a significant change by excluding non-job
changers as shown in table 32. This result reinforces the original conclusions that the
time-invariant worker heterogeneity biases the pooled OLS risk estimator upward.
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Since these two hypothesis leads to opposite conclusions, we need to carefully
examine which hypothesis is more appropriate. To test the appropriateness of the first
hypothesis, we estimate the model which adds interaction terms between job changing
status and all variables in the pooled OLS model (such as risk×JC, age×JC, college×JC
etc.). We test if the coefficients of all risk interaction terms are jointly different from
zero. We obtain the F-statistics of 4.34 and the p-value of 0.0040. The test result
suggests that it would be reasonable to assume that job changers and non-job changers
are systematically different in terms of worker/job characteristics. Therefore, we rely
estimation results from the second hypothesis for our conclusions.
With only the job changer sample, we estimate the VSL of $7.78 million, $2.59
million, and $1.70 million from the pooled OLS, FE model and FD model, respectively.
This result indicates that the use of the OLS model biases the risk coefficient upward
significantly due to time-invariant worker heterogeneity. Table 33 shows the 2SLS panel
models with the second type of instruments with only the job changer sample. We do not
find endogneiy problem in our revised panel models.
Next, we examine the potential bias associated with the market disequilibrium. If
the workers who tend to change jobs are ones who are out of equilibrium, and they
change jobs so that they move towards an equilibrium position, then panel models do not
provide consistent estimators. If this is the case, the panel estimators represent the
movement of workers from disequilibrium to the equilibrium, and not the static hedonic
wage schedule. Herzog and Schlottman (1990) use industry switching models to
examine this disequilibrium hypothesis. In this study, we compare hedonic wage
schedule of before and after job change for the job changer sample.
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Table 34 shows the summary of the sensitive analysis results. The last row and
the third from the last row shows the OLS results of the before job change sample and
after job change sample, respectively. The risk coefficient of before job change sample
and after job change sample is 0.0164 and 0.0234, respectively. The difference in the
risk coefficients is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, similarity in the two
estimates suggests that workers are not moving towards different HW schedules by
changing jobs. Of course this is not a concrete test for market disequilibrium since the
OLS estimation results may be biased for other reasons as shown in this chapter.
However, unless there is a strong reason why we should believe there is a different
direction or degree of bias in the before job change sample and the after job change
sample, this simple test provides useful information about the market disequilibrium
hypothesis for our sample.
Conclusions.
This study aims to identify the endogeneity bias in previous cross-section HW
studies by combining the panel data approach and the IV approach. The endogenous
nature of risk variable in HW models has been a major concern in using the wage/risk
premium estimators in policy analysis (Viscusi & Aldy 2003). This study uses two stage
least square (2SLS) panel models to control for endogeneity bias resulting from omitted
time-variant and time-invariant individual heterogeneity, measurement error associated
with the risk variables and simultaneity between the wage and risk variable.
We collect a sample of workers from a large national panel study, the 1996 SIPP.
Our occupational fatal risk rates vary by occupation and industry. This fatal risk measure
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provides important variation of the level of risk when workers change their occupation,
and enable us to estimate the wage/risk premium with panel models.
Our analyses find that there is a significant upward bias due to the omitted timeinvariant worker heterogeneity. The estimated VSL after controlling for the omitted
time-invariant worker heterogeneity is between $1.7 million-$2.5 million, which is nearly
a half of the VSL estimate when we do not control for the omitted time-invariant worker
heterogeneity. Our analysis of two stage least square panel models show that there is no
endogeneity bias in our panel models resulting from time-variant worker heterogeneity
measurement error or simultaneity between risk variable and wage.
Our finding is similar to the finding of Kniesner et al. (2005), which also use
panel models to estimate wage/risk premium. They found that the estimated VSL after
controlling for the omitted time-invariant worker heterogeneity is $6.7 million, which is
about a third of their VSL estimate without controlling for the omitted time-invariant
worker heterogeneity.
The difference in the absolute value of the VSL between the Kniesner et al. study
and our study comes from the different model specifications and the different wage level
of the sample. We find that industry dummy variables and firm-side variables that are
omitted from Kniesner et al. (2005) are significant wage determinants, and also correlate
with the risk variable. We show that omitting these variables bias the risk coefficient
upward by about 50% in both cross-section and panel models. Interestingly in footnote 9
in page 14, Kniesner et al. (2005) report that the VSL estimate becomes $4.4 million
when they include the one-digit level industry dummy, which is also about 50% smaller
than their estimate of the VSL when excluding the one-digit level industry dummy.
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However, in their text, they express concern about multicolinearity between the risk and
industry dummy variables and do not consider the model with industry dummies further.
Our sample of workers has a lower than average wage, while Kniesner et al.’s
(2005) sample has a higher than average wage. This divergence of the average wage
level may contribute to the disparity between our VSL estimate and their VSL estimate.
To further explore this issue, we re-estimate the FE and IV-FE models with an adjusted
SIPP sample. We first exclude workers who are earning less than $9.7 per hour so that
the sample average wage matches the U.S. average wage, $16 (see chapter 3). This
leaves 111,723 observations in the sample. The estimated FE shows the coefficient of
risk variable 0.0062, and a VSL of $2.0 million. We further reduce our sample of
workers to those earning more than $16 per hour so that our sample average wage
matches the average wage level in the Kniesner et al. sample. This leaves 44,605
observations in the sample. However, we do not obtain significant risk estimator with
this sample in the FE model. Although these results are only suggestive since we only
match the mean, not the variance in wage across samples, they do suggest that perhaps
the industry controls play a more important role in the difference our estimates as
compared to the wage differences.
It is important to remember that our sample is not a representative sample of
workers in the U.S. (see chapter 3), and we must be cautious to apply our VSL estimation
to policy analysis. However, it is not likely that the uniqueness of our sample would
undermine our conclusions about the existence of endogeneity bias in the cross-section
HW models and the critical importance of including firm-side components that Kniesner
et al. fail to explore.
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As a sensitivity analysis, we consider whether our comparison of pooled OLS and
panel models are appropriate to examine the bias due to time-invariant worker
heterogeneity in pooled OLS model. If there is heterogeneity between the job-changer
and non-job changer sample, the difference between pooled OLS and panel model
estimators comes from two sources; the worker heterogeneity and heterogeneity between
job-changers and non-job changers. When we estimate models only for job-changers, we
find larger difference between pooled OLS and panel estimators. This result reinforces
our original observation of significant upward bias in pooled OLS estimators due to the
time-invariant worker heterogeneity.
We also examine our underlying assumption that workers are in equilibrium in
any period of time. In our sensitive analysis, we do not find a significant HW schedule
change between before and after job change for the job changer sample. We conclude
that workers do not move between different HW schedules, but move along the same HW
schedule when they change jobs, and thus the our underlying assumption is valid.
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Table 27
Cross-section, Fixed Effect and First Difference Regression Results

risk
age
age2
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
female
workov
union
kids18
married
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize
neast
midwest
south
urban
agind
constind
tcuind
trdind
servind
manufind
craftocc
profocc
techocc
servocc
laborocc
Constant
N (# group)
R2 (overall)
VSL (million$)

OLS
(clustered)
0.0167***
0.0303***
-0.0003***
0.2022***
0.1373***
0.0785***
-0.0095***
-0.0569***
-0.1301***
0.0637***
0.1983***
0.0058***
0.0739***
0.1426***
0.1513***
0.0472***
-0.0472***
-0.0187***
-0.0421***
-0.0962***
0.0709***
-0.1309***
0.0112
-0.0399***
-0.2205***
-0.0933***
-0.0955***
0.2605***
0.3151***
0.1849***
0.0075
0.1130***
1.5049***
166,362
0.45
4.60

(SE)
0.0024
0.0010
0.00001
0.0089
0.0058
0.0053
0.0059
0.0055
0.0043
0.0037
0.0049
0.0017
0.0039
0.0036
0.0043
0.0033
0.0035
0.0063
0.0055
0.0053
0.0043
0.0166
0.0114
0.0107
0.0089
0.0086
0.0091
0.0154
0.0160
0.0152
0.0156
0.0151
0.0251
(34,847)

Fixed
Effect
0.0094***
0.0556***
-0.0007***
0.1097***
0.0199***
0.0150***

0.0147***
0.0515***
0.0014
0.0171***
0.0350***
0.0383***
0.0131***
-0.0149***
0.0174
-0.0095
-0.0501***
0.0111***
-0.0418***
0.0175*
-0.0122
-0.0957***
-0.0485***
-0.0105**
0.0717***
0.0868***
0.0558***
-0.0227***
0.0343***
1.3747***
166,362
0.06
2.59

(SE)
0.0015
0.0020
0.00001
0.0179
0.0137
0.0120

0.0015
0.0023
0.0013
0.0031
0.0016
0.0018
0.0014
0.0016
0.0195
0.0155
0.0144
0.0037
0.0111
0.0084
0.0085
0.0072
0.0069
0.0074
0.0088
0.0091
0.0087
0.0089
0.0086
0.0630
(34,847)

First
Difference
0.0062***
0.0156***
-0.0001***
0.0183
0.0026
0.0009

0.0071***
0.0163***
0.00008
0.0056
0.0116***
0.0118***
0.0060***
-0.0070***
0.0685
0.0623
0.0077
0.0026
-0.0241***
-0.0124
-0.0590***
-0.1135***
-0.0714***
-0.0432***
0.0611***
0.0733***
0.0501***
-0.0215*
0.0192*
0.0103***
113,343
0.26
1.71

(SE)
0.0022
0.0027
0.00003
0.0259
0.0195
0.0158

0.0012
0.0019
0.0017
0.0038
0.0014
0.0015
0.0014
0.0015
0.0272
0.0223
0.0210
0.0048
0.0181
0.0141
0.0145
0.0125
0.0121
0.0127
0.0121
0.0124
0.0120
0.0123
0.0116
0.0005
(26,269)

***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 28
First Stage Regression Results With Second Set of Instrumental Variables.
Fixed Effect
model
age
age2
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
workov
union
kids18
married
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize
neast
midwest
south
urban
agind
constind
tcuind
trdind
servind
manufind
craftocc
profocc
techocc
servocc
laborocc
Dif_rocc
Inc_other
Inv_all
N_SS
Nohi_reason
Constant
R2 (overall)

0.0075***
-0.00007***
0.0455**
0.0214
0.0122
0.0048***
0.0062**
-0.0011
0.0050
-0.0004
-0.0039*
-0.0025
0.0149***
0.0254
-0.0110
-0.0053
0.0037
0.4900***
0.8854***
0.3793***
0.0008
-0.0512***
-0.2171***
-0.6820***
-1.3007***
-1.3397***
-1.0315***
-0.4030***
0.6529***
2.42×10-7
0.00001
0.0034
0.0281*
1.3984***
0.78

(SE)
0.0024
0.00002
0.0206
0.0158
0.0138
0.0017
0.0026
0.0015
0.0035
0.0018
0.0021
0.0017
0.0018
0.0225
0.0179
0.0165
0.0042
0.0126
0.0094
0.0097
0.0083
0.0080
0.0085
0.0101
0.0105
0.0102
0.0103
0.0100
0.0015
1.06×10-7
9.43×10-6
0.0025
0.0171
0.0726

First
Difference
model
0.0005
1.47×10-6
0.0085
-0.0070
-0.0129
0.0039***
0.0024
-0.0006
0.0049
0.0008
0.0003
-0.0026**
0.0038***
-0.0530
0.0321*
-0.0010
-0.0059**
0.3973***
0.8795***
0.3107***
-0.0008
-0.0630***
-0.2015***
-0.8254***
-1.4503***
-1.5134***
-1.1550***
-0.5644***
0.6790***
-2.98×10-7
1.77×10-6
-0.0019
0.0060
0.0004
0.72

(SE)
0.0023
0.00002
0.0220
0.0165
0.0134
0.0010
0.0016
0.0014
0.0032
0.0011
0.0013
0.0012
0.0013
0.0231
0.0189
0.0179
0.0040
0.0153
0.0117
0.0123
0.0106
0.0103
0.0107
0.0102
0.0105
0.0101
0.0104
0.0099
0.0016
6.14×10-7
5.70×10-6
0.0017
0.0091
0.0004

***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the
10% level.
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Table 29
Second Stage (IV-FE and IV-FD) Regression Results: Second Set of Instruments.

risk-hat
age
age2
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
workov
union
kids18
married
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize
neast
midwest
south
urban
agind
constind
tcuind
trdind
servind
manufind
craftocc
profocc
techocc
servocc
laborocc
Anderson LR statistics
Sargan statistics
Endogeneity test
N (# group)
R2 (overall)

IV-Fixed
Effect
0.0112***
0.05567***
-0.0007***
0.1096***
0.0198
0.0149
0.0147***
0.0515***
0.0014
0.0171***
0.0350***
0.0383***
0.0131***
-0.0149***
0.0173
-0.0096
-0.0502***
0.0111***
-0.0418***
0.0150*
-0.0137
-0.0956***
-0.0483***
-0.0099
0.0722***
0.0878***
0.0568***
-0.0219**
0.0339***
P<0.01
P=0.83
P=0.19
157,784
0.08

(SE)
0.0021
0.0020
0.00001
0.0179
0.0137
0.0120
0.0015
0.0023
0.0013
0.0031
0.0016
0.0018
0.0014
0.0016
0.0195
0.0155
0.0144
0.0037
0.0111
0.0085
0.0085
0.0072
0.0069
0.0074
0.0088
0.0091
0.0088
0.0089
0.0086

(26,269)

IV-First
Difference
0.0077***
0.0156***
-0.0001***
0.0183*
0.0026***
0.0009
0.0071***
0.0163***
0.00008 **
0.0056
0.0110***
0.0118***
0.0060***
-0.0070***
0.0686*
0.0624*
0.0078
0.0026
-0.0257
-0.0146
-0.0601***
-0.1134***
-0.0711***
-0.0427***
0.0621***
0.0746***
0.0515***
-0.0203*
0.0195*
P<0.01
P=0.94
P=0.786
113,343
0.01

(SE)
0.0028
0.0027
0.00003
0.0259
0.0195
0.0158
0.0012
0.0019
0.0017
0.0038
0.0013
0.0015
0.0014
0.0015
0.0272
0.0223
0.0210
0.0048
0.0182
0.0143
0.0146
0.0125
0.0121
0.0127
0.0121
0.0125
0.0121
0.0123
0.0116

(24,142)

***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 30
IV-FE and IV-FD Results With First Set of Instruments.
IV-Fixed
Effect
Selected second-stage results
risk-hat
0.0077
Anderson LR statistics
P<0.46
Sargan statistics
P=0.68
Endogeneity test
P=0.99
N (# group)
157,784
R2 (overall)
0.08
Selected first-stage results
inc_other
1.01×10-6
inv_all
0.00001
N_SS
0.00166
nohi_reason
0.03748
R2 (overall)
0.53

(SE)
0.3052

(26,269)
1.61×10-6
9.43×10-6
0.00380
0.0258

IV-First
Difference
-0.1210
P<0.81
P=0.86
P=0.83
113,343
0.01
-2.91×10-7
8.76×10-7
-0.0030
-0.0048
0.30

(SE)
0.6047

(24,142)
9.76×10-7
9.06×10-6
0.0028
0.0145
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Table 31
Summary Statistics of Key Characteristics of Job Changers and
Non-job Changer Sample.

wage
risk
age
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
othrace
female
workov
union
kids18
married
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize

Non-job changers
Mean
SD
13.8676
6.2192
0.5643
0.9690
39.4184
11.58
0.4696
0.3283
0.4134
0.4924
0.1281
0.3342
0.1332
0.3398
0.0385
0.1924
0.4628
0.4986
0.1909
0.3930
0.2252
0.4177
0.7627
1.1019
0.4932
0.5820
0.4542
0.4979
0.2216
0.4153
0.5676
0.4954
0.2948
0.4559

Job changers
Mean
SD
12.5094
5.3895
0.5508
0.9410
36.3091
11.0654
0.3363
0.4724
0.4278
0.4947
0.1413
0.3483
0.1419
0.3489
0.0436
0.2042
0.4517
0.4976
0.1892
0.3916
0.1580
0.3647
0.8262
1.1086
0.5361
0.4986
0.4346
0.4957
0.1806
0.3847
0.5581
0.4966
0.2990
0.4587
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Table 32
Cross-section, Fixed Effect and First Difference Regression Results With Only Job
Changer Sample.

risk
age
age2
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
othrace
female
workov
union
kids18
married
hipart
hifull
empall
empsize
neast
midwest
south
urban
agind
constind
tcuind
trdind
servind
manufind
craftocc
profocc
techocc
servocc
laborocc
Constant
N (# group)
R2 (overall)
VSL (million$)

OLS
(clustered)
0.0207***
0.0303***
-0.0003***
0.1790***
0.1310***
0.0801***
-0.0928***
-0.0453***
-0.0378***
-0.1316***
0.0638***
0.1907***
0.0026
0.0791***
0.1390***
0.1469***
0.0463***
-0.0422***
-0.0243***
-0.0381***
-0.0949***
0.0743***
-0.1149***
-0.0063
-0.0567***
-0.1963***
-0.0873***
-0.0810***
0.2574***
0.3020***
0.1869***
0.0211
0.1113***
1.4790***
72,658
7.78

(SE)
0.0034
0.0015
0.00002
0.0135
0.0083
0.0076
0.0084
0.0079
0.0146
0.0061
0.0053
0.0075
0.0024
0.0056
0.0050
0.0061
0.0046
0.0049
0.0093
0.0081
0.0077
0.0062
0.0249
0.0168
0.0167
0.0139
0.0135
0.0142
0.0225
0.0233
0.0223
0.0228
0.0221
0.0365
(11,294)

Fixed
Effect
0.0090***
0.0629***
-0.0008***
0.0781***
-0.0153
-0.0082

0.0208***
0.0779***
0.0010
0.0288***
0.0477***
0.0516***
0.0170***
-0.0216***
0.0142
0.0021
-0.0456**
0.0130**
-0.0329***
0.0245***
-0.0095
-0.0874***
-0.0409***
-0.0079
0.0669***
0.0814***
0.0513***
-0.0261***
0.0301***
1.2468***
72658
2.59

0.0017
0.0033
0.00002
0.0242
0.0187
0.0164

First
Difference
0.0059**
0.0158***
-0.0002***
-0.0107
-0.0243
-0.0156

0.0024
0.0036
0.0020
0.0046
0.0024
0.0029
0.0021
0.0023
0.0252
0.0204
0.0188
0.0052
0.0125
0.0095
0.0096
0.0082
0.0079
0.0084
0.0099
0.0103
0.0099
0.0101
0.0097
0.0971
(11294)

0.0097***
0.0264***
-0.0020
0.0140**
0.0159***
0.0141***
0.0087***
-0.0124***
0.0587
0.0894***
0.0192
0.0027
-0.0227
-0.0099
-0.0588***
-0.1118***
-0.0695***
-0.0439***
0.0596***
0.0717***
0.0490***
-0.0228*
0.0180
0.0126***
49102

(SE)

(SE)
0.0023
0.0044
0.00005
0.0388
0.0312
0.0253

0.0018
0.0031
0.0025
0.0060
0.0021
0.0024
0.0021
0.0022
0.0398
0.0325
0.0301
0.0067
0.0195
0.0152
0.0156
0.0135
0.0131
0.0136
0.0130
0.0133
0.0129
0.0132
0.0125
0.0008
(11294)

1.70

***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 33
IV-FE and IV-FD Results With Second Type of Instruments: Job-changer Sample
Only.
IV-Fixed
Effect
Selected second-stage results
risk-hat
0.0108***
Anderson LR statistics
P<0.01
Sargan statistics
P=0.69
Endogeneity test
P=0.24
N (# group)
72,658
R2 (overall)
0.11
Selected first-stage results
dif_rocc
0.6528***
inc_other
4.39×10-7
inv_all
0.00004
N_SS
0.0065
nohi_reason
0.0523
R2 (overall)
0.78

IV-First
Difference

(SE)
0.024

0.0074**
P<0.01
P=0.73
P=0.66
4,9102
0.01

(11,294)
0.0023
2.29×10-6
9.43×10-6
0.0050
0.0349

0.6789***
-7.11×10-7
2.16×10-6
-0.0038
0.0127
0.72

(SE)
0.0030

(10,020)
0.0024
1.48×10-6
0.00002
0.0038
0.0200

Table 34
Summary of Estimated Coefficients.

Job changers-FD
All-FD
Job changers-FE
All-FE
Non-job changers
OLS
All-OLS
Job changers OLS before
Job changers OLS
(before+after)
Job changer OLSafter

Coefficient
(standard error)
0.0059
(0.0023)
0.0062
(0.0022)
0.0090
(0.0017)
0.0094
(0.0015)
0.0130
(0.0034)
0.0167
(0.0024)
0.0164
(0.0035)
0.0207
(0.0034)
0.0234
(0.0038)

95% confidence interval
0.00123

0.0105

0.0018

0.0105

0.0055

0.0125

0.0064

0.0124

0.0062

0.0197

0.0119

0.0215

0.0096

0.0233

0.0140

0.0275

0.0159

0.0309
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Chapter V
Transferability of VSL: Hedonic Wage Analysis

This study examines the transferability of the Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
between different policy contexts using labor market data. This study is motivated by the
persistent concern regarding the use of VSL estimates based on fatal risks which are not
directly related to the policy objective. For example, U.S.EPA relies on the labor market
studies to obtain the VSL to evaluate air pollution control program or fatal cancer
reduction programs. This exercise faces several criticisms; one of them comes from the
concern that individual’s may have different preferences towards heterogeneous risks
(USEPA, 1997, 2005; S. A. B. USEPA, 2000). If individuals are sensitive to the
qualitative characteristics of risk, such as dread, fear, and controllability, they may prefer
certain risks over others even though both risks have a same probability of death. If this
is the case, individuals will place different values on risk reductions of different types.
This implies that individuals may place different values on reducing environmentoriented risks as compared to occupational risks, and the VSL obtained in the context of
occupational risk is not a valid VSL to apply in the environmental policy evaluation.
Early psychology studies did find that individuals perceive fatal risks differently
depending on the perceived risk characteristics. For example, Slovic et al. (1980) find
that lay people judge the degree of “risk” of death not only from the probability of death
but also the characteristics of death. Slovic et al. (1980) survey different groups and ask
them to order the risk of 30 different activities, including nuclear power, motor vehicle,
smoking, vaccinations etc. They find that the order made by a group of experts matched
the actual frequency or probability of events, while the order of lay people does not. It
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was possible that the perceived probability of lay people itself was biased by different
reasons, such as an exposure to media coverage (Combs & Slovic, 1979). However,
Slovic et al. also find that the order that lay people assigned to the risk of death from
various activities did not match with their perceived probability of each event either.
Slovic et al. further examine what factors drive the disparity between lay people’s risk
perception and their perceived probability of event. Key characteristics that seem to
affect individuals’ risk perception include the degree of control over the risk, the amount
of dread involved, or potential to threat the future generations (Slovic et al., 1980).
Several contingent valuation (CV) studies further examine the relationship
between risk characteristics and individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce fatal
risks. There are three main approaches in these studies. The first approach elicits
individual’s WTP to reduce fatal risks that arise from different contexts, such as air
pollution or traffic accidents (Cookson, 2000; McDaniels et al., 1992; Savage, 1993).
The second approach elicits individual’s preference towards different policy programs
which reduce different types of fatal risk but the cost effectiveness of the policy is
identical (Cookson, 2000; Cropper & Subramanian, 1999). The third approach elicits the
individual perception on the equivalent number of lives saved in different policy contexts
to a certain policy program (Chilton et al., 2002; Cookson, 2000; Jones-Lee & Loomes,
1995). These studies also ask individuals to rate the degree of qualitative characteristics
of each risk according to their perception. The elicited WTPs or preference towards
certain policy are statistically or non-statistically related with the perceived risk
characteristics, and estimate the marginal effect of each risk characteristic on the WTP.
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Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995), Cropper and Sabramanian (1999), and Cookson
(2000) found that individuals tend to exhibit a lower WTP (or place lower priority) to
reduce highly controllable and voluntary risks (e.g., automobile accident risks) than to
reduce other types of risks (e.g., air pollution). Also, McDaniel et al.(1992) and Savage
(1993) found that individuals have a higher WTP for reducing risks that involve a high
degree of dread as compared to other types of risk.
While there are a number of survey-based studies suggesting that individuals
value a reduction of different types of risks significantly differently, we have little
evidence from revealed preference studies in these regards. There are two major
advantages of using the revealed preference methods. One advantage is that this method
bases on the data from individuals’ actual behavior and eliminates the hypothetical bias
which often pertains to survey studies (Cummings & Taylor, 1999). The second
advantage is that the labor market approach may mitigate the problem associated with the
subject’s inability to understand small risk levels, which again is often an issue with
survey methods (Corso, Hammitt, & Graham, 2001; Hammitt & Graham, 1999).
Benjamin (2001) shows that on average, individuals can estimate their personal
probability of death from various sources quite accurately. Since occupational risk is a
personal risk for workers, it is reasonable to assume that on average, these workers
understand their probability of death at work reasonably well.
This study attempts to provide insights into whether or not heterogeneous
workplace risks play an important role in workers decision-making using labor market
data. In particular, we will focus on the risk/wage tradeoff between two very different
risks: violent assault (homicide) risks and non-violent risks. Although the focus is on the
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individual’s behavior within the labor market, this study is potentially important to
evaluate the transferability of VSL across different policy contexts. If individuals exhibit
different WTP to avoid different types of risks within the same policy context such as
workplace safety, it is hard to justify the application of VSL transfer between different
policy contexts.
The next section describes previous work which this study improves upon,
followed by a presentation of the empirical model. Finally, results and conclusions will
be presented.
Literature Review
To date, there is only one study that attempts to estimate the wage/risk premium
for different types of risk using the hedonic wage model. Scotton and Taylor (2006)
construct an occupational fatality rate which varies by the cause of death from the public
use sample of the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Using this data, they
estimate wage/risk premiums for different types of risk faced by a broad sample of
workers.
The results of their hedonic wage model are puzzling. They find implausibly
large risk premiums or large negative premiums for violent assault risks. The authors
suggest that the reasons they may have failed to estimate a theoretically consistent wage
premium are: 1) the objective measures of risk they used may be different from the
workers’ subjective measure of risk where the type of death is a rare event, and 2) the
hedonic model they estimated may have failed to take into account the unobserved nonrisk characteristics of the job.
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Also, Scotton and Taylor did not take into account the spatial heterogeneity of
occupational risk. For instance, workers in large cities tend to face higher crime and
traffic accident rates, and thus face higher occupational fatal risks than those in rural
areas. The practice of assigning the same level of risk to workers in the same occupation
regardless of location may have biased their result.
In this study, we will improve the study design of Scotton and Taylor by using a
different sample of workers as well as creating new, location-specific different risk data
to estimate the wage/risk premia for two different types of risks: violent-assault risk and
non-violent risk.
To avoid measurement error caused by the disparity between an objective and
subjective measure of risk, we will use a sample of workers who face either high violent
assault or high non-violent (or both) risks routinely as part of their job. Benjamin (2001)
shows that individuals perform better in estimating their personal risk level when the
actual risk level faced is high. It is hoped that individuals who face high level of fatal
risk routinely as part of their job are likely to understand the objective risk level of their
job correctly. Also, to minimize the bias caused by the unobserved job characteristics,
we will use a sample of workers in a homogeneous occupation which requires very
similar job duties.
To fulfill these requirements, we will use a sample of occupational drivers,
which includes taxi, truck, sales and bus drivers. Occupational drivers face higher trafficaccident risks on the job than other occupations, yet the type of risks faced varies across
driver-types. As discussed in chapter 3, the main causes of driver death are violent
assaults and traffic-related accident. Truck drivers have the highest traffic-related
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fatalities among driving occupations. Taxi drivers, on the other hand, have the highest
homicide rate among those in driving occupations. Indeed, the risk of death from violent
assault for taxi drivers is the highest among all occupations, nearly four times more than
the homicide rate of police officers (Knestaut, 1997). In addition, the fatal risk rates from
different causes varied significantly by the geographic area in which drivers reside.
Slovic et al. (1980) show that lay people considers crime as a highly
uncontrollable, involuntary and a highly dreaded risk. In addition, lay people generally
consider the fatal risk involving motor vehicles as relatively controllable, voluntary and
with less dread. Therefore, the comparison between violent-assault and non-violent risks
for occupational drivers may be an excellent case in which we can examine the degree to
which risks with different characteristics, especially in terms of dread and control
involved, are valued differently by individuals.
Empirical Model.
We will use a cross-section hedonic wage model to estimate the risk/wage
premium for a specialized sample of workers for each cause of fatal risk. The estimating
hedonic wage model is:
ln wagei = a 0 + a1vrisk oj + a 2 nvrisk oj + a3 vinj oj + a 4 nvinj oj + X i β + Wo γ + Z j δ + ε i

(24)
where i denotes an individual worker in occupation o in area j. The variables for
occupational risk are as follows; vrisk is the fatal risk from a violent assault, nvrisk is
fatal risk from a non-violent event, vinj is the risk of non-fatal injury (injury risk) from
violent interactions and nvinj is the risk of non-fatal injury from non-violent causes.
These risk rates vary by occupation (o) and geographic area (j). X is a vector of relevant
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individual characteristics, W is a vector of relevant job characteristics other than
occupational risk, Z is regional characteristics which affect wage levels in each area, and
ε is an error term.
From the estimated HW model, we test if the wage/risk premiums for different
types of fatal risk ( a1 and a 2 ) and for different types of injury risk ( a3 and a 4 ) are
statistically different from each other. The wage/risk premium for violent assault
fatal/injury risk are expected to be significantly larger than that for non-violent
fatal/injury assault risk due to the nature of violent risk with higher level of perceived
uncontrollability and dread. We assume the same wage-risk compensation schedule for
each occupation.
The choice of which geographic level to create the risk rates to be used may be
important to estimate HW models accurately. If the drivers work only within the MSA,
the MSA level risk rates are the relevant risk measure. If, however, the drivers work all
over the state in which they reside, then a state-level risk rate is a more relevant risk
measure. It would be reasonable to assume that each driver works within and around the
MSA in which they reside. In this case, drivers would form their perception about their
risks by weighting the MSA level risk and the state level risk according to the time they
spend inside and outside the MSA.
However, there is no record available from the CPS on how each driver in the
sample allocates his/her time inside and outside of the MSA. Thus, the choice becomes
either using the MSA-level or state-level risks. We examine the sensitivity of results to
the use of different geographic level risks in the next section.
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Results.
This section presents the results of our analyses. The base results, which are
based on the MSA-level violent risk and the state-level non-violent risks created from the
1992-2002 and 1998-2002 risk data, are presented first. In general, the violent fatal risk
is higher at the MSA-level than the sate-level, and the non-violent fatal risk is higher at
the state level. We include the MSA-level violent fatal risk and the state-level nonviolent fatal risk in the base model to avoid the possible underestimation of either risk
level drivers face. The summary of risks by type of risk and geographic level are
presented in chapter 3.
We first test the sensitivity of the base model to the inclusion of injury risk
variables. Additional sensitivity analyses are as follows. The second and third analyses
examine the sensitivity of results to the use of risk rates created from the different
geographic levels as well as the inclusion of different geographic level dummy variables.
The fourth analyses examine the effect of adjusting the standard error in the model to
allow for correlation among workers in the same geographic area. We include
geographic-level correlation that is different from the geographic level included as
dummy variables. For example, if a model includes MSA dummy variables, then
correlation is allowed at the state level. Allowing the correlation among observations, so
called cluster, affects the standard errors of estimates (Sribney 2005). 50 Additional
sensitivity analyses examine the effect of excluding the workers who face zero or high

 nc ' 
The formula to estimate this variance is: var = ( X ' X ) −1 ∑ u j u j  ( X ' X ) −1
 j =1

where u j = ∑ ei xi and nc is the total number of cluster (William Sribney 2005 retrieved March 25, 2007
50

jcluster

from http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/cluster.html).
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violent fatal risks and examining the effect of including MSA-specific descriptive
variables.
Table 35 shows the regression results with the base model and base sample of
workers. The fatal risk data is created based on the 1992-2002 CFOI in model 1 and
based on 1998-2002 CFOI in model 2. The base sample is occupational drivers who are
not self employed, who work full time, who earn more than minimum wage, who work
only one job and who are between age 18 and 66. MSAs with less than 100 employees
are omitted from the sample.51

Also, only workers in the continental U.S. are included.

The base models (model 1 and model 2) include violent fatal risk, non-violent fatal risk,
demographics, occupation and MSA dummy variables. Since MSA-level violent risk is
only available for drivers in MSA, we exclude drivers who live outside of MSA in the
base model.
All demographic variables show the expected sign. Older workers earn more than
younger workers, but at a decreasing rate. College graduates and high school graduates
earn more than non-high school graduates, white workers earn more than other workers,
U.S. citizens earn more than non-US citizens, male workers earn more than female
workers, unionized worker earn more than non-unionized workers, and married workers
earn more than single workers. Among occupations, truck drivers earn the highest level
of wage, and taxi drivers earn the lowest level of wage.
In both model 1 and model 2, the violent assault fatal risk has a significantly
positive coefficient at the 1% level.52 The non-violent fatal risk has a negative, but not

51

Including MSAs with less than 100 employments does not change the results.
We also include the squared violent and non-violent risk terms in the model. However, the squared risk
terms are not significant in any model estimate, which indicates that the linear risk model is the preferred
model.

52
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statistically significant coefficient in model 1 and negative and significant coefficient in
model 2. The coefficient of violent assault fatal risk is statistically larger than that of
non-violent fatal risk at the 5% level in model 1 and at the 1% level in model 2 according
to Wald tests. A significantly larger coefficient for violent fatal risk than for non-violent
fatal risk indicates that the workers require higher wage compensation to accept a
marginal increase in violent assault fatal risk than to accept a marginal increase of nonviolent fatal risk. The estimated VSL based on the violent fatal risk and mean wages in
the sample is $1.8 million and $5.1 million for model 1 and mode 2, respectively.53
We also estimate the VSL based on the total risk, which is the sum of violent and
non-violent fatal risks. The coefficient of total risk is 0.0034 in model 1 and 0.0052 in
model 2. They are significant at the 5% level and the 10% level, respectively. The
estimated VSL based on total risk and average annual wage is $1.2 million and $1.8
million for model 1 and model 2, respectively. The VSL estimates based on total risk is
compatible with previous VSL estimates and VSL estimated from panel models in
chapter 4. Our VSL estimates based on driver sample is lower bound of VSL estimate
range (Kochi et al., 2006; Mrozek & Taylor, 2002; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).
Table 35 shows that the use of different period of risk data makes significant
impact on the risk premium estimation. Model 2 has almost three times larger coefficient
for violent risk as compared to model 1. As discussed in chapter 3, the risk data created
from 1992-2002 CFOI likely contains significant measurement error, which would bias
the estimated risk coefficients downward. In the following sections, we discuss the

53

VSL is calculated as follows: VSL=coefficient of risk variable ×weekly wage ×52 (weeks) ×10,000,
where 10,000 is the unit of fatal risk.
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sensitivity of model 2 to different model specifications and different geographic level
fatal risks.
Table 36 shows the sensitivity of the base result (model 2) to the different model
specifications. Model 3 adds the injury risk variables to model 2. Adding injury risk
variables slightly reduce the magnitude of coefficient for violent risk and remove the
significance of negative coefficient of non-violent fatal risk. Injury risk is significant and
it is more theoretically sound to include it in the wage model, indicating that the model 3
is preferred specification to model 2. Thus, the remaining analyses include injury risk
variables. In model 3, the difference of coefficients between two fatal risk variables is
significant at the 10% level. The violent injury risk has a significantly positive
coefficient at the 1% level, and the non-violent injury risk shows a positive but not
significant coefficient. The Wald test shows that the coefficient of violent injury risk is
statistically larger than that of non-violent injury risk at the 1% level. The estimated
value of statistical injury for total injury risk is about $70,000.54 This is in the line of
previous estimated value of statistical injury, which ranges from $30,000 to 360,000 (in
2005 dollars) (Viscusi & Aldy 2003). The value of statistical injury for violent injury risk
in this study is $1.0 million.
Model 4 repeats model 3, but replaces the MSA dummy variables with state
dummy variables. Using state level dummy variable has little impact on the risk
coefficient estimates, but does change comparison across risk types. The Wald test now
fails to reject the null of no significant difference between the two fatal risk coefficients

54

The coefficient of total injury risk for model 3 is 1.941 and significant at 1% level. The value of
statistical injury is calculated by multiplying 1.941 by annual wage.
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at the 10% level. However the difference is significant at 10.5% level. The difference in
coefficients of injury variables is still highly significant.
Table 37 shows the sensitivity of estimation results to using different
combinations of geographic level that defining the risk variables. Model 5 and model 6
include the MSA-level violent and non-violent risk variables, and model 7 and model 8
include state-level violent and non-violent risk variables. Model 5 and model 7 include
MSA dummy variables and model 6 and model 8 include state dummy variables. Note,
in Model 5 and model 8, the risk variables vary by the geographic level that is the same
level as the included geographic dummy variables. For example, in model 5, risk only
varies by MSA and occupation. In this model, including MSA dummy variables reduce
the variation of risk variables significantly, since the only variation to estimate the
risk/wage premium comes from the variation over the occupation within the same MSA.
Thus, it may be more reasonable to include geographic dummy variables which are not
the same level in which the risk variables are created. Model 6 and model 7 include the
geographic dummy variables that are not same level in which risk variable is created.
These models (models 6 and 7) show that two risk coefficients are statistically different
from each other at the 5% level. On the other hand, in model 5 and 8, the differences
between the two risk coefficients are not significant.
Although the same issue of multicolinearity applies to injury risk variables, which
are only created at the state level (and varies by occupation), the results are robust to
include state dummy variables. For all models in table 37, the coefficients of violent
injury risk are positive and significant at 1% level and the coefficients of non-violent
injury are positive and not significant. The Wald tests show that the differences in
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coefficients of injury variables are significantly different from each other for all models
at the 1% level.
To avoid multicolinearity between risk variables and geographic dummy
variables, we only focus on the model specifications that have a combination of fatal risk
rates and geographic dummy variables that are created at different geographic level, such
as model 6 and model 7. Although in model 6, violent injury risks and geographic
dummy variables are created at same geographic levels (state level), it seems there is no
significant bias by doing so. Therefore model 6 remains in our set of preferred models.
Table 38 repeats the specifications of model 6 and model 7, but we allow for
correlation among workers in a same geographic area.55 This allows us to examine the
sensitivity of results to allowing the correlation within a geographic unit, but assuming
there is no correlation across geographic units. For model 9, the model includes state
dummy variables and we allow for correlation within MSA. For model 10, the model
includes MSA dummy variables and thus we allow correlation within state. The major
change in table 38, as compared to table 37 is observed in model 10. Without allowing
correlation within geographic unit, the Wald test shows that the difference in the
coefficients of risk variables is significant (model 7). However, when we allow for
correlation among geographic area, the difference is no longer significant. The
coefficients of injury variables are still significantly different from each other at the 1%
level in both model 9 and model 10.
When comparing model 9 and model 10, model 9 is preferred. Model 9 uses
MSA-level violent and non-violent risk. The concern with model 10, which uses state-

55

The complete set of models in table 38 with allowing the correlation among a same geographic unit are
available in appendix G.
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level violent and non-violent risk rates, is that the risk rates may not reflect driver’s actual
fatal risk at work particularly for violent risk cases. In model 10, state-level risk is
uniformly assigned to the workers regardless of workers’ residency. For example, taxi
drivers working in MSAs and taxi drivers working in small towns in a same state are
assigned a same level of violent fatal risk, which is not reasonable to assume. On the
other hand, model 9 does not include drivers who live outside of MSA, which make the
sample of drivers more homogeneous in terms of the fatal risk level they face. It is more
reasonable to assume that the drivers who live in a same MSA face a same level of fatal
risk (which still varies by occupation), than to assume that drivers who live in a same
state face a same level of fatal risk.
Still, uniformly assigning the MSA-level risk rates for all drivers may not reflect
their actual risk. We also assign different geographic level risk rates for different drivers.
Truck drivers are likely drive all over the state or inter-state, and sales driver and taxi
drivers are more likely to work in the MSA. Bus drivers could work all over the state if
they are inter-state bus drivers. However, bus drivers may also work within a MSA (e.g.
public transit bus drivers). Table 39 presents the results when we assign different
geographic level risk rates to different drivers. In model 11 and 12, we assign the statelevel risk rate for both violent and non-violent events for truck drivers and assign the
MSA-level risk rates for both violent and non-violent events for bus, sales and taxi
drivers. The models also allow for correlation within geographic area as has been done in
table 38. Model 11 includes MSA dummy variables and model 12 includes state dummy
variables. In both models, violent risk is significantly positive at the 1% level and non-
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violent risk is not significantly different than zero. The difference in coefficients of two
risk variables is significant at the 5% level.
In model 13 and 14, we assign state-level violent and non-violent risk rates for
truck and bus drivers, and MSA-level violent and non-violent risk rates for sales and taxi
drivers. Assigning the state level risk rates for bus drivers reduce the magnitude of the
coefficient of violent fatal risk, and increase the magnitude of coefficient of non-violent
fatal risk. This change makes the difference between two coefficients of risk variables
insignificant in both model 13 and model 14. Throughout the models in table 39, violent
injury risk has significant positive coefficient and non-violent injury risk has a nonsignificant coefficient. The difference in coefficients of these injury variables is
significant in all models.
It is hard to discuss which model, model 11/12 or 13/14, is preferred. If the
number of local bus drivers outweighs the number of inter-state bus drivers, then model
11/12 would be preferred, and vice versa. There is no information in the CPS indicating
whether a bus driver works at the local or inter-state level. However, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that the number of local bus drivers outweigh the number of
inter-state bus drivers if it is the case that public transit bus industry at a local level is
bigger than the inter-state level bus industry. However, this model may contain the
problem due to the multicolinearity between fatal risk rates and geographic dummy
variables.
Table 40 examines the sensitivity of results when we drop the observations with
extreme levels of risks. The risk rates used in these models are MSA-level for both
violent and non-violent events and models include state dummy variables and allow
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correlation among workers by MSA. Model 15 excludes the workers who live in a state
in which the state-level violent risk rate is zero. This exclusion drops 1,572 observations.
The difference between two fatal risk coefficients is still significant at the 5% level.
However, the difference between two injury risk coefficients becomes insignificant. This
change is difficult to explain, and requires further characterization of dropped
observations in terms of injury risks.
In model 16, we drop the workers who face the MSA-level violent fatal rate
higher than 12.7 (in 10,000), which is approximately the 95th percentile for violent fatal
risk in our sample. This exclusion drops 142 observations, and affects the coefficients of
fatal risk variables. The coefficient of violent fatal risk is no longer significant and the
difference of coefficients between two fatal risks is also not significant. The exclusion of
workers who face a high level of violent fatal risk does not affect the coefficients of
injury risks. The coefficient of violent injury risk is still significant at the 1% level and
the difference between two injury coefficients is significant at the 5% level.
Model 17 drops both workers who live in a state with zero violent fatal risk as
well as workers who face a MSA-level violent fatal risk higher than 12.7 (in 10,000).
The results for this model are similar to model 14. The coefficient of violent fatal risk is
significant (at the 5% level) and the difference in the coefficients between two fatal risk
variables is also significant (at the10% level). Neither of injury risk coefficients are
significant, nor the difference in coefficients of these variables. In summary, the
estimation results are sensitive to the exclusion of extreme cases of violent fatal risk level
from the sample. However, in all models presented here, workers require higher
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compensation to accept marginal increase of violent risk level than marginal increase of
non-violent risk level, either from fatal injury events or non-fatal injury events.
Lastly, table 41 examines the robustness of results to including MSA variables on
model 9. The MSA variables included are the MSA-level annual unemployment rate, the
MSA-level sales volume per capita in wholesales, retail, transportation, entertainment
and food industries, and the MSA-level per capita vehicle miles traveled. The MSA-level
annual unemployment rates vary by year and the sales volumes is in 1997 level (see
chapter 3). Table 41 shows the coefficients for the fatal risk, injury risk, and MSA
variables. The coefficients of other demographic variables are not reported for
succinctness.56 Wholesales and retail sales volume per capita have positive significant
coefficients at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. Transportation sales volume per
capita has a negative coefficient that significant at the 10% level.
The vehicle miles traveled per capita has a negative coefficient which is
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of VMT per capita is small due to the large
size of VMT per capita unit as compared to the unit for the log wage. The mean VMT
per capita is 9,310 miles per year with standard deviation of 2,348 miles per year.57 The
increase of one standard deviation from the mean VMT per capita will reduce the wage
by 1.6%. Inclusion of the MSA variables slightly increases the coefficients for fatal
risks, but does not affect the comparison between types of fatal risks or types of injury
risks. The violent fatal risk has significantly larger coefficients than non-violent fatal risk
at the 5% level and the same is true for the injury risk cases.

56
57

Results for other variables are not affected by the inclusion of MSA variables.
This mean value is not from the sample and is computed assuming the each MSA receiving equal weight.
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Conclusions.
This is one of few studies that use a revealed preference method to test the
transferability of the VSL across different policy contexts. Improved study design upon
the previous revealed preference study enables us to articulate the individual’s WTP for
different types of risk. This study overcomes the issue of hypothetical bias that may
pertain to previous studies based on surveys, and provide insights about how individual
risk perceptions might play an important role in their actual decision making.
We create unique geographic-occupation-specific fatal and injury risk rates for
occupational drivers. The sample of drivers is collected from the monthly CPS. Our
estimation results generally show that occupational drivers require more compensation to
accept a marginal increase in violent fatal risk rate as compared to a marginal increase in
a non-violent fatal risk rate. Results also show that occupational drivers require more
compensation to accept a marginal increase in violent injury risk as compared to a
marginal increase in a non-violent injury risks. The estimates of the wage/fatal risk
relationship are somewhat sensitive to the different geographic level at which the fatal
risks are created and for the geographic level of dummy variables included in the model.
On the other hand, the estimates of the wage/injury risk relationships are quite robust to
these changes.
The sensitivity of the wage/fatal risk relationships are likely to come from the less
appropriate model specifications. For example, combining fatal risks and dummy
variables which are created at a same geographic level in the same model is likely to be
inappropriate due to the concern of multicolinearity among these variables. In addition,
the state-level fatal risk, especially for violent fatal risk, is not a preferred risk rate since it
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ignores the heterogeneity of workers in terms of the fatal risk level at work within a same
state.
Among all model specifications, we prefer models with MSA-level fatal risks that
include state dummy variables over other models for two reasons. The first reason is that
this model contains less multicolinearity issue. The second reason is that the MSA-level
fatal risks have a better representation of worker’s actual fatal risk level than state-level
fatal risks. When we focus on the estimation results from models with MSA-level
violent and non-violent risks that include state dummy variables, our wage/fatal risk
estimation results are robust to different model specifications. Allowing correlation
among workers within a same state, as well as adding MSA-specific demographic
variables does not affect the results. Our wage/injury risk results are also robust to
different models specifications just mentioned above.
Both wage/fatal risk and wage/injury risk results are somewhat sensitive to
dropping workers with extreme violent fatal risk values from the sample. When we drop
individuals who work in states with zero violent fatal risk (at the state-level), we lose the
significance of the violent injury risk coefficients, while we keep the significance of the
violent fatal risk coefficient. When we drop observations in high ends of MSA-level
violent fatal risk (greater than the 95th percentile for our sample), we lose the significance
of violent fatal risk coefficients while we keep the significance in violent injury risk.
When we drop both observations in state with zero violent fatal risk and high ends of
MSA-level violent fatal risk, we have significant violent fatal risk coefficient but nonsignificant violent injury risk. These changes of significance levels are puzzling.
However, in any cases, either fatal risk or injury risk estimations indicate that drivers
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require higher compensation to accept marginal increase in violent risk than non-violent
risk.
The VSL for total risk in our sample in our base model (model 2) is $1.8 million
and our preferred model (model 6) is $1.4 million.58 This is compatible with the VSL
estimated from the panel models in chapter 4. Although the type of workers included in
this chapter and chapter 4 are quite different, we control worker heterogeneity in both
studies, thus lending validity to the convergence of the VSL estimates between these two
samples. This study indicates that the VSL estimate from total risk is not applicable if we
want to evaluate risk-specific policies such as traffic risk or violent risk. When we
separately evaluate individual’s willingness to pay to reduce each type of risk, we find
quite different point estimates for WTP. We find much higher VSL based on violent risk
coefficient, and we do not find any wage compensation toward non-violent risk.
The VSL estimated for violent risk in this study (around $3-5million) is in a range
of the VSL estimated from previous cross section HW models, that is $4-10 million
(Viscusi 1993). At first thought, this comparison may appear to be counter to our
hypothesis that wage/risk premia are differentiated by type of risk. However, as
discussed in chapter 4, existing estimates of the VSL in the literature typically do not
control for unobserved heterogeneity. In chapter 4, when we use undifferentiated risks
and control for unobserved heterogeneity, our estimates of the VSL are approximately $2
million, lower than the $4-10 million range found in the comparable existing literature
using undifferentiated risks.59

58

The coefficient of total risk in model 6 is 0.0044.
Total risk is the sum of violent and non-violent risks. The wage/risk premium for total risk is likely
smaller than that for violent risk because we could not find a significant compensation for non-violent risk,
suggesting this type of risk may not be considered an issue for occupational drivers (perhaps they feel it is

59
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We argue in chapter 4 that $4-10 million for undifferentiated risks is likely an
upwardly biased estimate. Our results in this chapter for undifferentiated risks also
suggest $4-10 million is upwardly biased. As such, our results suggest that a VSL of
around $4 million may be appropriate to use in policy analysis designed to reduce the risk
of fatal violent injuries among occupational drivers, and would not be appropriate to use
for other policies involving different types of risks. This point is further underscored by
the fact that we could not find a significant wage premium for increased traffic accident
risk among occupational drivers. Traffic accident risk may be perceived as a highly
controllable risk by this group of individuals, and as such, may not require wage
compensation for working in areas with higher levels of fatality risks. How the VSL
level changes when we change the target risk type or target worker population should be
pursued in the future study.
The value of statistical injury for total injury risk in our sample in our base model
(model 3) is $70,000 and our preferred model (model 6) is about $52,000.60 This is in
line of previous estimated value of statistical injury. However, once we separate violent
and non-violent injury risk, we find much higher value of statistical injury for violent
injury risk, which is around $1 million while we do not find significant wage
compensation towards non-fatal non-violent injury risk. This result confirms the
conclusions from fatal risk analysis.
Although the focus is on the individual’s behavior within the labor market, this
study is potentially important to evaluate the transferability of VSL across different
policy contexts. Our results indicate that individuals exhibit different WTP to avoid
in their control). As such, when adding violent and non-violent risks together to get a total risk, we are
adding measurement error to the “risk” of the job, biasing this coefficient towards zero.
60
The coefficient of total injury risk in model 6 is 1.4544.
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different types of risks even in the same policy context. This makes it hard to justify the
application of VSL transfer between different policy contexts. Although the occupational
drivers are a special sample, we show that transferring VSL from one context to another
is not an appropriate policy evaluation approach. Our results from the revealed
preference method confirm the previous results from stated preference method, and
suggest risks with more dread/fear or less controllability require more compensation than
risks with less dread/fear or more controllability. These results suggest that it is
necessary to estimate VSLs in the same policy context, or that any benefits transfer
exercise require close attention to the types of risk being evaluated.
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Table 35
Regression Result: (Dependent Variable: ln(weekly wage), without MSA<100)

Violent risk (MSA level)
Non-violent risk
(state level)
age
agesq
ugdeg
college
hsgrad
hispanic
blacknh
othrace
uscit
female
salary
workot
union
married
central
truck
bus
taxi
Neweng
Midalt
Encent
Wncnet
Satl
Escent
Wscent
Mount
constant
Test: violent=
non-violent (p-value)
N
Average weekly
wage ($)
VSL (violent risk)
R2

Model 1
Risk data 1992-2002
Standard error
Coefficienta
0.0050***
0.0016

Model 2
Risk data 1998-2002
Standard error
Coefficienta
0.0140***
0.0042

-0.0087***

0.0063

-0.0138**

0.0058

0.0373***
-0.0003***
0.00002***
0.1012***
0.1000***
-0.0745***
-0.0348***
-0.0978***
0.1063***
-0.1800***
0.0833***
0.2716***
0.2341***
0.0741***
-0.0276***
0.0675***
-0.0245***
-0.1344***
-0.0389***
-0.3566***
0.0639***
0.1350***
0.1601***
0.1833***
-0.5688***
-0.3271***
5.5808***

0.0022
0.00002
0.0195
0.0109
0.0096
0.0137
0.0114
0.0256
0.0157
0.0153
0.0080
0.0073
0.0082
0.0079
0.0089
0.0207
0.0205
0.0290
0.2815
0.2899
0.2766
0.2852
0.3030
0.2833
0.3260
0.2928
0.2803

0.0369***
-0.0003***
0.1011***
0.1032***
0.0962***
-0.0701***
-0.0222***
-0.0704**
0.1273***
-0.1754***
0.0900***
0.2718***
0.2188***
0.0696***
-0.0362***
0.0860***
-0.0128***
-0.1480***
-0.0975***
-0.1698***
-0.0384***
0.0497***
0.0598***
0.1032***
-0.1920***
0.1386***
5.2821***

0.0024
0.00002
0.0218
0.0122
0.0108
0.0153
0.0126
0.0290
0.0173
0.0168
0.0089
0.0082
0.0092
0.0088
0.0101
0.0220
0.0234
0.0340
0.1930
0.1309
0.2918
0.3006
0.2575
0.2838
0.1589
0.1493
0.1076

0.05

0.0004

12,637

10,257
701.65

695.79
$1.8 million
0.32

$5.1 million
0.32

Note. MSA and year dummies are omitted to report.
a
regression shows significant heteroschedasity at 5% level and thus use robust estimators.
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.
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Table 36
Results With MSA Level Violent Risk and State Level Non-violent Risk Without
MSA<100 (Standard error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk (MSA level)
non-violent fatal risk
(state level)
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average weekly wage ($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Model3:
w/ MSA dummy
0.0121***

Model4:
w/ state dummy
0.0121***

-0.0043***

-0.0028***

29.2671***
0.5831***
697.64
0.32
8,685
0.08
0.008
$4.3 million

30.8813***
0.1285***
697.64
0.30
8,685
0.102
0.0044
$4.3 million
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Table 37
Results With MSA Level or State level Fatal Risks Without MSA<100
(Standard error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk
non-violent fatal risk
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average weekly wage
($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent
(p-value)
non-fatal: violent=nonviolent (p-value)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

MSA-level fatal risks
Model 5:
Model 6:
w/ MSA
w/ state
dummy
dummy
0.0110***
0.0115***
0.0010***
0.0003***
29.5636***
31.0635***
0.7203***
0.2158***

State-level fatal risks
Model 7:
Model 8:
w/ MSA
w/ State
dummy
dummy
0.0150***
0.0136***
-0.0001***
0.0084***
38.1399***
29.8873***
0.2217***
0.8323***

697.64

697.64

689.69

689.69

0.32
8,685

0.30
8,685

0.30
12,509

0.29
12,509

0.134

0.0256

0.0328

0.528

0.0085

0.0043

0.0001

0.0042

$3.9 million

$4.1 million

$5.3 million

$4.8 million
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Table 38
Results with Allowing Correlation Within a Geographic Unit (standard
error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk
non-violent fatal risk
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average weekly wage ($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (pvalue)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<00.1, **p<00.05, **p<00.01

MSA-level fatal risks
Model 9:
w/ State dummy
0.0115***
0.0003***
31.0635**
0.2158***
695.28
0.30
8,685
0.0131

State-level fatal risks
Model 10:
w/ MSA dummy
0.0150***
-0.0001***
38.1399***
0.2217***
687.31
0.30
12,509
0.1999

0.0215

0.0009

$4.1 million

$5.3 million
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Table 39
Different Geographic Risk Level by Type of Driver With Allowing Correlation Within a
Geographic Unit (standard error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk
non-violent fatal risk
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average weekly wage
($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent
(p-value)
non-fatal: violent=
non-violent (p-value)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

truck: state-level,
others: MSA-level fatal risks

Truck/bus: state-level,
others: MSA-level fatal risks

Model 11:
w/ MSA
dummy
0.0127***
-0.0047***
34.6514***
-0.1886***

Model 12:
w/ State
dummy
0.0119***
-0.0018***
26.8280***
-0.0503***

Model 13:
w/ MSA
dummy
0.0104***
0.0005***
42.3898***
-0.0701***

Model 14
w/ State
dummy
0.0082***
0.0087***
33.8273***
0.4533***

691.40
0.30
12,131

691.40
0.29
12,131

688.82
0.30
12,291

688.82
0.29
12,291

0.0119

0.0358

0.1796

0.9397

0.0003

0.0537

0.0001

0.0179

$4.5 million

$4.2 million

$3.7 million

$2.9 million
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Table 40
Results With Limited Risk Range (With State Dummy and Allowing Correlation Within
MSA) (standard error in parentheses)
Model 15
0.0139***
0.0021***
24.4766***
0.6544***
696.74
0.32
7,113
0.0135
0.1480

Model 16
Drop
vrisk_m>12.7
0.0105***
0.00003***
30.6181***
0.2835***
698.90
0.33
8,514
0.16
0.0244

Model 17
Drop vrisk_s<0 &
vrisk_m>12.7
0.0163***
0.0018***
23.2210***
0.8628***
698.26
0.31
6,942
0.08
0.18

$5.0 million

$3.8 million

$5.9 million

Drop vrisk_s=0
violent fatal risk (MSA level)
non-violent fatal risk (MSA level)
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average weekly wage ($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (pvalue)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 41
Results With MSA Variables With Allowing Correlation Within MSA
(standard error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk (MSA-level)
non-violent fatal risk (MSA-level)
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
unemp
whole_sales
retail_sales
trans_sales
ent_sales
food_sales
msavmtp
average weekly wage ($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Model 18:
w/State dummy
0.0133***
0.0021***
30.9522***
-0.2817***
-0.0043***
0.0035***
0.0063***
-0.0195***
-0.0225***
0.0082***
-7.06e-06***
692.43
0.31
7,082
0.0388
0.0329
$4.7 million
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Chapter VI
Conclusions

This dissertation addressed two important issues in the VSL literature. The first
issue is the potential endogeneity bias in cross-section hedonic wage models. The second
issue is the transferability of the VSL between different policy contexts.
Chapter 4 addressed the issue of endogneity bias in cross-section HW models.
We first estimated the cross-section model and panel models to identify the bias due to
the time-invariant worker heterogeneity. We also combined panel models and
instrumental variable approach to control potential remaining endogeneity bias due to the
measurement error associated with risk variable, time-variant worker heterogeneity and
simultaneity between wage and risk.
We use the national panel data of Survey of Income and Program Participation as
our labor market data and occupation-industry risk matrices from Scotton (2000) as
occupation-industry fatal risk data. We find a VSL of $4.6 million (in 2005 dollars) with
a standard error of $0.6 million from the cross-section hedonic wage model. After
controlling for workers unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity with the fixed-effect and
first-difference models, we find the VSL of $2.5 million with the standard error of $0.4
million and the VSL of $1.7 million with the standard error of $0.6 million, respectively.
With the 95 percent confidence interval, there is no overlap of the VSL estimated from
the cross-section model and panel models, while there is overlap the VSL estimated from
the fixed-effect model and first-difference model. We find no evidence of exacerbated
attenuation bias from measurement error or remaining endogeneity bias in our panel
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models. We conclude that the cross-section OLS hedonic wage model is significantly
biased upward due to the unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity, but not from
the time-variant worker heterogeneity or simultaneity between wage and risk.
Our hedonic wage models are sensitive to the inclusion of industry dummy
variables and firm-side variables. When we do not include industry dummy variables,
our VSL estimate from the cross-section model increases to $10.3 million. When we
further drop firm-side variables, the VSL estimate from the cross-section model decreases
to $7.2 million. As documented in previous studies (McConnell, 2006; Mrozek &
Taylor, 2002), we find that controlling industry differences and firm-side characteristics
are important to obtain unbiased VSL estimates.
The inter-industry wage differentials are well documented phenomenon in labor
economics, and theoretically, industry dummy variables should be included in the
hedonic wage model (McConnell, 2006). The reason for not including industry dummy
variables in hedonic wage models often is stated as a concern for potential multicolinerity
between the risk variable and the industry dummy variables (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003). This
concern is valid when fatal risk data only varies by industry. Including the industry
dummy variables often removes large amount of variation in risk variables and generate
insignificant or sometimes negative risk coefficient (Dorman & Hagstrom, 1998).
Our risk data in which risk rates vary by occupation and industry should mitigate
the problem of multicolinerity between risk and industry variables. Our regression
results show that omitting industry variables significantly bias the risk estimators.
Therefore when the industry dummies are omitted, the model may be significantly biased
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and that must be corrected with instrumental variables models.61 Our regression models
employ the one-digit level industry variables which are more aggregated than the industry
variation in the risk variable. Our second stage panel estimation results indicate that
there is not an endogeneity problem in our panel models due to not controlling for more
detailed level inter-industry wage difference.
Mrozek and Taylor (2002) suggests that the VSL obtained from previous crosssection hedonic wage models assuming all studies include industry dummy variables is
about $2 million dollars in 1998 dollars or $2.4 million in 2005 dollars. This is a quite
similar value to the VSL we obtained from our panel models. This may be because
previous cross-section hedonic wage studies suffer from two types of bias; omitted
variables bias and measurement error bias associated with risk variable, which work in
opposite directions in this case. Our study indicates that the previous studies suffer from
upward bias due to the omitted variables. However, at same time, previous cross-section
hedonic wage studies are likely suffered from the attenuation bias from measurement
error associated with risk variables.
Since measurement error bias has been one of the major concerns in hedonic
wage literature (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003), we further discuss this issue. Most studies
considered in Mrozek and Taylor (2002) use industry or occupation average risk data.
When studies assign industry average risk levels to workers, they ignore the variation of
risk within the industry. In the same way, when studies assign the occupation average
risk levels to workers, they ignore the variation of risk within the occupation. For
example, secretaries and construction workers in the construction industry must face
different levels of risk. However, in the hedonic wage model, researchers have had to
61

However, exclusion of industry dummy variables may lead to poor fit of the first stage regression.
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assign the same risk level for these two types of workers due to data limitations. This
creates a significant measurement error problem in hedonic wage models and biases risk
estimators downward. In our hedonic model, we assign risk rates that vary by occupation
and industry. Thus in our example, secretaries and construction workers in the
construction industry are assigned different risk levels. Thus our study might mitigate
measurement error bias caused from the disparity between actual risk and estimated risk
level.
Although our study mitigates the measurement error bias caused from the
disparity between actual risk and estimated risk level, there is still a potential
measurement error problem arising from the disparity between actual risk and perceived
risk. It is reasonable to assume that the workers do not know their exact actual risk level
(such as 3.5 in 100,000 chance of death), but have some perceived risk level which may
be different from the actual risk level. A major concern is that this measurement error
may exacerbate attenuation bias in panel models, which were estimated in chapter 4. To
attempt to address this issue, two stage panel estimations were employed.
It was somewhat surprising to find that there was not measurement error bias in
our panel models. There are two potential reasons why measurement error was not an
issue in our hedonic wage model. The first reason is that the measurement error we were
concerned with may not satisfy the classical errors in variables (CEV) assumption. The
CEV assumption indicates that measurement error biases the estimator only if there is a
correlation between measurement error and the objective (actual) risk level. If this is not
the case, then the measurement error only increases the variance, and would not cause
any bias in the estimator (Wooldridge, 1999).

140

The other reason is that the labor market may be in a long-run equilibrium and
firms have correct information about the actual risk level. As discussed in chapter 2, if
the market is in a long-run equilibrium, the hedonic wage schedule is solely determined
by the distribution of firm’ isoprofit functions. If firms perceive the risk level in the same
way as researchers do (i.e., perceive objective risks accurately), then a hedonic wage
function is unbiased even if workers perceive risks differently from the actual risks.
As compared with Kniesner et al.(2005), even after adjusting the difference of
model specifications, the VSL estimates from our panel models are lower. When we
omit industry and firm side variables, we obtain the VSL of $3.0 (in 2005 dollars), while
Kniesner et al. (2005) obtain the VSL of $6.7 million,62 both from the first difference
model. This is a quite large difference that we should not ignore. The reason of the
disparity between our VSL estimates and Kniesner et al.’s (2005) estimates may be the
difference of our labor market data. We use the SIPP as our labor market data while
Kniesner et al. use the PSID as their labor market data. According to the SIPP User
Guide, neither the SIPP nor the PSID are designed to gather a representative sample
within each state.63 This indicates that the distribution of workers characteristics may be
significantly different between the SIPP and the PSID. In addition, the PSID data set
tends to generate high-end VSL estimates. According to Viscusi and Aldy (2003), the
VSL estimated using the PSID is between $8-20 million while the VSL estimated using
the CPS is $0.7-12 million (in 2000 dollars).
In the future analysis, we should include the CPS as the labor market data to
examine the robustness of our results. The CPS is designed to be a representative
62

Kniesner et al. (2005) do not explicitly mention to which year they adjust their dollar values. Here we
assume they use 2005 dollar value.
63
Both SIPP and PSID are designed to over-sample low-income population.
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sample of households within each state.64 Therefore the panel estimates from the CPS
would have more relevance to be used in the policy analyses. Although the CPS does not
provide enough firm-side variables, we can estimate the possible bias due to the lack of
firm-side variables from this study. In addition, the CPS only has two current wage
observations for each individual, which may limit the sample size. Therefore, the results
of this study and the results from future study using the CPS should be combined to
provide an overall assessment of VSL estimates arising from current risk and labor
market data.
Chapter 5 addressed the issue of the transferability of the VSL between different
policy contexts using cross-section hedonic wage models. We examined whether or not
workers and firms differentiate heterogeneous risks to determine the risk-wage
compensation levels. We focus on two very different fatal risks in terms of the degree of
workers’ control over the risk and the degree of dread associated with risk. We use risks
related to violent assaults and risks related to non-violent events. We use occupational
drivers to mitigate potential unobserved heterogeneity of job characteristics and
measurement error associated with risk variables. The labor market data comes from the
basic CPS, and the occupation-geographic specific risk rates for each cause of death are
created from the non-public Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries.
When we use the MSA level risk rates for both violent and non-violent fatal risks,
we find quite robust evidence of worker’s different WTP to reduce a marginal risk for
different types of risks. We find that occupational drivers require larger compensation to
accept a marginal increase of violent risk as compared to non-violent risk. This is true
for both fatal and non-fatal risk cases. When we use different geographic combinations
64

According to the SIPP User Guide.
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of violent and non-violent risk rates, the results are less robust for the changes in the
model specifications, but this is largely due to inappropriate model specifications. The
injury risk data is only available at the state level, and the estimations of injury-risk wage
compensation are quite robust to changes in model specifications.
This study verifies the findings from previous contingent valuation studies
regarding the WTP to reduce heterogeneous risks. The contribution of this study is that
we show that individuals exhibit different WTP to reduce different types of risks by a
revealed preference method. The contingent valuation method is a very flexible and
useful tool in many settings, however this method may suffer from hypothetical bias due
to the nature of the surveys. The revealed preference (hedonic wage) method, on the
other hand, faces certain limitations due to the data availability. Slovic et al (1980)
indicates that violent risk is less controllable and more dreadful than traffic accident risk,
which is the major component fatal risk for occupational drivers. Our results strongly
support that occupational drivers and firms differentiate heterogeneous risks depending of
the qualitative risk characteristics, and generate different hedonic wage functions for each
type of risk.
Although both risks we examined in this study are occupational risks, we can
derive the implication of transferability of the VSL between different policy contexts. If
individuals differentiate heterogeneous types of risks in a similar circumstance (such as
risk at work), it is hard to assume that individuals do not differential heterogeneous risks
that arise in very different circumstances, such as risk at work and risk from
environmental damages. Thus this study suggests that current direct use of VSL obtained
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from hedonic wage studies in benefit estimation of various governmental programs
should be reconsidered.
Our study does not aim to quantify the difference of worker’s WTP for the
occupational risk and other types of risks. Instead, we aim to examine whether or not
individuals differentiate risks with very different risk characteristics in their risk-wage
compensation decision using the revealed preference method. In the future analysis, we
would incorporate more variety of risks such as exposure to harmful substances or
environment and examine the sensitivity of workers risk preference towards other types
of risks.
To provide more direct implications to the environmental policy analysis, we
would want to quantify the difference of worker’s WTP to reduce environmental-related
risk and other risks. Although there is no identical risk as environmental risk available in
occupational setting, the comparison between worker’s WTP to reduce exposure to
harmful substances or environment and other risks at work may provide more direct
implications to assess the validity of current environmental policy analysis.
In future analyses, it also would be important to examine robustness of our results
with different groups of workers. The fact that none of our estimation results show
significant coefficients for non-violent fatal or injury risk may suggest that there is not
enough variation in these variables to estimate wage/risk (wage/injury risk) coefficients
among drivers. Or, it could be the case that risks with great perceived personal control
such as auto accident risks, the primary component of occupational driver’s non-violent
risk, are not compensated in the workplace. Adding different types of workers may
enable us to estimate the non-violent risk premium better, since it would add workers
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who face different traffic-related risk level than occupational drivers, which would
increase the variation in non-violent risk/injury variable. In addition, non-occupational
driving workers may have different perceived personal control over the traffic-related
risk, and they may require a different compensation over the traffic-related risk as
compared to occupational drivers.
To include different types of workers in the model, it is important to control for
time-invariant worker heterogeneity as found in chapter 4. In chapter 5, we used workers
with similar job requirements to control unobserved job as well as worker characteristics.
However, if we include more variety of workers, we would have same problems related
to the unobserved worker heterogeneity as in chapter 4. We can solve this omitted
variable problem by employing the panel data analysis as in chapter 4.
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Appendix A CFOI Research File Elementsa
Element
Description
REC
Record ID
REF
Reference year
YEA
Year of injury
MON
Month of injury
DAY
Day of week
TII
Time of incident
NAT
Nature of injury
PAR
Part of body
EVE
Event or exposure
SOU
Source of injury
SEC
Secondary source of injury
ACT
Worker activity
LOC
Location
REG
Region
OCC
Occupation
USO
Usual lifetime occupation
IND
Industry
USI
Usual lifetime industry
OWN
Ownership
EST
Establishment size class
EMP
Employee status
TIE
Time with employer
GEN
Gender
AGE
Age group
RAC
Race
HIS
Hispanic origin
FOR
Foreign born
SUR
Days survived
NARR Narrative
a
Source: BLS, CFOI manual.
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Appendix B Industry Group Classificationa
Major industry
group
Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing
and Mining

Dummy name

SIC Division

Two-digit SIC
codes

AGIND

Division A and B
(10 and 20)

01-14

Construction

CONSTIND

Division C (30)

15-17

Manufacturing

MANUFIND

Division D (41:
Durable and 42:
Non-Durable)

20-39

TCUIND

Division E (51:
Transportation and
52: Communication
& Utilities)

40-49; except 43

Wholesale trade and
Retail trade

TRDIND

Divisions F and G
(61: Wholesale and
62: Retail)

50-59

Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate, and
Services

SERVIND

Divisions H and I
(70 and 80)

60-88

Public
Administration

PUBIND

Division J (90)

43, and 91-99

Transportation,
Communications,
Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services

a

Reproduced from Scotton (2000), pp.193.
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Appendix C Occupation Group Classificationa
Major occupation
group
Managerial and
professional
specialty
occupations
Technical, sales,
and administrative
support occupations

Service occupations
Precision
production, craft,
and repair
occupations

Operators,
fabricators, and
laborers

Dummy name

CPS Codes

Managerial

003-037

Professional

043-199

PROFOCC

TECHOCC

SERVOCC

Technicians and
related support
occupations
Sales occupations
Administrative
support occupations,
including clerical
Private household
Protective service
All other service
occupations

CRAFTOCC

LABOROCC

Farming, forestry,
and fishing
occupations

FARMOCC

Armed forces and
unidentified

(not used)

a

Sub-group

Reproduced from Scotton (2000), pp.199.

203-235
243-285
303-389
403-407
413-427
433-469

503-699
Machine operators,
assemblers, an
inspectors
Transportation and
material moving
equipment
occupations
Handlers,
equipment cleaners,
helpers and laborers

703-799

803-859

864-889
473-499
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Appendix D Occupation Group Mappinga
Occ code
70120
70300
70400
71290
71590
71900
72300
72400
72600
73100
73200

22 Occupation Groups
Executive & Administrative Positions
Management Related Occupations
Engineers
Professional Occupations (except Engineers)

Technicians (includes air craft pilots)
Marketing and Sales Occupations
Secretaries & Typists
Financial Records Keepers
Administrative Support Occupations (except Finance & Secretaries)
Cleaning & Building Service and Maintenance
Service Workers (except Cleaning & Building Service and
Maintenance)
73350
Mechanics (all types)
73400
Blue-Collar Worker Supervisors
73490
Construction Tradesmen
73510
Extractive Occupations
73540
Precision Workers
73630
Machine Operators
73700
Fabricators & Hand workers
73820
Truck Drivers
73900
Motor Vehicle & Material Moving Equip Operators
74000
General Laborers
74390
Farming, Forestry & Fishing Occupations
a
Source: Scotton (2000) pp.200 with some corrections.

Census Occupation Classification codes
003-022
023-037
044-059
043, 063-066, 069, 73-79, 083-106, 113199
203-235
243-285
313-315
337-344
303-309, 316-336, 345-389
448-455
404-447, 456-469, 425-432
505-552
503, 553-558, 613, 628, 803, 843, 864
563-599
614-617
634-699, 796-799
703-779, 796-799
783-795
804
806, 808, 813-814, 823-859
865-889
473-499
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Appendix E Industry Group Mappinga
23 Industry Groups
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

23 Inds
Code
9010
9010

Mining, Extraction and Quarrying

9010
9010
9010
9020
9020
9020
9020

Construction

9030
9030

Food and Tobacco Products
Textile Mill and Apparel Products

9030
9420
9420
9423
9423

Lumber/Wood/Stone/Glass Products
Paper and Printing Products

9432
9432
9432
9427
9427

Industry (2-digit SIC code)
Agricultural Production Crops
Agricultural Production Livestock and Animal
Specialties
Agricultural Services
Forestry
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping
Metal Mining
Coal Mining
Oil and Gas Extraction
Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals,
Except Fuels
Building Construction General Contractors and
Operative Builders
Heavy Construction Other Than Building
Construction Contractors
Construction Special Trade Contractors
Food and Kindred Products
Tobacco Products
Textile Mill Products
Apparel and Other Finished Products from
Fabrics & Similar Materials
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture
Furniture and Fixtures
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Paper and Allied Products
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries

SIC

SIPP code

01
02
07
08
09
10
12
13

010-032

040-050

14
15
16
17
20
21
22
23
24
25
32
26
27

060

100-130
132-152
230-262
160-172
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Chemicals/Petro/Plastics/Leather
Goods
Metals, Machinery, and Misc.
Manufacturing Industries

9431
9431
9431
9431

Chemicals and Allied Products
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
Leather and Leather Products

28
29
30
31

9435

Primary Metal Industries

33

36

9435

Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery &
Transportation Equipment
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment,
Components, Except Computer Equipment
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling
Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical
Goods; Watches and Clocks
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries

9437

Transportation Equipment

39

351-370

9500
9500

40
44

400, 420

9541

Railroad Transportation
Water Transportation
Local/Suburban Transit & Interurban Highway
Passenger
Transportation Services

47

9545

Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing

42

9545

Transportation by Air

45

9549

Communications

48

9549
9549

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas

49
46

9435
9435
9435
9435
Motor Vehicle and Equipment
Manufacturing
Railroad and Water Transportation
Personal Transportation Services
(ground)
Trucking, Warehousing and Air
Transportation
Communications, utilities and
Sanitary Services

180-222

9541

34
35
270-350

38
39

41

401, 402,
432
410-411,
421
440-442,
450-472
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Wholesale Trade

9651
9651

Retail Trade

9652
9652
9652
9652

Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Personal Services
Business, Auto and Repair Services

9652
9652
9652
9760
9760
9760
9760
9760
9760
9872
9872
9876
9876
9876
9876

Entertainment Services
Health Services

9879
9879
9880

Wholesale Trade-durable Goods
Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply
and Mobile Home Dealers
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service
Stations
Apparel and Accessory Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Miscellaneous Retail (Liquor and Drug Stores)
Depository Institutions
Non-depository Credit Institutions
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service
Real Estate
Holding and Other Investment Offices
Personal Services
Private Households
Business Services
Automotive Repair, Services and Parking
Miscellaneous Repair Services
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management
and Related Services
Motion Pictures
Amusement and Recreation Services
Health Services

50
51

500-574

52
53
54
55
56
58
59
60
61
63
64
65
67
72
88
73
75
76

580-694

700-714

761, 771795
721-760,
882-893

87
78
79
80

800-810
812-840
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Social, Legal, Educational and Other
Services

9885

Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other
Lodging Places

70

9885

Legal Services

81

9885

Educational Services

82

9885

Social Services
Museums, Art Galleries, and Botanical and
9885
Zoological Gardens
9885
Membership Organizations
Public Administration & USPS
9990
United States Postal Service
All Other Public Administration
a
Source: Scotton (2000) p.194-198 with some modification.

762-770,
841-881

83
84
86
43
91-99

412, 900932
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Appendix F Definition of Occupational Drivers.
Occupation
title

COC code

SOC 1980
code

Standard Occupation Classification 1980
definition

Truck
driver

804

8212

Truck drivers, tractor-trailer
includes semi-tractor and trailer truckers

8213

Truck drivers, heavy,
single body trucks of at least three tons weight,
including dump, flat bed,
redi-mix, tank trucks, and trucks mounted with
special service equipment as
tow trucks, etc.

8214

Truck drivers, light (including delivery and route
drivers) operating automotive trucks less than 3
tons weight, including
pick-up, delivery, and van trucks.

Occupation code [for 1998 (for 1999-2003)]and
definition category for Occupational
Employment Statistics
97120 (53-3032): Truck drivers, heavy or
tractor-trailer. Drive a tractor-trailer combination
or a truck with a capacity of at least 3 tons, to
transport and deliver goods, livestock or
materials in liquid, loose or packaged form.
May be required to unload truck.

97105 (53-3033) Truck drivers, light include
delivery and route workers. Driver a truck, van,
or automobile with a capacity under 3 tons. May
driver light truck to deliver or pick up
merchandise. May load and unload truck
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Appendix F (continued).
Sales driver 806
8218

Bus driver

808

8215

Driver-sales workers, includes occupations
concerned with driving trucks or other vehicles
over established routes to
deliver and sell goods such as bakery and dairy
products; collect and
deliver items such as laundry and dry-cleaned
garments; or collect coins,
refill vending machines and service vending
machines
Bus drivers, includes occupations involving
transporting passengers by bus including school,
inter and intra city, and
private.

97117: Driver/ Sales Workers. Driver truck or
other vehicle over established routes to: deliver
and sell goods, such as food products; pick up
and deliver items, such as laundry; or refill and
collect coins from vending machines. Include
newspaper delivery drivers.

97108 (53-3021): Bus drivers. Drive bus,
transporting passengers over specified routes to
local or distant points according to a time
schedule. Assist passengers with baggage.
Collect tickets or cash fares.
97111: Bus drivers, school: transport students
between pick-up points and school. Maintain
order during trip and adhere to safety rules when
loading and unloading pupils.

97114 (53-3041): Taxi drivers and chauffeurs.
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs, includes
Driver automobiles, limousines, custom-built
occupations involving operating automobiles,
sedans, or hearses to transport passengers or
limousines, and hearses to
cargo. May drive automobiles for delivery.
transport passengers and merchandise and
Exclude ambulance drivers and bus drivers.
driving new automobiles between
production and customer delivery.
a
Source: BLS, Occupational Employment Statistics, Dictionary of Occupations Customer Copy 1997-1998 retrieved April 25, 2007
from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/oes/oesdic_98.pdf.
Taxi driver

809

8216
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Appendix G Complete set of results with allowing correlation within a geographic unit
(Standard error in parentheses)

violent fatal risk
non-violent fatal risk
violent injury risk
non-violent injury risk
average wage ($2004)
R2
N
fatal: violent=non-violent
non-fatal: violent=non-violent
VSL (violent fatal risk)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

MSA-level fatal risks
Model9:
Model10:
w/ MSA
w/ State
dummy
dummy
0.0110***
0.0115***

State-level fatal risks
Model11:
Model 12
w/ MSA
w/ State
dummy
dummy
0.0150***
0.0136***

0.0010***

0.0003***

-0.0001***

0.0084***

29.5636***
0.7203***
695.28
0.32
8,685
0.1378
0.0041
$3.9 million

31.0635**
0.2158***
695.28
0.30
8,685
0.0131
0.0215
$4.1 million

38.1399***
0.2217***
687.31
0.30
12,509
0.1999
0.0009
$5.3 million

29.8873***
0.8323***
687.31
0.29
12,509
0.4854
0.0275
$4.8 million
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